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ABSTRACT
SHADES OF GREEN
THE USE OF FORCE DEBATE IN THE GERMAN GREEN PARTY, 1990-2002
Scott H. Brunstetter
Old Dominion University, 2007
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

Utilizing an heuristic model that incorporates aspects from several theoretical
perspectives this dissertation examines the German Green Party debate on the use of
military force from 1990-2002. From the absolute rejection of any use of force to evict
Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War in 1991, the Greens evolved over the course of a
decade to support the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan in the wake of the
9/11 terrorist attacks. This dissertation argues that this evolution was the result of a
conscious will to govern by German political leaders in particular and external shocks—
Srebrenica, Kosovo, and 9/11. It also incorporates two factors that enabled this change—
the end of the international system at the end of the Cold War combined with the rising
German international responsibilities and a dynamic Party leadership to foster internal
debate.
The shocks of the dire humanitarian crises first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo
empowered the internalized Green norm of "never again Auschwitz" that sought to
protect human rights and in turn challenged the other internalized norm of "never again
war." As more leaders saw the preeminence of the former idea, it in turn functioned as a
facilitating norm that withered the Green idea of pacifism. Building on the evolutions
among key Party leaders during the Bosnian crisis, the later pressure inherent in the will
to govern, both before and during their tenure in government forced a strategic choice to

either govern and support the deployment of German forces to Kosovo or remain true to
traditional pacifist values. The choice by both political leaders and the Party's grass roots
to govern rather than remained wedded to traditional values illustrated the desire to at
first gain and then later maintain the influence on German policy. By 2002, even after
the rejection of the Iraq war, the Green version of pacifism had been drastically altered
into a new security identity with clearly established limits.

IV

"We make our world significant by the courage of our questions and the depth of our
answers."
Carl Sagan, Cosmos
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

After Germany's unification and its decision to support Operation Desert Storm
financially instead of with troops, few commentators would have fathomed that eleven
years later, over 10,000l German troops would have been deployed in international
operations and Germany would have contributed to active combat operations in Kosovo
and in the war against terrorism. Nor would they have imagined that then Chancellor
Gerhard Schroder in a campaign speech at an SPD Party Day in 2002 would claim that
Germany was a self-confident land on its new "German way." With the era of "check
book diplomacy" at an end, he noted Germany's willingness to support military actions,
yet avoid "adventures" that were not in the country's interest.2 Over the course of a
decade, Germany moved from a divided state haunted by its past to one that had become
a responsible partner in European, and indeed, global affairs.
Germany has evolved considerably in security politics and in its position toward
This paper follows the format requirements of A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and
Dissertations 6th edition by Kate L. Turabian.
1

That number has since been reduced to 6882 as of November 2007, with the majority in the Kosovo and
Afghanistan missions. See the Bundeswehr website at http//www.bundeswehr.de, accessed 10 November
2007.
2
Gerhard Schroder, "Rede von Bundeskanzler Schroder zum Wahlkampfauftakt," 5 August 2002,
<http ://www. spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1019519/Schroder%20Rede%20 WahlkampfauftaktHannover.pdf>
accessed 10 August 2002. Many commentators focused not on the strong, confident language emanating
from Schroder's party, but rather on the use of a possible war in Iraq as a campaign issue by the SPD to
separate itself from the CDU/CSU, who at the time argued that Germany should support the US in a move
against Iraq if it fell under a UN mandate. The SPD was trailing considerably in the poles at the time and
Schroder's stance on the Iraq crisis was seen by many as critical in his eventual victory in the September
2002 elections. Schroder's approach to Iraq would receive considerable criticism from the internal
opposition as well as foreign governments during the remaining months of 2002 and would lead many to
question the goals and reliability of German foreign policy. See Georg Paul Hefty, "Der Kanzler setzt sich
ab," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 September 2002, 14; "Schroder will keinen neuen Konfliktherd
definieren," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 August 2002, 4.
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the deployment of its military since the Gulf War, moving from a rather strong antimilitary impulse, during which even the rhetoric of using military force was largely
taboo, to a greater focus on its international responsibility in the military and security
realm. From the baby steps that began with the deployment of mine sweepers after the
Gulf War in 1991 and humanitarian deployments in Cambodia in 1992 and Somalia in
1993, more active participation with Bosnian peacekeepers in 1995 and a combat
deployment for Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001 have followed. By the middle
of the first decade of the twenty-first century, German support of peacekeeping
operations has become accepted among almost all political parties, as the deployment and
continued support of the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate. Moreover, the
recent and continued support for the deployments of combat forces in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom and the continued stationing of peacekeepers to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan continue to suggest
German evolution.
This dissertation will focus exclusively on the Green Party's internal debate about
the legitimacy of the use of military force between 1990 and 2002 and ask the
fundamental question: Why did the German Greens change their perspective on the use
of force over the course of a single decade? The results of this study demonstrates that a
mixture of both external and internal factors played important roles in this evolution. The
hypothesis for this dissertation is as follows: Facilitated by external shocks, the
conscious will to govern led the Green Party to relax its absolute resistance to the use of
force.
Why examine the German Greens? Within Germany, all the major political

3

parties have had their debates on the use of the military, leading to a clear policy in the
CDU and the FDP. The SPD, like the Greens, had elements of pacifism, but they had a
foundation that rested instead on social issues, leaving their debate on the use of force far
from existential. For the Greens though, the debate on the use of force challenged one of
their fundamental beliefs—pacifism—that remained steadfast even past the fall of the
Berlin Wall, meaning that challenging such a belief for the Greens meant an existential
crisis. Unlike the other political parties in Germany, and indeed most other political
parties in the West, the Greens offer the opportunity to study change as a new dynamic
challenged the very core of a political party.
Moreover, the Green Party3 has been perhaps the most fascinating and clear
reflection of transformation on the use of force debate within Germany's domestic
sphere. Of all the major political parties in Germany, they were the last to actively
engage in the debate on the use of force. In addition, of all of the political parties'
debates, theirs was by far the most acrimonious, in the end threatening the very existence
of the party and even the early collapse of the Red-Green coalition. Examining the
Greens will provide considerable insight into the drive toward "finality" of Germany's
debate about its international responsibility with respect to the use of force. From its rock
throwing and protest days of the early 1980s, the Green Party in Germany had made
headlines with its strong anti-military stance, only to have their values challenged to the
core after 1995 amid the violence in Bosnia. Over the course of six years, the Party tore
itself asunder every time the potential use offeree became an issue, yet it also continued
3

Though often referred to simply as the "Greens," the party that sits in the Bundestag is in fact an
amalgamation of the West German Green Party and the East German Bundnis 90 (Alliance 90) Party. In
this dissertation, the term "Greens" will encompass the entire alliance. See the chapter III on the Greens
for more detailed information.
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to adapt and develop its ideas anew.
Perhaps more important is what an examination of the Greens can do to inform
the larger study of European politics. Though pacifism had been an important principle
in European politics during the Cold War, the German Greens had often been seen as one
of the primary purveyors of that concept in the political realm. The evolution away from
their strict adherence to pacifism amid the violence in the Balkans and their desire to
govern offer important perspectives on how a party steeped in pacifism reacts as they
grasp for power. As this dissertation will show, the German Greens in fact were unable
to hold on to their strict pacifism in the face of Germany's international responsibilities
and the new violence of the 1990s and 2000s. This perspective offers important insights
into the limitation of pacifism as a viable political approach in modern times.
For the Greens, foreign and security policy had always been a "difficult
relationship,"4 though it is one that has been transformed considerably over the past
decade. Different scholars have usually focused on specific events to elucidate clear
impacts on the intraparty debate. Nina Philippi argues that Srebrenica was the "decisive
turning point" for the party. Stephanie Bauer sees Kosovo as the culmination of the
evolution of the Green Party's debate on the use of force.5 In fact, however, the change
over time has been one of fits and starts, with a series of events from varying axes
occurring over the course of a decade. That change has had numerous influences and
continues even today, adapting to the situations the Party encounters. As Christoph Egle
argues, this evolutionary process over this decade can best be characterized as "learning
4

Ludger Volmer, Die Grunen und die Aufienpolitik-Ein schwieriges Verhaltnis (Minister: Verlag
Westfalisches Dampfboot, 1998).
5
Nina Philippi, Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsatze ah aufien- undsicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten
Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 1997); Stephanie Bauer, "Die Haltung von Btindnis
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under stress."6
The dynamic change of the Greens' position at the leadership and grass roots
from 1990 to 2002 can also easily be illustrated through minimal comparisons. There can
be no clearer exemplification of this change than the comparison of their stance on the
Gulf War after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks—
from an absolute rejection of any military usage to supporting the deployment of 3900
German forces to Afghanistan. Similarly, during the initial reaction to the Srebrenica
massacre, Fischer had argued for a military intervention in the name of the UN, though at
the same time decried an intervention of the type from the Gulf War; for this argument,
he was strongly criticized by his peers.7 Yet, six years later he argued before the Party
Day for a military action, Operation Enduring Freedom, that was more similar to the Gulf
War than operations in Bosnia or Kosovo and received significant support from the Party.
With the codification of the acceptance of the use of military force in the 2002 Base
Program and the gain by a few percentage points votes in the September 2002 election
suggests that among the base there was also an acceptance, if a bit hesitantly, to see
military force as a final, last resort in a newly-defined preventive foreign and security
policy.
Over the course of four years as part of the ruling Government in Berlin from
1998 to 2002,8 the Greens stood behind five different major deployments of the German
90/Die Grilnen zu militarischen Interventionen," Master's thesis, Johannes Gutenburg-Universitat, 2000.
6

Christoph Egle, "Lernen unter Stress: Politik und Programmatik von Bundnis 90/Die Grtinen," in Das
Rot-Griine Projekt: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schroder, 1998-2002, eds. Christoph Egle, Tobias Ostheim
and Reimut Zohlnhofer (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), 93-116.
7
Joschka Fischer, "Auf der Fluent vor der Wirklichkeit: Eine Dffentliche Antwort auf den Offenen Brief
von Kerstin Mtiller, Claudia Roth, Jiirgin Tritten, Ludger Volmer an unsere Partei," 27 November 1995,
Bestand B.I. 10, Akte Nr. 312, "Bosnia und Kosovo," Archive Grttnes Gedachtnis, Berlin, Germany (AGG).
8
The Green Party along with the SPD was voted out of office in September 2005, to be replaced by a
CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition. Though the Greens adamantly rejected any use of force against Iraq in
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military, the Bundeswehr. With their support of active combat roles in Kosovo and in the
Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, along with peacekeeping roles in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, and now in ISAF in Afghanistan, the German Greens appear to have lost
significant portions of their pacifist, oppositional basis and have moved more toward the
mainstream of German politics.9 Indeed, in a 2002 article looking back on four years of
Red-Green foreign policy, one commentator cited the "loss of meaning of the pacifists"
as one of the principle results of those past four years. However, the Greens decisively
rejected the Bush Administration's efforts to link the war in Iraq (Operation Iraqi
Freedom) to the GWOT, because the Party saw the US' preemptive doctrine being used
to justify the war in Iraq as illegitimate. Treated separately in this dissertation, a brief
discussion of the months prior to the invasion of Iraq will illustrate the limits of the Green
Party's adaptation on the use force.
This dissertation incorporates two distinct independent variables—international
shocks and, primarily, the Greens' will to govern—along with two enabling factors—the
end of the Cold War with a developing concept of German international responsibility
and the role of the Party's leadership and Joschka Fischer as a dynamic leader. A
thorough explanation requires an understanding of what opened the door to change (the
end of the Cold War and evolving German responsibility), the actual mechanisms of
change (shocks and a will to govern), and the inclusion of an enabling leadership element
(Fischer and the Party leadership).
The nexus of two independent variables and two enabling factors that lead to
the three years between 2002 and 2005, as they perceived the US action there to be based on great power
interests, they continued to support the annual vote for the continuation for the mandate for the deployment
of German forces in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force and some forces as
part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

change combine to form an heuristic approach that incorporates both the politics of ideas
and Hobbesian self-interests. The impact of the first variable, external shocks, led to a
conscious reexamination of the Party leaders' individual viewpoints on the necessity of
using military force as part of the reaction to the particular event. Over the course of the
late 1990s, many in the party would choose to support "never again Auschwitz" over
"never again war." Joschka Fischer in particular was personally moved by the events in
Srebrenica enough to reconsider his historical prohibitions on the use of force. Others
reacted to the increasing violence three years later during the Kosovo conflict and
dropped their opposition to the deployment of German forces. Given the very personal
nature of pacifism within the Party, this conscious introspection after a shock was a vital
element of change. The choice of predominance of "never again Auschwitz" or "never
again war" could only be made by the individual; it could not be sanctioned by a general
Party perspective and pushed on the larger group. Throughout this dissertation, the
debate among individuals and between the base and leadership of the Party would remain
a constant feature. Indeed, this debate would be a fundamental part of the Green Party's
challenging decision making process, from leadership opinions to Party Days that
brought together large portions of the Party.
The second variable, the conscious will to govern, was the most important reason
for change; however, it must be seen in the context of Germany's internal political
dynamics. To become a member of the governing coalition with the SPD, who had
mandated continuity with the evolved German international responsibility, the Greens
were forced to accept the use of force as a part of Germany's security policy. The shocks
9

See Eckart Lohse, "Kampfeinsatze und die Ost-Erweiterung, Ein Ruckblick: Rot-grime AuBenpolitik und
der Bedeutungsverlust der Pazifisten," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 August 2002, 3.
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had only led a portion of the Party to adjust their perspectives on the use of force; for
others, the desire to be a part of the governing coalition led to an individual choice
between government and "never again war." At the individual Party leader level now
and even later for the Party as a whole, this conscious will to govern, and in turn have an
influence on German policy, led in many respects to a reordering of normative priorities
that in turn helped to change the very security identity of the Party. That shift in identity
in turn lead to the incorporation of new Green elements into Germany's foreign and
security policy, such as preventative politics and limiting the use of German forces in
Afghanistan. In the late 1990s, remaining true to pacifism and being in the government
were mutually exclusive given the internal German dynamic.
Though the conscious will to govern is the mechanism without which the Greens'
change simply would not have occurred, the value of the external shocks cannot simply
be seen as significantly less important. In fact, there is an intersection of these two
independent variables that intertwines them. The shocks of Srebrenica, Kosovo, and 9/11
clearly had an impact on many within the Party, but they were not enough alone to have
changed the Party completely, as the status of the Party on the verge of the Kosovo crisis
clearly demonstrated. By the same token, a will to govern alone would not have been
enough to overcome the ingrained pacifist tendencies of the Party without the shock of
Srebrenica in particular. Moreover, their temporal relationship is also critical. The
appearance of external shocks first set the stage for change; a will to govern in the
environment of 1990s Germany would not have been enough for change alone.
Both of these variables—the shocks and the will to govern—worked together to
shatter the perspective of "never again war" within the Greens. While during the Cold
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War the ingrained ideals of "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz" had been
harmonious, after the fall of the Berlin Wall the absolutist nature of "never again war"
was withered first by the continued adherence to the dictum "never again Auschwitz"
amid the Srebrenica massacre and then later by the conscious will to govern. As the
empirical realities of the post Cold War era and the domestic goals of the party collided
with its opposition based, anti-establishment history, the Party rushed headlong into a
debate that would shatter its earlier security identity.
Those two variables worked in concert with the two enabling values that, while
difficult to precisely measure, provided the background for change—the end of the Cold
War coupled with an expanding German responsibility and a dynamic party leadership
that shepherded the evolution of the debate and provided a champion for change in the
person of Joschka Fischer. Without the first variable, it is quite doubtful that this Green
debate would have even occurred, as the Party would likely have remained wedded to its
traditional pacifism that rejected any use of the military amid the nuclear armed world.
The unification of Germany, moreover, was not enough to change the Green Party, as
Germany's place in a new international realm had little resonance on the Party's early
post Cold War values. As the early years of the Bosnian crisis would demonstrate, the
Greens remained aloof to the early phases of a developing rhetoric on German
international responsibility.
Similarly, without a champion for change, the debate within the Party would
have likely been one of only words, rather than actions given the strong interpersonal
relationships within the Greens. Fischer's decisive leadership role and his ability to guide
debates, both after the Srebrenica massacre and on the eve of joining the governing
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coalition in 1999, provided a spark that helped to move the debate forward at critical
junctures. The debate at the federal level similarly helped to push the grass roots, which
became particularly evident at critical Party Days after the Bundestag votes to deploy
German forces amid the Kosovo and Afghanistan crises. Both of these enabling variables
set the stage, in the case of the former, and worked in the background, in the case of the
latter, of the Green debate. Though they were not elements of change within the Party,
they are fundamental enablers of the overall change.
Over the course of the 1990s, the Greens essentially moved from a "peace
movement" party to one of "peace politics" {Friedenspolitik). As the Green Member of
the Bundestag Winfried Nachtwei, who was neither a strict pacifist nor one who
unconditionally supported the use of force, noted in 2002, "unconditional" adherence to
pacifism was no longer a "practical" alternative for the Greens.10 After the tumultuous
decade of the 1990s, pacifism has clearly lost power in the Green Party, though its
followers and lingering persuasive influence remain. Though the Greens continue to be
very supportive of the use of the military for strictly peacekeeping operations and are
now more amenable to its use to prevent genocide and in support of self-defense, they
remain very suspicious of the goals of states, in particular those of the US, and critical of
specific methods of warfare, such as the use of cluster bombs. They are loathe to use
military force in more traditional realist based power moves, as the case in Iraq clearly
demonstrates.
Given this considerable evolution and the inclusion of a conscious desire to
10

Bundnis 90/Die Grilnen, Bundestagsfraktion, "Von der Friedensbewegung zur Friedenspolitik: Element
einer neuen Weltinnenpolitik," December 2002, <http://www.gruenefraktion.de/themen/sicherheit/011205friedenpolitik.pdf> accessed 2 January 2003, 2; Nachtwei, "In a
Changing World," 3.
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govern as one of the intervening variables, it will also be very useful to examine Green
policies since the end of the Red-Green collation in 2005 to determine the resonance of
this change. If the Greens still continue to accept some of the ideals and policies
developed during this debate that would suggesting an element of internalization if not
permanency of the change. Contrarily, if these values were more fleeting, a return to the
opposition would suggest a return to a more traditional pacifist approach and in turn
suggest that the requirements of government were the reasons for only a temporary
change. A short review of Green policies since the return to the opposition can offer
strong evidence that changes in the Green Party were real and not just short-term political
considerations.
As will be discussed over the course of the ensuing chapters, specific events and
the pressure of being in government, led in particular by a dynamic leadership, pushed
the debate a bit further each time; a direct leap from opposing the use of any military
force during the Gulf War to supporting the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom would simply not have been possible.
Pacifism as a defining paradigm for the Greens was no longer credible amid the new
security challenges in the post Cold War world, in particular the humanitarian crises in
the Balkans. Indeed, without the shocks of Srebrenica and Kosovo (to include Racak)
and the 9/11 attacks in particular along with the combination of the Green involvement in
the government in the case of Kosovo and Afghanistan, there is little reason to believe
that the Party as a whole would have grown to accept the deployment of German combat
forces.
To study the interaction of these variables, this dissertation will focus on four
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major case studies—the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. It will also briefly
examine the Greens approach to the deployment of the Bundeswehr to Macedonia in
2001 and the diplomatic crisis during 2002 surrounding the run-up to the Iraq War.
Examining all of these particular case studies not only will demonstrate evolution over
time, but also both the direct causal roles and collaborative impact of the independent
variables. The return of the Greens to the opposition in 2005, moreover, provides an
excellent opportunity to examine as part of the conclusion whether the changes that
occurred between 1990 and 2002 have an element of permanency or were rather only
fleeting, based on short-term political desires.
In essence then, this dissertation suggests that the Greens have jettisoned their
pure "Greenness" and instead taken on new shades of green, the oft mentioned Army
"olive green," into their identity. From a party steeped in the dictums of pacifism, the
issue of using military force remains a significantly complex decision for the Greens.
The rejection of the war in Iraq by the Greens demonstrated the threshold for Green
support of military operations; future operations now have requirements they must meet
before the Greens will support or accept them. And even then, it will never be a
unanimous decision. The four primary factors of change examined here—the change in
the international system, external shocks, the will to govern, and the strong leadership
element in the Greens—all had significant impacts on the change over the course of a
decade. This evolution traced out in one political party can also offer considerable value
for scholars examining areas other than the German Green party. Importantly, it explains
how a political party steeped in pacifism reacts when it achieves a new level of political
responsibility. Moreover, the variables laid out here can be tested with other pacifist
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political parties, especially in Western Europe, to test their general viability.
This dissertation seeks to add to the burgeoning literature on the use of force
debate in Germany. Unlike the majority of the works in this area, which focused on the
general evolution of the government policy and Germany's position on the European and
global stage, this work looks at the transformation of one political party—the Greens.
The literature on Germany's general debate on the use of force is quite well developed,
though studies of the German Left (SPD, Greens, and PDS) have remained absent for the
most part. Given the critical role the Greens played in the decisive post Cold War era,
understanding their evolution is critical.
Unlike most works, this dissertation provides a detailed study of the concept and
mechanisms of change in a political party. By studying the specific impact of foreign
security crises, especially the impact of clear shocks, the role of the ingrained desire to
protect human rights as a facilitator of change, and the role of a conscious aim to
participate in the governing coalition on change, this dissertation offers a depth of
understanding not achieved elsewhere.
Most studies that include an interrelationship between the international realm and
domestic actors includes some element of congruity between them that helps to facilitate
change. However, when those belief structures are so diametrically opposed to each
other, as in the case here, how will the domestic actor react? One important contribution
here is the use of shocks to lead to guiding principles of a political party. This study
examines how some ingrained ideals can actually function as facilitating norms to change
a group's defining identity by changing the relative importance of one over the other. In
the case of the Greens, the ideal of "never again Auschwitz" actually helped to wither the
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adherence to "never again war."
This study also highlights the pull of the international sphere on a political party.
Most studies look at the impact of the international environment's ability to change a
state actor, but the conscious desire of a domestic entity to change in order to become a
part of the government remains largely understudied. With continuity of German foreign
policy such a defining aspect of its foreign policy, being part of a governing coalition in
Germany necessitates an acceptance of and willingness to act on the state's international
responsibilities. The impact of the German idea of Regierungsfahigkeit injected a
strategic element to the Party's change—leaders were now forced to choose between
principles and governance. Thus, the potential to have any influence for a political party
becomes inexorably linked to its ability to adapt to the requirements of the international
sphere.

15
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY

The process of change within the Green Party in the debate on the use of force
during the 1990s and early 2000s was a constant struggle, influenced by a multitude of
factors. To explain the shift in Green perspectives on using military force requires a
multi-variant approach that incorporates the complexity of actual events. Domestic
factors and international influences combine to create a nexus of catalysts that continually
spurned the Party to react and develop new policies and perspectives. Without an
integration of the two independent variables—external shocks and a will to govern—and
the two enabling factors—the systemic change with the end of the Cold War and the
dynamic leadership in the Party—change with the Greens would have been impossible.
This chapter defines the heuristic approach and is divided into three section. Part one
outlines the independent variables. The second section outlines the enabling factors. The
final portion briefly discusses the mechanism of change drawing on psychological
literature.

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Of the two independent variables responsible for the change in the Greens, the
conscious will to govern clearly had the most decisive impact. Without it, the Greens
would not have made the significant shifts as a whole to accept the use of force. But to
say simply that this factor alone changed the Greens belies the complexity of the
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situation. The other independent variable—the external shocks—likewise had a very
direct impact on the Green debate. Coming temporally before the will to govern really
began to exert its influence, these shocks both set the stage and in fact drove the debate to
the position where the influence of the will to govern could even have an impact.
Without the early reaction to the shocks and the resulting detailed debates, the will to
govern alone could not have pushed the Greens to accept the use of force.

External Shocks
At the most basic level, external shocks were direct facilitators of change as they
illustrated a clear break with the past and offer the greatest impetus for a quick
reevaluation of philosophy. A quick empirical examination of the Green Party's
evolution demonstrates their role. These events, such as the massacres at Srebrenica in
1995 and Racak in 1999 or the 9/11 terrorist attacks, provided a necessary reactive
quality that galvanized both political leaders and generated personal reflection from both
leaders and regular grass root members alike. The result was the furious debate that
raged within the Greens in the mid 1990s. These shocks helped to press for clarity and
even a redefinition of commonly held ideals within the Greens.
Borrowing from sociological literature on cultural trauma, shocks must be sudden,
radical, and have an external source. Perhaps most important they must be perceived
within a particular mental frame, meaning that the event will then be viewed as shocking,
unexpected, or repulsive.1 Shocks can come in many varieties—as wars, single attacks,
genocide, mass murder, or economic failures—and, much like systemic changes, often
1
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Theory 3, no. 4 (2000): 452.
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create a new, fluid environment in which changes in guiding philosophies are possible.
Over the past decade, the massacres in Srebrenica in Bosnia and Racak in Kosovo, the
genocide in Rwanda, the terrorist attacks against the US in September 2001, or the
revelations of torture at the Abu Ghrayb prison in Iraq have all moved political elites.
These shocks, however, differ from systemic changes, to be discussed in more detail
below, in that they are decisively more sudden and often grisly. Moreover, they are often
compact in time and have more limited, shorter duration effects.2 In response to security
shocks, such as the 9/11 attacks, responses are often much quicker given the need to
counter the often immediate changes.
Amid these shocks, policies and politics remain fluid, which creates an
environment that is more conducive for persuasion of, and by, political elites. As Jeffrey
Checkel has argued, a persuadee in a new environment, such as after a shock, is forced to
cognitively analyze the new situation as the previous beliefs and guiding ideas are called
into question. With external shocks more political elites can embrace a new ideal, either
through persuasion from others or through their own conscious reevaluation. In many
respects this is the backbone of the transformation process. Indeed, interviews and
discussions conducted for this dissertation with German foreign policy elites lends
considerable credence to this argument.
Throughout the Green Party debate on the use of force, there were three primary
shocks that impacted the debate—Srebrenica, Kosovo (Racak), and 9/11. Initially, the
2
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massive humanitarian catastrophes in Bosnia, Rwanda, and even Somalia, shattered the
perception that all the world's problems had been solved with the end of the Cold War
and ushered in the era of humanitarian crises as a security issue. The July 1995 massacre
in Srebrenica would be the first spark in a fierce debate within the Green Party and would
firmly define the main perspectives on the use of force debate within the Party. The
humanitarian catastrophe in the Serbian province of Kosovo in late 1998 and the January
1999 civilian massacre in Racak similarly affected the German population and members
of the Green Party.4 Finally, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC on
11 September 2001 clearly shocked many in Germany. The video of the attack on and
the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers made the reality of the events very
personal to many in Germany.
All of these shocks galvanized even some of the most ardent pacifists to rethink
their views toward the use of force.5 They also created clear impetuses for a need to
either act or respond, especially when the Greens were part of the governing coalition.
The necessity of action in turn brought in the possibility of the use of force in general and
in the case of the latter two shocks, the possibility of the deploying German combat
forces. Though these events caused most to rethink their views on the use of force, it
does not mean that their views were changed completely.
At the most basic level, these external shocks also created conflicts between two
already ingrained perspectives for the Greens—"never again war" and "never again
Auschwitz." Whereas they two ideas had long defined the Green foreign and security
4
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policy and mutually co-existed, they would be diametrically opposed in the 1990s. This
dissonance would be a crucial aspect to the change in the Greens.
Scholars have widely recognized that Germany's historical experiences have
created a normative political culture that helps define its actions in the international
arena, in both a positive and negative way, which can in turn have constructive or
destructive effects. Germany's disastrous defeat in the Second World War "dealt a lethal
blow" to those in German society who favored military practices and created a sense of
malleability to redefine German attitudes. The historical narrative of a disdain for war
o

and its genocidal results became thoroughly ingrained in the German identity. At the
same time, faced with division and a common enemy represented in the Soviet Union,
Germany turned toward western integration.9 The unparalleled successes of security and
economic institutions in western Europe, primarily NATO and the European Community,
brought Europe to a stable plateau never before seen in European history that essentially
6
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changed history's ways.10 Over the course of forty years of the Cold War and western
integration, the common historical memory of "never again war," "never again
Auschwitz," and western integration led to certain approaches on self-defense issues.
These same scholars suggest that historical culture exerts a continual and largely
unchangeable impact on modern policy—the view of history in the present cannot
change. As Markovits and Reich believe, the "collective memory" of a state, the "lens
through which the past is viewed," provides a means of interpreting the present and
determining policy. These memories are the "foundation stones for contemporary
ideologies." The constant effect of history on German contemporary politics is usually
viewed as a "restraint." Germany's past continues to "cast a large, inescapable shadow"
over current actions.l' Others, such as Arthur Hoffman and Kerry Longhurst do go a bit
further, suggesting that political culture both constrains and facilitates German security
policy.12
However, as this dissertation will outline and also highlighted by Anja DalgaardNielsen in Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, political culture and history are
indeed quite dynamic. As Dalgaard-Nielsen importantly notes, concepts of change can
come from within a concept of security culture and not just from outside.13 Change
occurs from a reinterpretation of history and its interpretation as new events challenge
current perceptions.
10
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Applied to the events of the 1990s, the role of internalized normative perspectives
offer important insights to understand the mechanism of change within the Greens.
While the ideals of "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz" had previously
worked harmoniously together, the genocide in Bosnia in particular caused many to
rethink the prevalence of one over the other. With the shocks of the humanitarian
catastrophes in both Bosnia and Kosovo, the ingrained perspective of supporting and
protecting human rights, "never again Auschwitz," became a magnet that helped to pull
many away from their steadfast rejection of the use of force. Indeed amid the wars in the
former Yugoslavia, the German government often used the developing international norm
of humanitarian intervention to help justify increased involvement by contextualizing
military force as a reaction to prevent humanitarian disasters.
In essence, the belief that human rights should be protected in order to prevent an
occurrence of the Nazi genocide became a "facilitating norm"15 in the overall
transformation of the previously ingrained norm of pacifism within the Green Party. At
the most basic level, the prevalence of "never again Auschwitz" withered the absolute
value of the "never again war," leading to an evolution away from the absolute and
toward a bifurcated perspective on the uses and roles of military forces. The very concept
of "never again war" thus became largely diluted within the Party over the course of this
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evolution. Both during the Bosnian and Kosovo debates, this concept would be critical.
An important part of the facilitating concept is the roles of clash and divergence
between competing perspectives. When ideas complement each other and no external
stimulus arises to challenge an ideal, there is little impetus to change. For example, in
their formative years, the Greens had seen pacifism and the prevention of genocide as
two sides of the same coin. Contrarily, when defining philosophies begin challenging
one another in the context of an external stimulus, that harmony becomes impossible to
hold. Change in one form or another becomes inevitable. Through political negotiation
in both the private and public sphere, political leaders could emphasize the facilitating
ideal in an attempt to move away from an ingrained philosophy. Thus, Green leaders
who supported the necessity for the use of force could appeal to other more hesitant Party
members by invoking an element familiar to all Greens.

The Will to Govern
The second, and most important, independent variable that led to change within
the Green Party was its conscious will to govern that emerged in the mid to late 1990s.
Like the impacts of international shocks, the desire to become a part of the governing
coalition directly facilitated evolution through an internal desire to change measured by a
reordering of individual Party leader priorities. Encapsulated in the German term
Regierungsfdhigkeit, this desire to govern forced the Party to choose between the chance
to be in and, more importantly, remain in the governing coalition and the values of pure
pacifism. Indeed, this will to govern clearly played a large role during the Kosovo crisis
and was decisive during the November 2001 linkage of a vote of confidence with the
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deployment of the Bundeswehr, as that very dichotomy was put to a vote in the
Bundestag.
The idea of Regierungsfahigkeit, loosely translated as capability to govern, in a
general sense refers to the capacity of a political party to act responsibly within the
proscribed requirements of the German government. Given the SPD's desire to maintain
continuity with the Kohl government's international responsibilities, a regierungsfahig
Green Party required the acceptance of the already established German place in the
international realm. As the unified Germany developed further through the late 1990s
and early 2000s, accepting that international responsibility, including the role of the
German military in the numerous security challenges, would be a primary measurer of a
party's Regierungsfahigkeit.
Germany's perception of responsibility (Verantwortung) as a prominent guidepost
for German security policy, emerged principally out of the developed German interest of
remaining embedded in Western institutions. The fear among German leaders of the
consequences of a Sonderweg, or special path of unilateralism, led to the absolute
rejection of any unilateral action as a means of policy. By the 1980s, there was a broad
political consensus in Germany on the adherence to multilateralism and continued
cooperation with Western institutions.17 This in turn developed into one of the defining
aspects of German foreign policy—the need to be seen as a reliable and calculable
partner—by accepting international responsibilities.18 Rejecting such responsibility
16
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would wither the alliances, which would run counter to German interests.

Indeed, in

the early post-unification years Chancellor Kohl often spoke openly of Germany's desire
to be seen as a reliable partner.

Such concepts are now so ingrained in the German

political memory that changes in government no longer bring major foreign policy shifts
with them.
Germany's desire to be seen as reliable emerges out of an examination of the
influences of both institutions and the impact of norms within an international society.
By creating linkages of cooperation and assuring that states cannot cheat through a
99

system of reciprocity, institutions can help to create paths of cooperation.

International

norms, also referred to as commonly held beliefs or constructed rules, will often provide
an understanding of what is important and what the appropriate and legitimate means are
to obtain these goals. Moreover, as states interact within an institutionalized system, they
create a collective identity that strengthens the influence of an international logic of
appropriate action upon the domestic sphere.

These internalized international rules
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create "patterns of behavior," and guidelines for "proper conduct" that when viewed
within the qualities of a specific system, develop into levels of appropriate action. The
system thus begins to define the limits of legitimate action and in turn helps to provide a
sense of direction for a state.

Learned through a process of interaction, these logics can

impose pressure on a member state to help persuade it to accept a more common ideal
throughout that system. This logic of appropriate action in turn translates into the
concept of responsibility at the domestic level.
Over the course of the German debate on the use of force, the "rhetoric of
responsibility," especially from the CDU but later also from the SPD and the Greens, was
used to pave the way for significant evolutions in the debate on the use of force.

As

early as the end of 1990, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was already noting the rising German
responsibility for international security. In a 1991 speech in the German Bundestag,
Kohl noted that it was "correct" that others awaited a stronger German engagement. As
the situation worsened in Bosnia, he argued that Germany could no longer stand idly by
as others acted. By 1994, he was arguing that Germany "wants and must accept
responsibility alongside our partners and friends" and must reform the Bundeswehr to
permit action outside the confines of self-defense.

Indeed, the move to a greater
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German responsibility was one of the main arguments used by the government in
presenting its case before the German Constitutional Court in 1994.
As Chancellor Schroder assumed power in 1998, the well developed air of
German responsibility in international affairs remained, embodied in his notion of
continuity and represented by his support for NATO operations in Kosovo. He argued
that Germany had "come of age" and was ready to assume responsibilities without
hesitation. Moreover, he echoed Kohl when he spoke of Germany's desire to "remain a
reliable partner."30 One month after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Schroder clarified the new
German responsibility, arguing Germany must be prepared to undertake responsibilities
outside of Europe.

Even amid the Iraqi crisis, Schroder still spoke of a "responsibility

for peace," noting Germany's continued deployment of troop in support of the war
against international terrorism, while at the same time aiming for a peaceful solution in
the Gulf.32
The idea of Regierungsfahigkeit had its most direct impact through this
mechanism to push for conformity. Political parties that wished to be part of a ruling
coalition would be guided by the logic of appropriate action at the international level,
especially in the case of security policy. Those that do not support that international
position would be incapable of being a part of the governing coalition. Thus, any party
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whose ideals were contrary to those goals would need to change if it wanted to be a part
of the governing coalition in Germany. The Green Party's potential to govern would
those be decisively linked to its ability to conform to Germany's responsibilities
For many in the Green Party in the mid to late 1990s, Regierungsfdhigkeit became
an important watchword. In order to gain the legitimacy of a major political party and
increase their support base, the Greens, like any other political party, had to accomplish
the goals and programs laid out in the party platforms or risk political extinction.

As

such, becoming a part of the governing coalition became an important prerequisite for the
party's further development. Indeed, many Green politicians, especially Joschka Fischer,
made it a goal to prepare the party for being part of the ruling coalition.34 Since the
Greens could never hope to gain the votes to become the plurality or majority partner,
they were forced to focus on becoming a coalition partner. Given the political makeup of
Germany, the SPD was the only viable option, meaning that it would play a significant
role in the Green Party's transformation during the 1990s.
In practical terms, in order to become a part of the ruling coalition in a
parliamentary system and remove itself from the rules that guide an opposition setting, a
political party must release itself from a strictly domestic setting. In so doing, its
domestic politics will become intermixed with the international level, making its nexus of
goals and actual policy profoundly more complex. The domestic agenda, and the
potential to make progress as a party, becomes linked with the party's ability to function
and uphold the role of the state at the international level. To become a part of the
government, the Greens had to govern "correctly" and "normally," yet at the same time
33
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be unique in order to maintain the basis for their identity.35 Doing so made the party
regierungsfahig while at the same time ensuring the continued support of its constituent
base.
At the most basic level, for the Greens to become regierungsfahig required a clear
strategic decision between governance and pacifism. The evolving German
responsibilities in the international realm, including the deployment of its military, and a
pledge by the SPD to continue this German policy, meant the desire to govern as a
minority party with the SPD would require a shift, if not outright rejection of the
traditional pacifist argument by the majority of the Party. As this dissertation will show,
that choice was not easy, as acrimony and debate would be the watchwords of pacifism
and responsibility collided. Indeed, as The Economist noted in 1999, accepting NATO's
bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo crisis was the "most wrenching recent
compromise" the Party pacifists had to accept.

Such a strategic choice would again

appear in 2001, when the pacifists were forced to choose between preserving the RedGreen coalition and rejecting their pacifist values by accepting the deployment of
German forces to Afghanistan.

THE ENABLING VARIABLES

Though the already identified independent variables were the primary purveyors
of change, two additional factors—the end of the Cold War coupled with an increasing
German international responsibility and the dynamic leadership of the Party—provided
December 2002. The Germany Foreign Ministry, Berlin, Germany.
Raschke, Die Grilnen, 823.
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the precursor for change in the former case and a champion of change in the latter. Both
provided a background for change. Unlike the independent variables these enabling
factors did not directly cause the change within the Green Party, but rather enabled it.
It is quite clear empirically that the end of the Cold War and German unification
did not suddenly change the Green Party's perspective on the use of force. However, the
end of the Cold War and its systemic change provided the most basic permissive element
for evolution in the Green Party. Had the US-Soviet struggle continued, in particular
with the continued potential for a nuclear catastrophe, there is no reason to believe that
the Greens would have relinquished their pacifist values. The new regional conflicts and
developing German responsibility that developed amid its ashes provided the overall
context for the Green evolution.
Only with a real change in the international system could the necessary impetuses
for change emerge. International systems, which are "institutional environment[s]
structured by intersubjective cognition and norms" that views rationality as "constructed"
or "context bound," are open to change.

When such changes at a systemic level occur

the ideals that define them also evolve. As state interests and strategies remain unclear
during such changes political relations at the domestic level become fluid. There is then
a necessity for both the state and its constituent political parties to develop new
36
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perspectives and ideas to address the transformations.

An excellent example here is the

adaptation of NATO to the new strategic environment of the 1990s, in particular its
incorporation of out of area operations into its mission.
Importantly, this change in international systems with the end of the Cold War
also helped lead to the acceptance of German responsibility. By the early 1990s,
remaining aloof from international security problems was no longer consistent with
German foreign policy.40 As foreign minister Klaus Kinkel (CDU) noted in a speech
prior to sending German humanitarian peacekeepers to Somalia: "Let us make our
country into the capable (handlungsfahig) and responsible partner that the world
community and we ourselves want to see in us."41 As noted above, this evolved concept
of responsibility would play a critical role in the evolution of the Greens, given their will
to govern.
The second enabling factor was the impact of a dynamic and evolving leadership
element within the Party, especially that of Joschka Fischer. Unlike the impact of the end
of the Cold War and Germany's evolving responsibility, this factor is much more difficult
to measure. Still, there are a number of references to the importance of Party leaders,
especially Fischer, that point to its role.
This leadership element also brought with it clear goals for the Party and in the
end offered a push for change. There is strong, though often anecdotal, agreement that
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Joschka Fischer was the primary player for the Greens. Frank Pfetsch for example argues
that Fischer's "convincing speeches and impressive arguments" led the Greens to change
their general position.42 Fischer's opinion figured prominently in all of the points of
change for the Party and he was one of the primary proponents of foreign and security
policy evolution for the Greens. Indeed, Otto Schily, a former Green Member and later
SPD Interior Minister in the Red-Green collation, argued in 2007 that the Green Party's
success was primarily due to Fischer.
While Fischer's exact role may be challenging to measure, the role of the Green
leadership in setting the tone and nature of the debate is quite clear. From Bosnia
through 9/11 the Party's leadership led the debate; they were always one step ahead of
the grass roots level. Their interaction with the international community, building on the
Putnam model described in more detail below, even as members of the opposition and
especially as part of the governing coalition, in effect brought them closest to the two
intervening variables that brought change in the Party. Without this strong leadership, in
particular Fischer's, it is doubtful the Greens would have changed their perspective on the
use of force as rapidly as they did.

THE MECHANISM OF CHANGE

Whereas the heuristic approach above outlined the major reasons for the Green
Party's change, it is also useful here to understand some of the mechanisms for how they
42
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evolved. Explaining the method of change has been a gaping hole in the literature on the
German Green Party and in international relations in general. Though this discussion
here is not intended to be a portrayal of the exclusive mechanism of change, it does set
out some of the major mechanisms of change, especially in the individual determinations
to select protecting human rights over pacifism and later in choosing governance over
pacifism.
The Harvard psychologist Howard Gardner in Changing Minds presents a number
of reasons why an individual or even a state can change their perspective. He defines
"changing minds" as the "situation where individuals or groups abandon the way in
which they have customarily thought about an issue of importance and henceforth
conceive of it in a new way."44 These are thus significant conscious changes, based on
identified forces.
Gardner identifies seven factors that help influence a change in one's mind:
reason, research, resonance, representational re-descriptions, resources and rewards, real
world events, and resistances. For the purposes here, only five of the seven need be
discussed. Reason involves a rational, logic based approach that weighs a number of
critical factors. Resonance reflects the extent to which an idea or view "feels right" to a
person given the current situation. Both reason and resonance are significantly
influenced by the rhetoric of the time, suggesting in this case the importance of
leadership and the press in affecting a decision. Rewards, as the name suggests,
correlates to a tit-for-tat type, reciprocal strategy—one action is rewarded with another,
forcing an individual to realign their position on a specific subject. Real world events are
44
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in essence shocks—such as wars, hurricanes, terrorist attacks, or depressions—and
particularly effects entire societies.
While all of these elements help to facilitate change in perspective, one factorresistance—actually helps to limit change. As we age, our views become hardened and
more difficult, though not impossible, to change. Thus, Gardner concludes, minds can be
changed as the facilitating factors act upon an individual strongly, while there is
relatively weak resistance.45
While factors affecting individual change are clear, those impacting a society also
bring forth new elements, in particular the role of leaders. Here the stories that leaders
tell and the lives they lead help to create a resonance that can be transferred to others. As
Gardner noted, England's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, given her past of hard work
and "cleverness," which she could then impart on the general population, was the
individual that could bring about change in England of the 1980s.46 In essence, the more
an individual leader's life and actions relate and in turn resonate with a population, the
more influence he has and the more he can be a champion of change. As this dissertation
will clearly demonstrate, Gardner's concept would play a critical role in the Green
Party's evolution.
The primary drivers and working arbiters of change in the Greens were the
political elites. As Robert Putnam has noted, political elites sit at both the domestic and
international tables and must react to both domestic and international requirements.

7

As

such, political elites are caught between the evolving international system in which they
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must act, and an at times distinctly different domestic environment they must gain
support from if they are to remain in power. This linkage is a critical factor for the
individual, personal reflections that proved to be so important in the evolution of the
Greens.
Indeed, Elizabeth Bomberg suggests in general terms that a green party's
involvement in a broad European forum "has accelerated the mellowing of Green
ideology and 'professionalization' of Green Party politics." Moreover, this trend can be
"intensified" when a minister must make decisions for the state rather than the party, a
trend which can often be seen in foreign and security policy. These different positions
can in turn lead to strong divergences between the Party leadership and its rank and file.48
She, moreover, recognizes that the interaction is two way—the system affects the party
and vice versa. Indeed becoming a part of a government in order to have an impact was
indeed a common theme suggested by Volmer throughout his book.49
Though political elites may be the drivers of transformation, a political party must
also reflect this change if it is to gain legitimacy on a larger scale.5 Given the strong role
of the grass roots of the Green Party, to be discussed in the next chapter, a debate
between Party elites, who act within the international realm, and general Party members
that are often outside the direct influence of the international arena often ensues when
international events challenge domestic principles. Thus the defining ideals of the party
that provide a general framework for its domestic actions can collide with the regulative
principle of international responsibility that comes with involvement in the government.
48
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As this dissertation will clearly show, the dissonance between the leadership and the
grass roots would be a constant theme throughout this decade of change.

CONCLUSION

The heuristic approach presented here brings in two distinct arbiters and two
enablers of change. Put succinctly, in the wake of significant systemic change, strong
shocks caused political elites to reevaluate their ingrained ideals and in turn engaged a
dynamic leadership element that when combined with a strategic choice to govern led to
change on the Green position on the use of force. Though the will to govern clearly
resounds as the primary arbiter of the Greens' shift, no single variable can explain the
complexity of change. A brief discussion of how the Greens changed, especially the
roles of facilitating principles, provides insight into the complexity of this evolution.

CHAPTER III
THE CONTEXT OF THE GREEN DEBATE

Since their formation in Karlsruhe in January 1980 the Green Party has occupied
a rather unique position in the history of postwar Germany's political system. From the
party built around rejecting the power of the government, it has embraced it and from
1998-2005 jointly governed the Federal Republic. Though this dissertation focuses on
the evolution of the Party's perspective on the use of force, it is useful to provide some
context for understanding this evolution. This chapter will first provide a short synopsis
of Germany's overall debate on the use of force. Second it will discuss some of the
aspects of the Greens that influenced their debate on the use of force. Third, it will
contextualize the Party's evolution of pacifism by highlighting the Party's overall
evolution in security affairs.

UNDERSTANDING GERMANY'S EVOLUTION

During the Cold War, the West German military was designed solely to repel a
Soviet invasion. Its defensive posture, in stark contrast to the offensive military actions
waged by Nazi Germany, became the soul of the German viewpoint on the use of force.
The rapid changes with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, and the
collapse of the Soviet Empire ushered Germany into a new environment. The rules and
ideas of the Cold War did not always correspond to the realities of the Post Cold War era.
Since Germany's unification in 1990, Germany has had to adapt and redefine its

policies to operate in this new environment. According to Rafael Biermann, this
evolution was an "ad hoc" improvisation, in large part because it was an entirely new
concept in German postwar history. Indeed, as Hans-Ulrich Seidt argues the move from
the euphoria of the end of the Cold War to the acceptance of the harsher realities of the
post Cold War era was a long and "difficult" period.2 Fifteen years after unification, the
new consensus in German foreign and security policy is a product of both its unique
historical experiences and an adaptation to its new environment.

Tracing an History of Change
As the realities of the Post Cold War era crystallized, in particular that of
intervention in internal ethnic conflict, Germany's stance on the use of military force
progressed as well. This evolution emerged out of the reaction to the war in the Balkans,
a paradigm change within Germany, and the shift of NATO away from a focus on selfdefense to including out of area operations.4 From its "checkbook diplomacy" of the first
Gulf War to its deployment of 3,900 troops in support of the war against international
terrorism following the September 2001 attacks, Germany's evolution in the use of force
question has been a series of small steps.5
Its choice to "pay instead of fight" in the Gulf War of 1991 was the "point of
1
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change" according to Nina Philippi, as increased pressure focused on Germany's
necessity to participate.6 After that decision Germany became increasingly involved, first
by sending humanitarian peacekeepers with no combat capability to Cambodia and
Somalia. Amid the horrors of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia in particular,
discussions among political elites on the potential of German participation in out of area
operations sharpened. The conflict in that shattered state became a "point of pressure"
{Druckkulisse) that led to change.7 However, the German Basic Law was somewhat
ambiguous on the deployment of troops for purposes other than defense.
Limited by the law, politicians took the issue to the German Constitutional Court.
In making the case for allowing out of area operations, German leaders focused in
particular on its growing international responsibility, while also linking its own domestic
security to that outside its borders. Indeed, then German foreign minister Kalus Kinkel
stated that "peace, stability, and our own security depend even more on the management
Q

of crises outside the alliance area." Germany's leaders were now distinctly linking its
own interests to acting outside of its traditional area of security.
The German Constitutional Court's July 1994 judgment recognized the legality of
German participation in out of area operations within a collective security system, to
include the UN and significantly NATO. It left the decision on the particulars of
participation, however, to the German Bundestag, whose simple majority was required to
approve a deployment. With this verdict the discussion moved from its legal framework
to a political debate, thus sharply changing the character of the debate by incorporating
Kosovo: Auslandseinsatze der Bundeswehr (Frankfurt am Main: Report Verlag, 2000).
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the interests of political parties.9
As NATO posture sharpened with the worsening events in Bosnia, so too did the
political debate within German. When NATO requested eight Tornado aircraft in late
1994, the ruling parties of the government could not even agree to support this request,
and creatively sidestepped it. Yet, within the next half a year, Germany's leaders offered
assistance to assist NATO in stopping the war, though they remained adamant that such
forces should not be used for combat operations. The primary reasons for the change in
perspective rested on several axes—a desire to assert more responsibility, the desire to
prevent a total collapse of the UN mission in Bosnia to protect its credibility, and a want
to maintain any chance for the future of NATO.10
With the end of the war ushered in by the Dayton Peace Accord, Germany was
again faced with the issue of whether to participate with the Implementation and later
Stabilization Force. Unlike earlier arguments for the operation, which were still echoed
here, a new argument also arose—the German deployment was to prevent a new war, not
wage one. This new perspective for the first time resonated with opposition SPD and to
an extent Green leaders, for the desire to bring peace to the region was constant within
almost all German parties. In the end, the Bundestag supported the deployment with a
majority of 543-107, with eighty percent of the SPD and fifty percent of the Greens
accepting the legislation.11 Both SFOR and IFOR were "key phases" in the "process of
normalization" of Germany's security policy. Indeed, the following three years were
"critical" in Germany's development, as successes in suppressing further violence in the
Bundeswehr in der Praxis," in Deutsche Konfliktbewaltigung aufdem Balkan, 104.
8
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Balkans gave rise to a tacit acceptance of the usefulness of the military for other than
self-defense.12
Several years later, the specter of conflict again rose in the troubled region,
forcing Germany to consider again its position on the use of force amid a second ethnic
clash. This time, however, the decisions would be made during the transition from a
CDU led to government to the SPD-Green coalition. Germany's decision to deploy
combat forces to stop the genocide and later other forces for the Kosovo Force was an
"important step," rather than a sudden break, in the evolution of attitudes toward the use
of force, particularly for the SPD and the Greens. Even absent a UN mandate, it was not
a departure from Germany's tradition of a civil power that had guided it since the end of
the Cold War. In many respects, though, Germany's decision to participate was a
manifestation of the priorities of "solidarity" with NATO and protecting human rights.13
The November 2001 decision by Schroder's SPD-Green government in the wake
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US to send 3900 combat troops in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom was perhaps the largest step forward in the German
evolution in the out of area debate. Within the Bundestag there was a large body of
support across party lines, a fact that was obscured by the vote of confidence Schroder
used to bring members of his own party and the Greens into line.14 Karl Kaiser, the
lu
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former Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, believes that events of 9/11
led to the third "great reorientation of postwar Germany," and Germany's assumption of
responsibility in the "context of global strategies." It was "at last stepping out of the
shadows of World War II and assuming its role as a functioning democracy with global
responsibilities."15
The significant advance forward represented by the deployment in support of the
war against terrorism did not, however, mean a blanket support for all international
military actions, as the 2002-2003 crisis before the US led invasion of Iraq demonstrated.
Chancellor Schroder's "unlimited solidarity" of 11 September 2001 quickly withered in
view of what he perceived as American "adventures."

Schroder remained adamant

about his "absolute no" to participation in a war against Iraq, though members of the
CDU/CSU remained more open for a time to supporting the war.17 The Iraq case was in
fact an exemplification of the limits in Germany's support of the use of force. As Regina
Karp suggests, Germany's perception on the use of force has been clearly solidified with
the 2002 debate, with a willingness to support it as a last resort and then only in support
of international interests as opposed to raw national interests.18

The Internal Political Debate
The German evolution was mirrored by a debate among German's political elites,
with the primary divisions between the CDU and FDP on the right and the SPD and
15
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Greens on the left. In general, the right was much more open to using force, while the
left remained considerably more hesitant, if not completely opposed to its use. Still there
was unanimity in general that the kind of raw power driven violence endemic of the
Nazis had no place in modern Germany. For the debate on the use of force, the debate
thus focused on how and when to use limited military force.
Though a small minority on the right favored a more assertive foreign policy even
early after unification in which Germany would take on more responsibility, especially in
the use of military force in multilateral operations,19 most German leaders eventually
realized a strong continuity to the past with a recognition of and adaption to current
challenges provided the guide for Germany's foreign policy. For a "normal" power, by
this logic, force had to be used on some occasions. As such, Germany would act in a
multilateral environment, but with its own interests in mind.20 Indeed, in a November
1999 speech, then German foreign minister from the Green Party Joschka Fischer argued
that based on Germany's past, continuity and reliability were the cornerstones of German
foreign policy. Though Germany had undertaken new responsibilities in international
politics, they represented the idea of "mediating [German] interests through international
fora."

That a Green foreign minister would make such an argument suggests the broad

evolution of all of Germany's major political parties.
In the out of area debate, the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union
(CDU/CSU) was by far the most aggressive in leading the way for German participation
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in international military operations, believing Germany should participate in the "full
range" of military operations that could be authorized by the UN. Furthermore, they
supported early-on the possibility that Germany could participate in military operations
authorized by a European organization, such as NATO. The appearance of new
challenges to European security, a new German responsibility in the wake of unification,
and a desire for influence in international politics were the oft quoted reasons for this
view.22 In hindsight it is quite clear that the Kohl government was one of the key
influences driving the overall evolution in the German stance on out of area operations.
For the CDU/CSU there was little evolution in their stance on the use of force, but rather
calculated attempts to change German policy.
The Free Democratic Party (FDP), like the CDU/CSU, recognized the need for
rethinking German foreign policy given the changes since the end of the Cold War and
indeed offered similar reasons. Unlike their more powerful partners, the FDP was more
hesitant on German participation in out of area operations for political and legal reasons.
As such, the FDP was the leading figure in the movement to change the German law to
permit out of area operations with the approval of the German Parliament.

The FDP

while desiring a more involved German foreign policy wanted that integrated into a strict
multilateral framework.
On the other side of the spectrum, left leaning intellectuals and political parties
have generally argued Germany should actively engage in a foreign policy to civilize
other states. As such, German foreign policy should seek to constrain the use of force in
22
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international politics, promote individual freedom, and address inequalities in the world.
From their perspective, Germany's foreign policy tradition of the Cold War already
contained elements of civility, which in turn created a "particular responsibility" for the
post Cold War era.24 As such, they were considerably more hesitant, if not hostile,
towards an assertive foreign policy and the use of military force.
The Social Democratic Party (SPD) supported a much broader perspective of
security, encapsulating an approach focusing on integration and diplomacy rather than
military force. Yet the SPD was also conscious to remain a reliable partner in a broad
multilateral framework, given their desire to lead the government. Except for the Greens
the SPD had the most controversial debate on the use of force. Their evolution from a
Party that supported only strict UN Chapter VI peacekeeping operations to a broader
acceptance of out of area operations was fraught with sharp debate.

Though not as

adamant as the Greens, the SPD clearly sought to limit the use of force in international
relations and provide security through other means. Indeed, the clear differences between
the policies of the Kohl government and those of Schroder provide an excellent
illustration of this phenomenon.
The Greens, who will be the focus of this work, have largely adhered to the idea
of civilizing foreign policy; the Party has never been able to come to a consensus on the
use of the military in general. The crux of their debate focused along the axis of
principles over strategy. The less influential ultra left wing PDS has unanimously
rejected any form of German assertion, particularly in military matters.
The public has been largely much more hesitant on accepting the use of force as a
24
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method of German security policy. In the early 1990s, there was at most a 25% - 33%
level of support among the German population for the use of German troops in out of
area operations.

Strict peacekeeping operations, on the contrary, have received

considerable backing since the mid 1990s. Indeed, the measure of support among the
population for these operations rose from 71% to 93% between 1997 and 1999.
Supporting combat operations, however, has elicited a more differentiated
response. At the onset of the Kosovo bombing campaign, there was a clear majority in
favor of the bombing, in large part because of a lack of a viable alternative. Interestingly,
by the end of April 1999, a full month into the bombing campaign, 70% of Germans
believed that the allied attack should continue as long as was necessary.28 Public opinion
surrounding the German support on the war against terrorism returned to the trend of
hesitancy. A 57% majority of Germans opposed German participation in Operation
Enduring Freedom just before the Chancellor announced his decision to send German
troops, suggesting the population was not as willing as the German leadership.29
That tentativeness among the population has remained strong even up to 2002, as
a joint Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United
States survey demonstrated. Only 68%) supported the use of troops to uphold
international law, while 62% supported using such troops to destroy a terrorist camp.
Interestingly, only 58% supported using such troops to "bring peace" to a civil war torn
region, such as Kosovo. In all of these cases, German support for such operations was
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significantly lower than that in other European countries.

In general, though support

has risen over the course of the last decade, Germans remain much more hesitant to use
force than other states.

THE UNIQUE GREEN PARTY

Relative to Germany's other political parties, the Greens were not only younger,
but also significantly different. Their varied outlook on policies and how to act as a
political party would have definitive impact on their debate on the use of force. An
ingrained perspective of being an oppositional and anti-establishment Party, their internal
divisions, and how they made decisions would all be hurdles impeding their overall
evolution. Still, the Greens, like other political parties, had dynamic leaders, notably
Joschka Fischer, that we able to guide debates and move the Party forward.
One of the founders of the Greens, Petra Kelly, often used the descriptions "antiparty" and "anti-party party" to describe one of the primary guiding principle of the
Greens. In the 1980 election platform, which brought the Greens for the first time into
the West German Parliament, the Greens described themselves as the "alternative to the
conventional Parties."31 They were an anti-establishment party, representing the
antithesis of others. In their policies, their attitudes, and even their appearance the
Greens rebelled against the established tradition in German politics. Their essence was a
30
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critique of most of what had defined West Germany.
As Party delegates attended their first session of the West German Parliament
after the 1980 election, they wore tennis shoes and carried plants, hardly the norm for
Members of Parliament. To bring attention to their policies, members of the Greens often
publicly demonstrated in the streets. Indeed, Germany's later Green foreign minister,
Joschka Fischer, at one time took part in violent street demonstrations, a photo of which
would eventually cause a political stir. The Greens understood themselves as a "pressure
group," whose role was to bring critical theories into everyday politics.33
The Green Party's dislike of the establishment was particularly reflected in a
general suspicion of governmental power. During the early years of its existence, power
for the Greens brought forth a negative connotation. Instead of governmental power,
they often referred to a softer term, "discourse," to reflect their involvement in the
creation of policy.34 Early Green leaders preferred to remain aloof from governmental
participation, but did recognize that participation would be possible if, according to Petra
Kelly, the "right conditions were created."35
This distrust of power also played out within the Party, as the Greens worked hard
to ensure the decentralization of power and include a significant role for the grass roots in
defining the direction of the Party. A product of their opposition to the establishment
status, this diffusion of control would make it harder, though not impossible, for one
person to control the direction of the Party. It would also make it much more difficult to
define a coherent policy, especially on the use of force, given the numerous levels of
32
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involvement in the decision making process.
The desire to prevent any one person could gain too much power within the Party
played out in the so-called "Amt versus Mandat" debate that separated government and
Party roles. After joining the government in 1998, the debate intensified as some leading
federal leaders wanted to drop the division to further the move away from the anti-party
basis of the Greens, while other more traditional, anti-establishment Greens wanted to
maintain the distinction, believing it had been successful up to then and was a valuable
tool in the prevention of gaining too much power.36 In the end, the Party held on to the
separation between party and government in December 2002, though it later accepted a
"lasting compromise" that loosened, but did not rescind, the restrictions on the separation
in May 2003.37
In the same vein of reigning in the power of the individual, the Greens also sought
to define policy through consensus. Not only would the high level leaders of the Party
define goals and interests, but the grass roots—the local Green organizations, activists,
and members—would play a significant role. Over the course of the debate on the use of
force, the generally different approaches between the Party's federal leadership and its
grass roots would play a prominent role, especially in the mid to late 1990s. The federal
leadership, with their linkage to the international realm, proved to be more open to
change than the grass roots, who largely help firm to the traditional pacifism. This
conflict, played out over a number of forums, would be a omnipresent part of the Party's
35

Stoss, 9-10.
Alexander Weinlein, "Amt und Mandat: Es soil zusammenwachsen, was nicht zusammen gehbren darf."
Das Parlament, no. 44,4 November 2002, <http://www.das-parlament.de/2002/44/Dokumentation/
048.html> accessed 12 May 2003.
37
Alexander Weinlein, "Amt und Mandat—Nun soil die Basis den Dauerstreit beenden," Das Parlament,
no. 51/52, 23 December 2002, <http://www.das-parlament.de/2002/51_52/Dokumentation/065.html>
accessed 12 May 2003; Stephan Haselberger, "Grtine lockern Trennung von Amt und Mandat," Die Welt,
36

49
evolution.
The confusing nature of the Greens' decision making process warrants a short
discussion. The federal Bundestag leadership met frequently to define the leadership's
policies and provide declarations on specific issues. Similarly, the Landerrat, a high
level meeting between approximately 30-50 federal and local party leaders, would
provide senior level direction for the Greens. Neither the faction meetings nor the
Landerrat defined overall Green Party policy. As this dissertation will illustrate in
numerous instances, the leadership would often make decisions violently at odds with the
base of the Party, only to be rescinded later. Unfortunately, both the press and scholars
alike would often mistake these leadership decisions as general Party positions.
The primary arbiter of Green Party policy, and the inject for the grass roots, was
the so-called Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz (BDK) or "Party Day." These large gatherings
of 600-800 leading Party delegates were held at least annually to define the general way
forward for the Greens, approve election platforms or discuss specific issues. There can
also be special sessions, for example to debate the deployment of troops to Kosovo or for
Enduring Freedom. The results of these conferences represent the will and decision of
the entire Party, though their declarations would not always be followed by the federal
leadership.
Though decentralized power and the provision of a voice to a disgruntled
percentage of the population for a wide range of issues may have been the major
underlying bond, it was not, however, enough to create unity. Unlike the other parties in
Germany that focused around one issue that could give them a sense of identity, the
Greens were a "compilation party" (Sammlungspartei) of groups championing different
24 May 2003, <http://www.welt.de/data/2003/05/24/100983.html> accessed 24 may 2003.
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issues.

A collection of feminists, pacifists, environmentalists, and other groups were

held together by a "fundamental feeling of many of its members."39 A common, positive
identity, either from their basic fundamentals, their political goals, socials basis, or
interests even today has not been achieved.
Though it would be hard to conceptualize all of the Green diversity into strict
divisions, there were two diverse wings that had fundamental differences on the role and
future of the party. Known as the realos and the fundis, or the realists and the
fundamentalists, they argued for advancing toward the mainstream of political parties
versus remaining true to their formative beliefs. In general, the realos operate
pragmatically to attain definitive political goals, even at the expense of compromising
with other political parties. Contrarily, the fundis adhere uncompromisingly to their
principles, even at the expense of achieving any progress.40
The division between the realos and fundis played out most decisively in the
debate on whether the Greens should participate in government. Though they had some
success in the 1980s and 1990s governing a the local level, Green participation at the
federal level was another issue.41 Within the Party, the realos were much more focused
on joining a coalition with the SPD than their fundi counterparts. As early as 1993, this
realo obsession had ceased to became an issue of tactics and moved to a goal, all but
Raschke, Die Griinen, 10.
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"replacing] other issues in the Greens' public identity." From the fundis perspective,
such a move decisively undermined the party's "very essence" as an anti-establishment
party.42 As this debate will clearly demonstrate, the divergence between the two factions
on this issue would play a significant role on the use of force debate, especially during
the Kosovo and Afghanistan crises.
Despite the massive divisions within the Party, empirical observations of the
Greens during the 1990s and especially during the use of force clearly show the impact of
the individual on the direction of the Party. Important members such as the Ludger
Volmer, Hans-Christian Strobele, and Jurgen Trittin guided debates at various times. In
general, and especially amid the context of the use of force debate, perhaps the most
influential leader, even if he only became the official Party Candidate for the 2002
election, was Joschka Fischer.
As a dominant leader and fixture within the Greens for over two decades, he
helped to mold the Party's evolution from a rebellious, counter-government group in the
late 1970s that abhorred the establishment, to a party that engaged in changing the
establishment and indeed became the establishment. In many ways he jettisoned his
revolutionary past43 and sought to engage in change for the betterment of Germany and
from his perspective, the Green Party. According to his biographers Matthias Geis and
Bernd Ulrich, Fischer was the very essence and representation of the evolution of not
42
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only the Greens, but also within the country as well. As one contemporary press account
noted: "In Fischer, Germany has become reconciled with itself—the former rebels with
the system, the system with the old rebels."44
Even from his early days within in the Greens, Joschka Fischer had been
important leader. Within two years of joining, and despite a rather colorful past that had
seen numerous run-ins with the law as part of the protest movement, he quickly found
success in Hessen as the Environmental Minister in the first instance of Green
governance. His leadership was instrumental in regaining a part in the Hessen
government in 1991 and that helped to enlarge his leadership portfolio. By the early
1990s, in large part due to the Greens' absence from the Bundestag and Hessen as the
solitary Green participation in local government, Fischer was the most widely recognized
and influential Green.45 Within a decade, Fischer had grown from a new member to a
prominent leader.
During the 1990s, there is little question that Fischer was the defining Green
leader. According to Markus Klein and Jiirgen Falter, after the 1994 election, Fischer
was the single most important Green politician.46 Winfried Herman, a Member of the
Bundestag from the Green traditionalist faction, believed that the Green Party followed
Fischer.47 Kevin Cullen of The Boston Globe argued in 1999 that Fischer was the most
powerful Green party leader.48 His spirit and decisive nature could push a debate in one
direction or another.
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Within the context of the use of force debate under discussion here, some see
Fischer as pivotal in the evolution of the Green's position on the use of force debate.
Hoffman and Longhurst, based on an article from the Siiddeutsche Zeitung suggest that
during the contentious debates of the 1990s Joschka Fischer consciously attempted to
shift the Greens to accept a more "pragmatic policy stance" on the use force.49 Indeed,
Fischer had such sway within the party that he was able to push for the protection of
minorities and their rights within failed states even against the dictums of a pacifist party
and be largely successful.50
Contemporary German political leaders also highlight Fischer's leadership role in
this debate. Winfried Hermann, who opposed Fischer's argument, argues that Fischer
was a central figure throughout the discussion that brought a new reality to the visions of
"never again Auschwitz" and "never again war" amid the new challenges in Europe. The
new use of the "never again Auschwitz" clause as a means to use military force was
C 1

particularly critical.

Gert Weiskirchen, a Member of Bundestag for the SPD saw

Fischer as the "key politician" that helped in the evolution of the Green debate. From his
perspective he helped to make the breakthrough against the ideological resistance to the
"never again war" paradigm within the Party.52
However, not all saw Fischer as a heroic figure of change. The Germanophone,
Josef Joffe wrote in the New York Times Magazine that Fischer was a "sort of a Forest
Gump" whose defining feature was "self-invention to fit the time."53 Moreover, Ludger
Volmer, in an interview conducted by this author, suggested that Fischer was important,
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though not decisive in the Green Party's debate on foreign and security policy.54
An analysis of the debate and its results suggests, however, that within the overall
context of the Green Party's debate on the use of force, it was Fischer's letter and his
distinct leadership that pushed this debate to new levels and in turn raised the perspective
of the Party to a different threshold. He was not the first to argue for military force and
he did maintain some distance from the rather hard-core realos by precluding the use of
German forces in combat operations in Bosnia. Though understanding his role is a bit
murkier in Kosovo and Afghanistan, his position as the German foreign minister and
decisive roles in the Party Day amid the Kosovo and Afghanistan crises give clear
indications of his strong leadership role.
Throughout this dissertation, it will be quite apparent that the unique nature of the
Greens would have a profound effect on the use of force debate. The lack of a common
identity amid a compilation of varied interests inflated internal divisions, a suspicion of
government power, a desire to be an oppositional Party, and the decentralization of
internal power were all obstacles to overcome. Still, leaders in all parts of the Party, most
importantly Fischer, would be able to drive the debate and in turn the solutions.

PACIFISM IN A DIVERSE PARTY

From their earliest days to the present, foreign and security policy has always
been a "difficult relationship" for the Greens. Throughout their existence, pacifism and
anti-militarism have remained key elements of the Party's foreign and security policy. In
November 2002. The German SPD Party, Berlin, Germany.
53
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broad terms, the concept of non-violence for the Green Party has primarily focused on
removing the use of force as a means to accomplish political goals.55 However, the
Green Party's stance on the use of force,56 encapsulated in the phrase, "non-violence,"
has been left somewhat undefined. Amid the conflicts in southeastern Europe and as a
result of the terrorist attacks in 2001, the concept of pacifism has transformed. To use
Ludger Volmer's words from January 2002, the pacifism of one era does not give
"categorical plausible answers" to the threats of a different era.57 By 2002, the rhetoric of
non-violence remained, though the absolutist nature of pacifism had withered, leaving a
new concept of Green non-violence that differed significantly from its origins two
decades earlier.

An Evolving Concept
In its infancy there was general consensus in the Greens on the pacifist approach
as an articulation of the protest movement in the wake of the German Parliament's
decision to permit stationing of American middle-range nuclear rockets in Germany. The
1980 election campaign platform rejected war as a means of solving conflicts between
states and decried mutually assured destruction, which defined the US-Soviet Union
nuclear struggle. During the final decade of the Cold War, the Party continued to call for
Volmer, interview by author.
Vogt, 155.
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the outright dissolution of NATO and the Bundeswehr as well as the complete
demilitarization of the world. The 1990s and 2000s, however, saw a confrontation
between the ideological dogmatism of the fundis and the practicality of the realos that
collided with the realities of southeastern Europe and the threat of terrorism. During this
time the Party left the "alternative subculture" and consciously addressed the
controversies of the day.58
Though the majority of Greens during the 1980s remained wedded to a general
form of nuclear pacifism reflective of the bloc confrontation of the Cold War, the very
concept of nonviolence even at this stage was relative. In the declaration announcing the
formation of the Greens, the idea of freedom from violence was not mentioned as one of
the defining elements of the Party because the original Green peace manifest was a
"minimal consensus" designed to gain the most support. Most in the Party rejected the
use of force by states to achieve geopolitical goals and opposed arms races, but a
reference to the rights of emergency defense and resistance put the absolutist nature of
nonviolence into a more relative perspective. As such, the concept of being "against
violence," and as such military force, did not form a basis of collective identity within the
Party because it led to discussion and conflict rather than consensus.59
For the first election in the newly unified Germany in the 1990s, the Greens
presented a campaign platform that was strongly reminiscent of its positions during the
previous decade. Even after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Greens saw a role for
their goals and policies, believing that disarmament in Europe and the creation of a
"demilitarization dynamic" would lead to peace on a continental scale. They proposed
58
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Germany lead a unilateral disarmament of the West, a dissolution of NATO, an end to
military training in Germany, and the cessation of weapons exports. For them, the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), not NATO, offered the best
chances to create peace in the region.60 Continuity in the form of traditional pacifism
remained the guidepost. It was a victory for the radical pacifists; the early realo
reformers had failed even to set forth their position.61
As the conflict in the former Yugoslavia challenged the Green concept of
pacifism and debates within the Party began in earnest, the 1994 election program
remained largely consistent with Green traditional ideals. Common themes, such as
demilitarization, disarmament beginning with Germany, and the dissolution of NATO
remained. Yet there were some indications that the Party was beginning to respond to the
new international environment. It called upon Germany to take on a new responsibility,
one of peaceful conflict reduction, support for human rights, and the equalization of
prosperity between North and South. It rejected the Kohl government's idea of
responsibility, which focused on a greater involvement in UN peacekeeping actions,
since it could lead to the militarization of German foreign policy.62
Relative to the previous program, the 1998 election platform adopted in March
1998 showed some marked differences in foreign policy and the concept of pacifism, in
large response to the events on the ground in Bosnia and the possibility of participation in
the coalition government.

Old goals such as demilitarization, the dissolution of NATO,

and unilateral disarmament of Germany remained, but now they were seen as a step in the
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process of the creation of peace, rather than something to be done unilaterally. While the
Greens had earlier called for an outright withdraw of Germany from NATO, they rejected
that idea, believing such a unilateral action could create fear among Germany's
neighbors, thus hindering the dialog needed to ensure peace.
Unlike earlier platforms, there was now a clear recognition of the necessity of
becoming actively involved in conflict resolutions. Still, the Green approach was still
tempered by its pacifist history. Military peace enforcement operations and combat
operations in general and Bundeswehr participation in particular were still strictly
rejected. The Greens instead argued for the creation of a civil based conflict prevention
mechanism.

The 1998 election program continued to show the earmark of the left

wing,pacifists, but the influence of the more realistic reformers was becoming more
apparent. Instead of more idealistic trends as before, the Greens of 1998 wanted to
become an active part of the international dialog.
After four years as part of the coalition government, in which the Greens had to
react to several different security crisis that involved the use of the military (Kosovo,
Macedonia, and 9/11), the election platform of 2002 showed significant evolutions in the
ideas for non-violence. The goal of dissolving NATO has been dropped for the first time;
in fact the Greens complimented NATO for its role in preventing the conflict in
Macedonia. The concept of non-military means of conflict prevention, first
conceptualized in the 1998 campaign, had become a stronger and clearer aspect.
Most significantly, the Greens evolved their stance on involvement in
international security affairs. For the first time, they recognized that there were "threats,"
including international terrorism, ethnic conflict, and the spread of weapons of mass
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destruction. Countering those threats could require the deployment of the Bundeswehr,
which they had supported several times from 1998-2002. As such, the Party dropped its
desire to dissolve the German military and instead focused on the values of a smaller
military capable of deploying in a UN sponsored peace action.65
Though the Greens claimed that these evolutions remained in the spirit of their
original party values, it is clear that the decade since unification had brought forth some
significant changes in the Party's policies. They have conceptualized a new view of
security policy, moving from the idealist principles of strict pacifism to a pragmatic
green-based policy of limited violence. The goal of dissolving NATO was eventually
dropped; the realization of the utility, albeit limited, of the Bundeswehr had developed;
and most importantly, a policy of active involvement in international security had been
conceptualized. Though the goals of the Party remained the same, the means to achieve
them had evolved. Though this brief overview of the election platforms provides a
general evolution of the pacifism principle in the Greens, the reality of the debate was
much more acrimonious.

Internal Green Differences
The evolution of the Party's perspective on non-violence and pacifism was more
broadly reflective of a general division of the Party on the issue of the use of force.
While not strongly apparent during the 1980s, it became much more noticeable when
confronted with the foreign and domestic challenges after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
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There were different cultural backgrounds between East and West German Greens,
variations between federal and local level officials, as well as divisions among various
groups in the Party. All of which help to explain the evolution of the Party's view on the
use of force during the 1990s and early 2000s.
The Greens are in reality a tolerated combination of West German Greens and
East German Greens, knows as the Alliance 90. Their union after German unification
was not a marriage of love, but rather one of "convenience."66 The Eastern counterparts
emerged out of the democratic resistance to dictatorship, and thus virulently supported
democratic values. Their foundational initiative of protecting human rights carried
significant weight during the early years of the new Green Party. Like their Western
partners, the East German Greens presented themselves as an oppositional party, a
protector of the environment, and a supporter of peace.67 Unlike their western
counterparts, however, the Alliance 90 members did not distrust parliamentarians.
Indeed, in the early years of the union, considerable strife reigned as varying approaches
between East and West Green sparred against each other.68 It was the different political
experiences, rather than diverse political goals that led to the discord.69
In general, the Alliance 90 was less pacifist than the West German Greens in part
because they saw NATO and the military pressure it exuded as a principle reason for the
defeat of the Warsaw Pact. They still were decisively on the left, rejecting the use of
force as a means of solving conflicts, opposing aggressive warfare, and forbidding the
66
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use of German troops.

But as the conflicts of the 1990s expanded, members of the

Alliance 90 were more open to the use of force in response to acts of aggression or to
protect endangered groups. For example, some in the Alliance 90 supported the
American led coalition to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. When confronted with
genocide, as in the case of Bosnia, Alliance 90 members were much quicker to question
the strict rejection of military force based on their adherence to the principle of protecting
71

human rights.
The extent of the influence the Alliance 90 had on the use of force debate within
the Green Party as a whole was limited given their small numbers and the lack of a voter
constituency in East Germany. Instead, the majority of leaders who had significant
impact came from West Germany. Within a few years of their union, as Ludger Volmer
argues, the axis of intraparty conflict had ceased to be between East and West, and had
79

shifted to a left-right debate.
The various levels of the Green Party also bring forth considerable differences on
pacifism and the use of force. Between the federal level leaders and local members there
was a significant gap when it came to adhering to pacifism and sanctioning the use of
force. In general, the lower levels of the Party have remained much more focused on the
founding values of the Green Party. As the pacifist Green MP Winfried Hermann argued,
pacifism has a much larger support base in the grass roots of the party rather than at the
70
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federal level. Indeed, he believes that at the November 2001 delegate conference in
Rostock that debated the prospect of German action in Afghanistan, the majority saw the
prospects of war differently than federal leaders, believing that military force was not the
answer.73 In the context of the debate surrounding the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo,
local level leaders tended to propose motions at Party Days that were much more in tune
with strict pacifism. While some federal leaders were more likely to propose pacifist
leaning motions early in the 1990s, that tendency faded by the time Greens became part
of the governing coalition.
In addition to the vertical differences, the Party was also split along horizontal
lines. In general terms, the Greens were thought to have had two opposing groups
debating the use of force—the realos and the fundis. The fundis most rigidly adhered to
the basic constitutive concepts of pacifism in the party, deploring the use of violence. On
the right side, realos approached the possibility surrounding the use of force from a more
realistic perspective, accepting its use in certain cases. This general approach, however,
does not provide an accurate view of the evolution during the 1990s; a more nuanced
perspective on the debate is required.
The Greens were not simply realos and fundis, as many have believed; there was
a third, swing group that proved to be the primary purveyor of change for the Greens in
this debate. Generally, they stood between the radical pacifists and the realos. During
the Cold War, the swing group, like the realos rejected every nuclear option, but accepted
conventional defensive requirements and to an extent alliance responsibilities in
Germany-47,801.
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defense.

In the 1990s, this swing group would be more willing to accept the use of

force for a variety of reasons, though they remained less supportive than the realos.
It is important to note here that few Green members openly admitted what group
they adhered to; in fact it was the press that typically assigned that label and that was
either fundi or realo, as there was no mention of the swing group. Though identifying
fundis and some realos was easy, swing group adherents could only be identified through
a ex post facto analysis of an individual members' evolution over the course of the
debate. Making this even more challenging was the continuing evolution of baseline
perspectives over time. What defined the realos in 1993, was in many was accepted by
some fundis in 2002. In general, a swing group member can be defined as one who stood
in the political middle within the use of force debate, irrespective of when it occurred.
While it is not a perfect science, its generalities are still effective for the purpose of
identifying the adherent to the swing group.
The swing group, also referred to as "political pacifists" or "governing leftists,"
attempted to remove military force as a normal means of international politics and
civilize it, but increasingly over the course of the 1990s adjusted to see military force as a
means to achieve that goal in some cases. They based their decisions on strategic as well
as convictional reasons.75 Reaching that goal required disarmament, but also necessitated
the continued existence of certain military institutions and capabilities. Indeed, Nina
Philippi prophetically notes that as a compromise between the realos and fundis was
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impossible, the swing group, what she refers to as those surrounding the Volmer
compromise for the 1995 Bremen party Day, would in fact define the future.
Throughout the 1990s, the realos were the catalytic element within the use of
force debate in Party, often questioning the dogmatic adherence to strict pacifism and
openly asking whether force should be used. With each new security challenge, they
were generally more willing to consider using the military. Fundis never wavered in
their acceptance of pacifism as the mean toward world peace.77 Indeed, that eight Green
Party delegates wanted to vote against German participation in support of the Operation
Enduring Freedom in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks demonstrates that
radical pacifism has not been eliminated in the Party.
Yet amid the security challenges in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, it was the
political pacifists from the swing group who were the primary purveyors of the evolution
on the use of force; their decisions determined the compromise the Party would adopt.
Federal level leaders such as Angelika Beer, Winfried Nachtwei, and Ludger Volmer
became critical in the debate. Though the realos and the swing group were close
ethically,78 the latter were typically harder to convince of the need for military force. As
this dissertation will demonstrate, the evolution of the Green Party's position on the use
of force was largely endemic of the position the swing group adopted, particularly its
Philippi, Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsatze als aufien- undsicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten
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federal level officials.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of the first decade after German unification, the Green Party
underwent considerable evolutions in their stance on security issues, on joining the
government, and within the makeup of the Party. The Party's unique history of an
oppositional political party made of an amalgamation of different interests groups
exploded into crisis when confronted with the war in the Balkans that set the internalized
dictums of "never again Auschwitz" and "never again war" against each other. The very
soul of the Party began to evolve, as Greens confronted their outlook on foreign and
security policy as well as participation in the government. The nuclear pacifism of the
1980s could not stand up to the pressures of the 1990s and began to wither
This chapter has set the background and the context for the following dissertation.
First, it provided the context for the Green debate by highlighting the general German
evolution and the various positions of the other political parties in Germany. Second, it
outlined several factors outlining the debate, such as the strong history of antiestablishment, a hesitancy for power, and the importance of Joschka Fischer as a leader.
Third, it examined the history of pacifism in the Party, to include the various divisions
within the Party at the leadership level and between its leaders and grass root members
and the three groups that would define the debate.

CHAPTER IV
CLINGING TO THE PAST

The end of the Cold War that changed so many of the dynamics of world politics
left the Green Party's defining security policies mostly unchanged. The euphoria amid
the collapse of the Soviet Empire that so quickly faded at the international level,
remained strong within the Greens for several years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as
most continued to maintain that the end of the US-Soviet confrontation would usher in a
new era of peace and prosperity. Specifically, they dreamed that the world would
demilitarize its politics, concentrate on North-South economic disparities, and usher in a
wave of democratization. Such ideas were quite apparent with the 1990 election
platform.1
The end of the Cold War, moreover, further invigorated the Greens' belief that
NATO should be dissolved (aufgelost). For a strong majority of the Party, the western
military alliance did not contribute to peace, but rather exacerbated the chances of war,
which was a theme that would be heard often over the next decade. Yet even at this early
stage, a small number of Greens, especially Joschka Fischer, were already pushing for a
change to accept a pro-NATO position and accept western integration. However, the
majority of the Party, especially the traditional fundi pacifists, remained steadfastly
adhered to the pacifist ideals.2
The Gulf War in 1990-91 provided the first clear external challenge to Green
Party pacifism, opening the gates ever so slightly to the withering of the pacifist ideal.
1
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Indeed, a very small minority were openly asking whether the use of military force could
be justified in cases like this. However, the Gulf War would do little in the long run for
the evolution of the Party's stance on the use of force. It would be the wars in the former
Yugoslavia beginning in Bosnia, however, that would be the starkest catalyst for the
questioning of the absolutist nature of pacifism. The atrocities that filled television
screens provoked many Greens to call for some form of action to stop the violence.
Amid such brutality, the prominent Green Member of Parliament (MP) and later speaker
on security policy, Winfried Nachtwei, suggested that simply remaining aloof, "count me
out!," as he described it, was no longer an option.
As the Bosnian conflict raged and the horrors of genocide and human suffering
become more apparent, the Party was faced with a difficult, yet significant question: How
could the Party develop an effective human rights oriented policy that could address
regional conflicts defined by nationalism, without giving up the values of pacifism that it
held so dearly? Amid the new dynamics of conflict, the Cold War based pacifism proved
inadequate, as Green methods proved incapable of quelling the violence. For Joschka
Fischer, the essential leader of change in the Party at this early stage, the pacifism that
defined the Cold War times, the so-called "nuclear pacifism," had to be redefined. It
needed a new "value base" that functioned in the Post Cold War world.4
Though the Party officially continued to cling to its past pacifist guiding
principles, the beginning of the transformation process began during these early years
after unification. Differing opinions began to develop and voices of dissent and
2
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reconsideration toward the values of absolute pacifism in the Greens found larger
audiences. Amid the Balkan wars in particular, the Greens began a significant
"reorientation process"5 that would have long-reaching effects.
This chapter will outline the early portion of the Green Party's debate on the use
of force. It will be divided into three major section. First, it will discuss the strong
rejection of the UN mandated eviction of Iraq from Kuwait by the US led military
coalition in 1991. Second, it will discuss the Green Party's initial reaction to the wars in
the Balkans and how the emergence of this new security challenge opened the gates for a
new, dynamic debate within the Party, leading to the emergence of various factions
within the Party and divergences between the leadership and the base. Finally, it will
look at the Green response to the worsening of violence in the region in 1994 and
examine their reactions to the appearance of the political debate on the possible
deployment of German forces.

THE GREENS AND THE GULF WAR

As Helmut Kohl's CDU led German government expressed its support for the US
led and UN sanctioned war to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait with financial support,
the Green Party remained firmly wedded to its past. Resolutely rejecting any support for
the governing coalition's efforts, the Party clearly expressed its pacifist values. In the
first challenge of the so-called Post Cold War world, the Greens showed few signs of
jettisoning their views and evolving for the future.
Grunen!," interview with Joschka Fischer, taz, 21 August 1992, 10.
5
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Despite the apparent uniformity of the Green Party to the crisis in the Gulf, there
were for the first time some small noises about the limits of pacifism and possible
justifications for the use of force. Still, even among those few voices that quietly talked
about the occasional need for the use of force, the prospect of using German forces
remained effectively taboo. The debate on the use of force, though it remained quiet,
nonetheless began with the war to evict Iraq from Kuwait.

Voices Against the War
The Green Party strongly opposed the invasion of Iraq against Kuwait, claiming
that such naked aggression could not be accepted by the international community. It
clearly violated international law, for which the Iraqi regime bore primary responsibility,
and Iraq's gains needed to be reversed.6 Adhering solely to its pacifist values, the Party
simply called on Iraq to leave Kuwait as quickly as possible and without condition.
Saddam's taking of hostages was similarly criticized by the Greens. Still, though there
was a distaste for the invasion of Kuwait, the mechanisms to counter it remained firmly
embedded in the Green pacifism ideal.
The only mechanism to solve the crisis from a Green perspective was
negotiation.8 The Greens forcefully rejected any considerations of the use of military
force to eject Iraq from Kuwait, even if it were sanctioned by the UN. Instead, the
Greens offered non-military methods, in particular the "good possibilities of promising
6
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economic sanctions" against Iraq. Such means created both the chance for success while
avoiding the dangers inherent in using military force. A strict embargo was from the
beginning of the crisis the preferred method of pressure.9 To supplement this idea, the
Greens called for an international conference under the auspices of the UN, the Arab
League, and the European Community to deal with all of the military conflicts in the
region in an effort to reduce the overall tensions in the region. Not only was Iraq-Kuwait
included, but also the Palestinian-Israeli and the Lebanon conflicts.10 Even now, the
important tendency to include the entire regional context, rather than a focus on just one
specific conflict, is apparent in Green foreign and security policy.11
The Greens' characterization of the conflict also focused criticism on those they
saw as bearing considerable responsibility for the increasing militarization of the world's
conflicts—in particular the weapons export industry. Indeed, they argued that the
German government, as well as those of the French and American, bore some
responsibility for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Even more explosive, the Party
publicized its belief that the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1988 was only
possible through the export of German poison gasses. German firms, according to the
Greens, had contributed approximately fifty percent of the materials necessary for Iraq's
WMD program. Stopping those exports would be a definitive measure to ensure that
9

Die Grilnen, Pressemitteilung Nr. 681/90, from Angelika Beer, Tay Eich, Alfred Mechtersheimer, Almut
Kottwitz, and Petra Kelly, "Stopp der Militarisierung des Golf-Konflikts- Entmilitarisierung statt
weltweiter Bundeswehr Einsatze!," 20 August 1990, Bestand B.II.3, Akte Nr. 6024, AGG; "Resolution der
Bundesversammlung Die Grtlnen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90." The Greens were quick to point put,
however, that any boycott must be sure to avoid humanitarian casualties by ensuring the food and medicine
were still able to reach the people of Iraq, suggesting a strong adherence to the protection of human rights
that would play such a large role later.
10
"Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Grilnen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90."
" The Party also expanded their definition of the conflict zone by including the dangers of weapons of
mass destruction (WMDs). Not only did they push for the removal of Iraq's WMDs, but they also called
for the creation of a WMD free zone for the entire Middle East, to include Israel. The spiral of escalation
was only steepened by Israel's possession of nuclear weapons according to this Green logic. See

71
conflicts in the world would not escalate further.12 Out of this tenet of demilitarization
arose another ideal of the Greens—the "logic of war" must be countered by a "logic of
stopping weapons exports."13
Relative to Green actions in later conflicts, in particular after 9/11 and even to an
extent the 2003 Iraq war, the Party's very loud criticism of western export industries was
a bit of an anomaly. Though there would always be a desire to restrict the spread of
weapons, over the next decade, the Greens would begin to focus blame for conflicts more
on those who started the conflict, rather than on those who supplied the weapons. That
shift would be an important recognition for the overall evolution of the Party.
The rejection of military force as an option and the choice for the use of political
pressure to end the conflict found its background both in the desire to avoid the
consequences of war and in the historical suspicion of the military and great powers so
endemic in pacifist ideals. In the case of the former, the Greens focused on the
destructive aspects of any war to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, in particular the
results of any potential American-led bombing. Such damages to the people,
infrastructure, and even the environment in both Iraq and Kuwait dispelled and
usefulness of military action according to this logic.14 Even more importantly, the
potential for humanitarian suffering as a result of a war led many Greens to reject the use
of force as a viable option.
Green Party rejections of any use of force were also grounded in the pacifist belief
that the use of military force brought with it a "danger of escalation" that could lead to a
"Erklarung zur Golfkrise."
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remilitarization or further militarization of world politics. This argument was justified
from the Green perspective with the US led military buildup for the forceful removal of
Iraqi forces from Kuwait.15 Taking it a step further even, many in the Greens felt that the
international military buildup was actually an hindrance to solving the crisis. As such,
many in the Party called on coalition forces to withdraw from the crisis area.16
These fears of escalation predominated the Greens' perspectives in spite of the
existence of a UN mandate authorizing the use of force to evict Iraq from Kuwait by a
US led coalition. Despite that authorization, the Greens still viewed it as a dangerous
precedent. The Green MP Helmut Lippelt called the UN ultimatum "playing with the
17

destruction of the world (Weltbrand)."

Whereas later the Greens would insist on a UN

mandate before any use of force, at this early stage, not even an internationally agreed
upon mandate and strong world unity could sway the Green perspective on using force.
Closely linked to this general distrust of military solutions was the perspective
that the great powers, under the leadership of the US, were using this opportunity to
pursue national interests. In particular, many in the Green Party felt that the primary
purpose for the coalition reaction to the Iraqi invasion was for the securing of "'their' oil"
in the region. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, there were some that feared that
the great powers, especially the US would try to define Saddam Hussein as the new
enemy to fill the security vacuum and provide a future role for the military and the
military-industrial complex.18
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From the Greens' perspective, the evolving policies of the Western nations toward
the use of the military in crisis situation such as in the Gulf prevented disarmament and
the creation of peaceful world order.19 The distrust, if not animosity, toward the goals of
western states, especially the US, was clearly expressed in a declaration by the Green
federal leadership of the Party after the start of the invasion to liberate Kuwait in January
1991. Referring to the casualties caused by the war, they sharply rebuked the "inhuman
happiness of the war planners in the White House."

Clearly there was not only a sharp

mistrust of the US motives in the Gulf War, but also a strong abhorrence of any casualties
caused by war.
As coalition military actions against Iraq began on 17 January 1991, the Greens
sharply criticized the US led attack, citing reports of the immense destruction and the
grief of the civilian population. They called immediately for an end to the war, claiming
that the original breach of international law could not justify the destruction of an entire
land and its population. Expressing solidarity with American protesters, the Greens
claimed they would continue with anti-war demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience
until the fighting stopped to bring pressure to bear on the government.

In every official

capacity the Greens were definitively opposed to the war and expressed that sentiment in
declarations and on the streets.

The Greens and German Participation in the Gulf War
Much like their general approach to the use of force, the majority of the Greens,
Bundeswehr," 19 March 1991, Bestand B.I.3, Akte Nr. 57, AGG, 1.
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and indeed the Party as a whole, were resolutely opposed to the use of German troops in
the Gulf War. Although the debate within Germany as a whole about the possible uses of
German soldiers in a Post Cold War world was only in its infancy,22 the Party remained
clearly distant from the perspectives of the other major German political parties. During
the Gulf War, Party declarations and press releases denounced any direct or indirect
German participation. Economic support, the deployment of the navy to the eastern
Mediterranean, the maneuvers of the German Army in Turkey, as well as the support
from German territory including transportation and over-flight rights were strongly
opposed.
The strong anathema in the Green Party toward the use of German soldiers arose
primarily out of the tragedy of German history, in particular the Second World War. This
view, encapsulated in the idea of "never again war" was strongly integrated into the
Green psyche and continually influenced Green Party decision makers. Indeed, the
Resolution adopted by the Party in Neumunster in April 1991 specified that because of
the background of German history, German soldiers should not be used in internationally
supported out of area operations, not even as peacekeepers.24 Whereas the absolutist
nature of "never again war" would later be diluted, at the time it remained extremely
pervasive and highly influential on the Green Party debate.
The goal of "never gain war" in turn had an impact on the already evolving debate
22

The Greens did recognize that the Gulf War was not the sole reason for the debate on the possible
participation of German soldiers in international operations. Rather the Gulf War led to a sharpening of a
broader debate that had already begun. See Graebener, "No Germans to the Front!," 1.
23
Pressemitteilung Nr. 803/90; "Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Grttnen im Bayreuth vom
22/23.09.90."
24
"Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Griinen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90." Such a perspective
was not far from the Kohl government's perspective either. Indeed, what would later be known as the
"Kohl Doctrine" specifically noted German history as to the reason for not sending German forces to the
Balkans initially.

75
within Germany surrounding the possible change of the Basic Law to permit out of area
operations for the German military. The Greens viewed the piecemeal support of the USled effort in the Gulf War by the German government (CDU/CSU and FDP) as well as
the SPD as a deliberate attempt to change the German Basic Law. Indeed, prominent
Green security expert Angelika Beer derisively called debate on sending German force to
the Gulf War a "welcome occasion" for the German governing coalition to take a
decisive step on the way to a "worldwide intervention capability." For the Greens at this
stage of evolution, any change to incorporate German military deployments was an
indication of a new phase of German foreign policy, one of being a great power, which
96

had to be prevented.

The decision to accept a greater military role was "the wrong
97

signal and especially the wrong lesson from German history."

As such, the Greens

rejected any change in the Basic Law to address the possibility of out of area operations,
no matter what form it took.
Much like the overall perspective on the use of force, the Green opposition to the
use of German peacekeepers had a strong number of dissenters, though not as many as
the overall debate on the use of military force. The official resolutions of the Party, such
as that from Neumunster, rejected any participation in peacekeeping operations even
For some in the Greens, the SPD was the sole remaining chance to prevent what they perceived as a
militarization of German foreign and security policy. Indeed, a Green position paper in March 1991 argued
that a solid attempt must be made to influence the SPD. The paper suggested "internal" discussions with
leaders of the SPD and its federal level Parliamentarians to influence their decisions. Similarly, in the
resolution from Bayreuth in September 1990, the Greens publicly called on the SPD "especially" to
withhold their support for any change in the Basic Law. See Graebener, "No Germans to the Front!," 1,19,
and "Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Griinen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90." That the SPD was
already viewing the Greens as an incapable coalition partner because of their stance in foreign and security
affairs illustrates the large disconnect between the two future coalition partners and the gulf that had to be
overcome.
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under the auspices of NATO, the WEU, or, surprisingly, especially the UN. Some in the
Party believed that agreeing to peacekeeping operations with the UN would only serve as
a "door opener" for further military participation in NATO or the WEU.28 Moreover,
there was the distinct fear that introducing German peacekeepers would actually escalate
the situation, rather than reduce the tensions.29
Yet at the federal level a small number, such as MP Alfred Mechtersheimer,
accepted the principle of German involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. He
conditioned that support by arguing at the same time that it must not become a "door
opener," for further expansion of German participation. Mechtersheimer argued that it
would not be a contradiction for the Green peace policy to accept Germans as
peacekeepers. However, since it could be perceived practically as an acceptance of
further military operations outside of peacekeeping duties, which he disagreed with, even
he rejected the use of German peacekeepers.

For the Greens there was practically

unanimous rejection of using German combat forces anywhere and strong majorities
against even the use of peacekeepers. Interestingly, as will be demonstrated in the
following chapter, Mechtersheimer's argument would prove somewhat correct, as the
eventual approval of peacekeepers opened the door for greater involvement.

A Baseline with Dissent
In defining their policies subsequent to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iraq, Green
perspectives showed stark differences relative to later years, in particular to their time in
27
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government. In these early years, there was a congruence of the normative ideas of
"never again Auschwitz" and "never again war," as they acted synergistically.
Disdaining war and preserving human rights, in this case more specifically abhorring the
consequences of war, were one in the same. Similarly, there was no linkage to the
international community for the Greens. Despite the legitimacy afforded by a UN
mandate, there was zero pressure exerted upon the Greens for change. Not only was
there no momentum for change, but there was also no catalyst to begin the process.
Thus, opposing war was the only possibility for the Greens.
Yet amid the near absolute opposition to the war, one very significant
development for the overall use of force debate in the Green occurred. There were a few
voices that spoke for the possibility of change, though they were largely drowned out by
those for continuity of pacifism. A few accepted that the use of force may be legitimate
in some cases. An even smaller minority proposed the use of German peacekeepers
suggesting that the Green Party's version of pacifism even at this early stage was not
absolute. And for the first time, the very nascent concept of direct German involvement
at the international level began to appear within small minorities in the Party. With the
end of the Cold War and the appearance of new security challenges, some in the Party
questioned the dogmatic adherence to strict pacifism. Could it work in a more dynamic
world free of nuclear bloc confrontation? What would later emerge as a serious debate
during the Bosnian campaign and continue through Kosovo, Enduring Freedom, and Iraq
was barely in its embryonic stage.
Seemingly contrary to Green pacifist values, some well known names were
suggesting that the use of military force could be legitimate. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who
B.II.3, Akte Nr. 6024, AGG; Graebener, "No Germans to the Front!," 10.
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would be one of the original realo MPs noted that the American war against the Germans
in the Second World War was legitimate, thereby diluting the absolutist rejection of the
use of force. The MP Alfred Mechtersheimer echoed a similar sentiment, believing that
"there are historical situations in which the international community could be forced to
use military force." Both, however, believed that war should only be the final means
available, the ultima ratio. Joschka Fischer, who would become the champion of change
for the Greens, also showed his first indications of change now, even if they were quite
mild, asking what the borders of pacifism truly were. How pacifists deal with the use of
chemical weapons, invasions, or the taking of hostages needed to be defined. For
Fischer, avoiding the issues surrounding the sanctioned use of force could make the
Green Party's version of pacifism unbelievable, which could have dire consequences for
the future of the Party.

Those asking the questions now about the nature of pacifism

amid difficult crises became prominent members of what would be termed the realo
section of the Party.
Even as a large majority of the Party officially rejected the use of German troops
in the Gulf War, the discussion of that possibility in public was not completely a taboo
subject, though it often elicited a strong backlash. It is worth briefly discussing this case
to show the emotional level involved even at this early stage by using a series of papers
from the late summer and early fall of 1990 by Bernd Ulrich and Udo Knapp, who were
staff members for prominent members Waltraud Schoppe and Ludger Volmer.
Udo Knapp, in an article published in the Left newspaper taz recognized the
importance of military pressure to achieve a diplomatic solution. In searching for a
solution to the Gulf crisis, he believed comparing Hitler with Saddam was correct.
31
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Moreover, the failure of appeasement vis-a-vis Germany prior to the start of the Second
World War should not be forgotten, as it offered important lessons for the Gulf war. As
the UN "internationalized" the conflict, he called on Germany to undertake its
"responsibility for world peace," to include logistical support and practical helping
measures. Most controversially, he appealed for the active involvement of Germany in
the Gulf War, even to the extent of the use of German military forces. His perspectives
were well ahead of the debate, putting him very squarely in the leading edge of the realo
argument. According to Ludger Volmer, his appeal met up with almost absolute
rejection.

Indeed, Knapp was called a "warmonger" by some of his own party members

at a discussion in Frankfurt.
Bernd Ulrich similarly suggested the necessity of German involvement in world
crises, proposing that Germany should be a new civil world power and act to create a new
order of peace. Unlike Knapp, however, Ulrich believed that the chances of success of a
military intervention would be doubtful in the short term, and fatal in the midterm.
Consistent with the fear so common within the Party that war brings further escalation,
Ulrich believed that any military response from the West would only lead to a stronger
counter-reflex from Arabs and Islamic people. Although he argued against military
force, he believed that the Germans must undertake some measures to halt the war.
Deciding for a militarization or demilitarization of international conflicts would be the
"decisive question" for the future role of Germany. To influence such a discussion,
Germany, and the Greens, had to become involved. In the case of the Gulf War, an
economic embargo was the best mechanism for solving the conflict and at the same time
32
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beginning the process of demilitarization that the Green Party held so dear.33
Though Ulrich and Knapp argued in the end for different approaches to solving
the crisis with Iraq, both maintained that a newly unified Germany, and in turn the Green
Party, must play a role in the conflict. Effecting the world and by proxy interjecting
some Green values, in particular the demilitarization of world and local conflicts and the
economic disparities between North and South, required involvement. Though these
discussions were clearly not framed in this context, the beginning of the idea expressed
quite often later, that of Regierungsfahigkeit, can be seen among the suggestions of
Knapp and Ulrich. Though there is no clear documentation that participation in
government was a defining feature of these arguments, the call for involvement and the
need for a German responsibility clearly do indicate the infancy of the expansion in
Green thinking that will eventually result in the conscious desire to become
regierungsfdhig later.
In this early stage of the debate, the divide between the realos and the fundis was
slowly beginning to clarify itself. The new realos were very clearly a small minority and
their ideas were not exactly concrete. The group that would eventually play such a large
role in the evolution of the Party in the late 1990s, the swing group, did not exist at this
point; they were no different from the traditional fundis. The initial evolution of some
MPs at the federal level, based in large part on their greater interaction at the international
level, also meant that the difference between the federal level and the grass roots, that
would explode so drastically in 1999, were beginning to show, even if they were still
very minute.
involvement of the German government, thus maintaining a strong Green perspective.
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Comparing the policies of the Green during the Gulf War to those during the
Kosovo crisis and after 9/11 gives the sharpest exemplar of the evolution by the Greens.
Absolutist pacifism, predominant rejection of international involvement and, an absolute
rejection of any positive role of military force were predominant here. Over the ensuing
decade, the importance and even working definitions of the ideals of "never again
Auschwitz" and "never again war" would evolve, the dynamics of the international
community began to filter to the Party's leaders, and voices for change began to speak.
With the eruption of war in Europe's own backyard, these changes would be decisively
set in motion. The Gulf War can thus be considered a baseline of Green philosophy on
the use of force, even as some voices of dissent began to emerge.

A WITHERING OF PACIFISM?

As the war in the former Yugoslavia spread, becoming increasingly more brutal,
and as television reports brought its horrors to the everyday European, many pacifists
were forced to address the new challenges it created. The Green Party's view of peace
politics was challenged as the increasing frequency of ethnic conflicts since the end of the
Cold War "deeply troubled" the Party.34 The wars in the former Yugoslavia, in particular
in Bosnia, became a "test case" for all of the security and peace policies of the Green
Party. That general debate, moreover, was a direct reflection of the overall discussion in
the Party about the necessity and legitimacy of German military out of area operations.
34
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Ignoring the conflict was not an option for either the Europeans or the Greens.
According to Joschka Fischer disregarding this ethnic cleansing could not be accepted by
Europe, for it would throw it back to the time of "nationalist chaos."

Volmer notes that

the Greens did not argue for remaining aloof from the conflict. Rather the choice of
methods was at stake.

Moreover, as a general Green Party declaration noted, standing

idly by could mean that war and territorial aggression could become more common in the
future, the direct antithesis of Green values.

Taking it a step further, by June 1993,

some of the leadership of the Greens were appealing for an "active policy of international
intervention for the protection of human rights."39 Such a statement, however, left
considerable room for interpretation. The question was what form that intervention
should be.
Amid the early years of the violence of Bosnia, the distinct groups began to
distinguish themselves based on their varying approaches to addressing the conflict. It is
important to note here that the adherents to these various groups fluctuated, as their views
changed; to say that someone was a realo in 1995, does not necessarily mean that they
accepted that perspective in 1993. Realos generally broached the idea of an active
intervention that could include military force, though generally not German forces, to
stop the genocide. The fundis outright rejected any form of military intervention, strictly
leadership noted that the call by some within the Party for Bundeswehr participation in UN military actions
"discredited the serious debate" within the Party. Moreover, in an opening paragraph the Party leadership
rejected the notion floating in the press that the expressions of some members for a military intervention in
the former Yugoslavia or the participation of German soldiers on such actions represented the view of the
Party as a whole. Such comments reflect the continued influence of the Party as a whole of its pacifist
ideals as well as its intense distaste for a new concept of German responsibility.
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adhering to the credos of the old pacifism. At this point, the swing group continued to
adhere to the basic pillars of pacifism and was for the most part indistinguishable from
the traditional pacifists. Yet its later adherents, who would not be identifiable for another
five years or so, began to ever so slightly differ from their fundi brethren in their attempt
to define a policy that addressed the crisis and still affirmed their values. In essence, they
tended to address the conflict quicker than the fundis did. They called for the
construction of a new "world internal policy" (Weltinnenpolitik) that envisioned military
protection for humanitarian convoys and the proclamation of safe zones to be protected
by the UN.40
The official position of the Party, which reflected the strong majority at this point,
generally continued to suggest that the concepts of non-violence and the protection of
human rights as complementary. The credos "never again Auschwitz" and "never again
war" for the most part remained two sides of the same coin in policy. Non-military
mechanisms remained the preferred method to address the Balkan crisis. However, as
will be noted later, the Bosnian conflict would eventually fundamentally challenge the
complementarities of these two tenets.

Reactions to the Evolving Crisis
In the early stages of Yugoslavia's collapse and explosion into war, the Greens
were not shy about expressing their opinions on the looming crisis. Early in the war
between the Croatian and Serbian Republics when Yugoslavia still existed, the Greens
continued to argue for the creation of an "overall solution" that envisioned a redefined
40
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federal or confederate structure, economic assistance, and democratic developments.41
Yet, as conditions worsened through the late summer of 1991 the Green leadership
shifted its position and for the first time blamed the Serbian government for the war and
appealed for an economic embargo to stop the conflict. All thoughts of a military
intervention were still soundly rejected by the Party as a whole.

Though still steeped in

traditional pacifist values, that early proclamation in 1991 would provide a hint of a
larger and deeper Green Party involvement in the crisis. There was now a thorough
recognition of the dangers of the crisis.
As the conflict raged and the Slovenian and Croatian Republics vied for
independence from the Yugoslav federation the German government became a strong
proponent of their independent recognition, hoping it would halt the violence of the Serbs
in sending a signal that their aggression would bring no benefits.43 In December 1991
Germany recognized the two new states, which was followed in kind by the European
Community in January 1992. The Green Party, based in large part based on the support
for the right of self-determination, also supported this motion, though they would
eventually come to regret that decision as it would be a primary factor in the spread of the
44

war.
Even as the Greens supported the recognition of the two states, the fear of
escalation interjected a traditional value of pacifism into the debate. In March 1991 after
traveling in the region Reinhard Weisshun, a staff member of Gerd Poppe, warned of the
41
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dangers of a war spreading to Bosnia. He eloquently defined the dangers of the policy of
recognition Germany was debating, noting the deleterious effects it could have on the
Yugoslav Republic with the Serbs and Croats already fighting and the strong divisions
between those two groups in the neighboring ethnically intermingled Bosnia. By January
1992, even as the Greens accepted the recognition based on humanistic values, Party
leaders were publicly expressing the fear that the war could spread to other regions, in
particular Bosnia, and in turn bring monumental challenged to Germany and by proxy the
Greens.45
Despite these reservations and the strong tendencies of traditional pacifism, the
Green Party did accept the recognition of the two individual states. Though in tune with
other Green fundamentals, it did represent a new aspect to the Green foreign and security
policy debate—involvement. In essence, the Greens took the first small overt steps in
their debate, shunning for the first time the old principles of aloofness and as an antiestablishment party. To be sure, not everyone accepted this involvement, especially the
grass roots, but this was an important step by the leadership. As the international domain
began to have an increasing influence, Party leaders began to not only recognize the need
for involvement, but also some form of action. As the crisis worsened, that involvement
would only deepen.
The outbreak of the war in Bosnia in April 1992 created the very escalation the
Greens had sought to avoid, as the war between Serbia and Croatia ballooned into the
atrocities committed by both ethnic Serbs and Croats. The appearance of concentration
camps as well as the circulation of news of massacres, rape gangs, and expulsion
confronted members of the Green Party by directly contradicting the Green centerpiece of
45
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protecting human rights and the embedded norm of "never again Auschwitz." Indeed, in
June 1992 the Party leadership publicly recognized that the wars in the former
Yugoslavia created "new types of challenges" for Green peace politics that traditional
valued may not necessarily be able to address.
The events in Bosnia in 1992 and 1993 were quickly reflected in the publications
of Party members and organization as the Greens finally joined the public discourse. The
future MP Claudia Roth referred to the "tragedy of Yugoslavia," believing that such
actions had definitive elements of fascist ideology.47 Citing statistics to highlight the
tragedies that had befallen Bosnia, Helmut Lippelt, a leading foreign policy expert in the
Party, stated that without question, the conscious policy emanating from the Serbs was
genocide.48 Party resolutions at various levels referred to the "genocide in Bosnia,"49 or
noted that the concentration camps, expulsions, and mass murders were "signs of a fascist
genocide," that had been viewed as no longer possible after the end of National Socialism
in Germany.50 The reference to the belief that such actions had ended with the fall of
Nazi Germany illustrates the degree to which the early events in Bosnia shocked the
Greens, as their ideals of pacifism had been in many respects built on the idea that such
events could no longer occur in the modern world.
At the most basic level and over the long term, the Bosnian conflict led to stress
between the two values that had defined the Party for so long—pacifism and protecting
46
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human rights. Amid the brutal violence effecting the people of the region, the Green
values of non-violence were having little effect. Despite this ineffectiveness, official
Party declarations appeared to reflect their apparent congruity and continued harmony.
The Declaration at the Party Day in Bonn in November 1993 reflected that even in its
title—"Non-violence and Human Rights: Foundations of Peace Politics in the Alliance
90/The Greens." Its preamble highlighted these lessons: "The most important
consequence from German history for us is never again war. But it is also never again
Auschwitz."51 In fact, this apparent congruity would be at the heart of the Green
quandary for the Balkans and would be a primary means of change within the Party. In
effect, applying the former to the wars in Bosnia prohibited active intervention with
military force, while employing the latter ideal called for effective action, which could
possibly include military action. Bosnia thus left the Green basis of peace politics in a
complete quandary.
In the debate on the possibility of military intervention in Bosnia, these two
historical lessons were seen with varying levels of adherence, depending on the guiding
philosophy of the individual. The synergy that applied during the Gulf War began to
break down on the violence in Bosnia. As will be demonstrated below, fundis tended to
hold firm to "never again war," while the realos would believe that "never again
Auschwitz" should be the preeminent value of the Greens. The majority dogmatically
remained wedded to the tenet of "never again war," while others, at first a small minority,
began to question the absolutist nature of avoiding war when faced with genocide. The
early shocks of genocide in Bosnia forced the beginning of a major debate, with these
two ingrained ideals as the backdrop.
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The Early Debate on Military Intervention in Bosnia
A quick overview of the primary Green Party declarations in the early phase of
the Bosnia debate suggests that the official line remained steady, wavering little from its
pacifist ideology. At a conference in Hanover in March 1993, Green Party leaders
rejected by a large majority three resolutions calling for "humanitarian interventions,"
implying the use of military force, and instead passed a resolution calling on non-military
methods, such as embargoes, to solve the Bosnia crisis. Another resolution from Green
Party leaders in Bonn in June 1993 believed that military intervention could not bring a
solution to the Bosnian war, though it called for an "energetic [non-military] intervention
from the UN."

At the important special Party Day in Bonn in October 1993, Party

members passed a resolution that opposed military intervention, but argued for "fast,
hard, effective, and consequent, but not military" action.

In the 1994 election platform,

the Green strictly rejected UN peace interventions, such as in Bosnia or Somalia, that
used military forces.54
The official party line apparent in its declarations and resolutions, however,
masked a deepening conflict in the party. Even early on in the Balkan wars, the voices of
dissent, primarily those who would define the realo side of the spectrum, began to
emerge, questioning at first whether pacifism should be so absolute. The voices adhering
to the traditional pacifism, however, still remained the strong majority. Importantly,
differences between the Party leadership and its members on security issues began to
become evident for the first time, especially at the 1993 special federal delegate
52
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conference in Bonn.
At this stage in the debate, the different heritages of the Party members helped to
define their positions. The East German Greens (Alliance 90), who as of 1990 were in
the Bundestag, focused strongly on the violations of human rights in the Balkan wars.
They were much more open to the use of military force to stop genocide, in large part
because of their acceptance that the threat of military force had been a defining factor of
the end of the Cold War, and became an early driving force in the debate. Indeed, as part
of the Bundestag, the Alliance 90 presented a motion in 1992 that called for changing the
Basic Law to allow peacekeeping missions "to protect people from one another" under
the auspices of a reformed UN.55
The West German Greens, however, remained more focused on how the tenets of
pacifism could be used to find definitive solutions for the Balkan wars.56 They were
distinctly more hesitant in considering the possibility of using military force to stop the
conflict, as the tenets of "nuclear pacifism" continued to dominate the perspectives of the
majority. Over the course of the debate during the 1990s, however, the West German
Greens became the defining players, while the East German Greens faded increasingly
more into the background, especially at the federal leadership level. As such, the focus
will be on their debate.
Within the West German Greens, the debate about the use of military force in the
Balkans began in earnest in August 1992, after Helmut Lippelt and Claudia Roth, two
leaders and future MPs, returned from a fact finding trip in Yugoslavia. Both called for
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the use of force to free the concentration camps in Bosnia, though Roth later diluted her
en

remarks.

Ralf Flicks, a leading figure in the Party, echoed a similar sentiment in

December 1992, arguing that the erection of demilitarized zones, the supplying of
foodstuffs to civilians, and the prevention of delivery of war materiel to the warring
factions should be achieved "when necessary also with military methods."58
In an April 1993 essay entitled "Intervention in Yugoslavia?," Lippelt, one of the
early realos, expanded on his earlier thoughts. He proffered that the need to intervene
militarily was based on the necessity to respond to genocide. In what would become a
defining feature of the pro-intervention argument, Lippelt publicly claimed that the Green
pacifist axiom of the dangers of escalation with further military involvement was in this
case questionable. Moreover, he openly asked whether intervention must always lead to
an enlargement of the war. He specifically cited the example of the Allied intervention in
the Second World War, claiming that the German concentration camps would not have
been liberated were it not for the Allied intervention.59 Unlike others in the Greens who
took the lesson of "never again war" from the past, Lippelt stood this lesson on its head
and argued that force should be used to free concentration camps to stop that which
historically had only been halted with military force.
The majority of the Party, including most of the leadership, however, did not
share that realo perspective. Indeed, a declaration from the Party leadership conference
in February 1993 noted that the public statements by some in the Party supporting
military intervention in Bosnia were isolated perspectives. The conference's end
57

Volmer, Die Grilnen und die Aufienpolitik, 499. Though both proposed the use of force to free the
concentration camps, neither supported the use of German troops in Yugoslavia. For both historical
reasons as well as a fear of the militarization of German policy, both firmly rejected even German
peacekeepers. See below for a larger discussion of this issue.

91
declaration believed that such ideas actually "discredited the serious debate" within the
Party on how to address the Bosnian crisis. Accordingly, the statement enunciated that
the "overwhelming majority" of the Party rejected any intervention in the former
Yugoslavia, choosing instead to support non-military methods such as embargoes.60
Indeed, with strong majorities the leadership council rejected motions that leaned toward
humanitarian interventions three times in attempting to define their final statement.61 As
of early 1993, the leadership and the members remained largely together, with only a few
realo voices making headlines.
The clear majority of those that did not support military intervention in late 1992
and early 1993 included some who would later support armed intervention, suggesting
that the realo perspective was just in its infancy. Joschka Fischer, who would be the
champion of active military interventions in Kosovo and in support of Enduring
Freedom, would not be a member of the realos until the summer of 1995 after the
Srebrenica massacre. He did, however, decisively recognize the need for debate within
the party, but in August 1992 he followed a traditionalist argument, believing that a
military intervention would only lead to an expansion of the war and not to a cessation of
the ethnic cleansing. Significantly, he recognized that pacifism could not have stopped
the murders in Auschwitz, which conformed to his rejection of absolute pacifism, and
suggested the potential for change.

Such a viewpoint differs significantly from that

proffered by Fischer in an open letter to the Party in July 1995, after the Srebrenica
massacre. As will be described later, the worsening of the events in Bosnia and the
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recognition of the ineffectiveness of political measures to stop ethnic cleansing will be an
important factor in the evolution of the views of many in the Green Party.
Ludger Volmer, one of the later leaders of the swing group as it emerged during
the Bosnian conflict, noted in a September 1992 essay the defining aspect of the debate at
the time. He bluntly stated that "pacifism was in crisis." Specifically, political pacifism,
which was defined by historical experiences, was being challenged by the brutality in
Bosnia. He decisively rejected using military force to free concentration camps, instead
arguing for a new Green foreign policy that would champion a new form of political
pacifism. Under this new guise, multilateral institutions would supplant national interests
and nationally controlled armies. For Bosnia, this meant a complete blockade and the
recognition of Milosevic as a war criminal.

Interestingly, the differences between

Fischer and Volmer, who would have rancorous debates in the coming years, were not
that stark in early 1993. Though both showed a recognition of the challenged Bosnia
posed for Green Party values, it would be there different reactions to the worsening
violence that would provide the primary reason for their later divergence in opinion.
Even Claudia Roth, who had earlier proposed using military force to liberate
concentration camps felt the need to clarify here statements amid the strong resistance
within the Party. She diluted her earlier comments in an open letter to the party in
August 1992 entitled "Never again Fascism—Never again War" and moved away from
the redo perspective and into what would become the swing group. From her
perspective, the "fascist" elements of the Bosnian war directly contradicted the ideal of
"never again Auschwitz" and had to be opposed with "every means" short of the use of
"Bitte nicht schon wieder ein Glaubenskrieg bei den Griinen!"
Volmer, "Bosnien und der Pazifismus."
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military forces. Claiming that war can never be a method for solving conflicts, she did,
however, call for the Greens to discuss the issue and to think about all possible options
that could stop the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. In backing off some of her earlier harsh
rhetoric, she claimed that her call to free the camps was neither a betrayal of the values of
pacifism nor an acceptance of the "military logic." She was not distancing herself from
her "left identity."64 Though Roth had been galvanized by the horrors of the war to
consider other action, even the use of force to liberate concentration camps, the strength
of the Party's pacifist ideals, however, imposed considerable pressure to the extent that
she felt the need to clarify her views.
The Party's overall perspective on the possibilities of military intervention in the
former Yugoslavia does become somewhat murkier in the summer of 1993. The
declaration from a June 1993 special Landerrat meeting in Bonn designed to project a
course for the Party for the Bosnian conflict argued for the expansion of political
methods, especially under the UN, to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia. It also cited a need to
"protect" humanitarian food convoys from "terrorist attacks." 5 Nina Phillipi, citing an
article from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, believes that this resolution suggested a
distinct shift in the Green Policy toward support for out of area actions, in that the
resolution passed appealed for the use of force to protect UN humanitarian convoys.
However, Ludger Volmer suggests the resolution from this Bonn conference was
primarily a compromise before the main Party Day Conference in Bonn in October.66
The Landerrat meeting was in fact a very complicated and difficult process
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designed to find a guiding principle for a leadership that was very divided. Indeed, after
the conference, the Green Party leaders were in fact only able to say with clarity that the
view of the Party's peace politics had become "unclear."

A number of motions were

presented at this meeting that represented several different viewpoints, though none of
them found strong majorities. Even the final concluding resolution was based on a
compromise and in the end, the meeting failed to chart a clear course for the Party on the
Bosnian crisis. This largely dispels Philippi's idea that this represented a fundamental
shift in the Party, as there was no clear consensus at all.
At the onset, eight motions were proposed, of which four were later voted upon
after further negotiations. The proposal from the March 1993 Hannover meeting that
focused on a general "civilizing" of international affairs through demilitarization and
institutionalization of international affairs was deemed too general for this Bosnia
specific conference and set aside.68 A revision of the Hannover resolution attempted to
address the Bosnia conflict more specifically by including a paragraph that decisively
rejected military interventions in Bosnia, believing such outside interventions could not
remain neutral and could not achieve the goal of de-escalation. This motions received
thirteen supporting votes, thirteen rejecting, and two members withheld their votes. As
such, this resolution was withdrawn.69
The two remaining motions, one proposed by Helmut Lippelt and the other by a
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group led by Friedrich Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf, each received a majority vote
during the first round. Lippelt's received a clear majority of fifteen for and seven against,
though with eleven abstentions, while Baringdorf s received fourteen supporting votes,
thirteen against, and five abstentions. Though Lippelt's received a larger majority, the
high number of abstentions meant that it did not have as much support among the
participants as was desired.
The motion from Lippelt was more along the lines of the realo perspective.
Citing examples of genocide and the lack of international protection even in the so called
protection zones, this proposal set out that international politics for the Bosnian crisis had
"collapsed." Clarifying that the Greens were decisively opposed to the use of German
soldiers in the Bosnian crisis, the proposal argued primarily for non-violent measures to
stop the war and address the humanitarian crisis. Croatia should be pressured
diplomatically to stop the ethnic cleansing, while Germany should open its doors to
refugees.70
Baringdorf s suggestion, which would eventually be adopted in revised form,
likewise noted the devastating war in Bosnia and similarly expounded the dangers of a
militarization of German foreign policy through the use of German troops in Bosnia or
elsewhere. For the Bosnian conflict the only possibility of success was through UN. It
sought to use non-military methods, such as embargoes and political pressure to force the
warring parties to end hostilities. It stopped short of supporting some form of military
intervention.71
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Between the two proposals, neither developed a clear majority of support. Thus,
shortly before the final vote, a number of participants, including Ludger Volmer, Helmut
Lippelt, and Baringdorf, developed an ad-hoc group to create a compromise that could be
supported by a strong majority. After a vote between the two motions, Baringdorf s
received a slim majority of 16-14, meaning that it would become the primary document
that would be supplemented by elements of Lippelt's.72
While both proposals had similar elements, at issue was a section of demands
from Lippelt's motion. Given the "alarming" situation in Bosnia, he argued for four
immediate measures to stave off catastrophe. First, the provisions of the populations
should be secured. Second, humanitarian supply convoys should be protected from
"terrorist attacks." Third, the boycott should be fully implemented, even through
"coercive police methods" if necessary. Fourth, weapons exports to the region should be
interrupted.73 Many of the delegates wanted these four demands included and by
integrating these aspects into the section of Baringdorf s proposal, it received a solid
majority of 20 to 10. The top thirty Green Party leaders from the Ldnderrat had general
agreement, though by no means unanimity, on the idea to protect humanitarian convoys,
though there was some resistance to an enlarged view supporting active defense, meaning
the possible use of combat power. In speeches after the vote several delegates distanced
themselves from the preamble of Baringdorf s proposal because it supported the active
protection of these UN safe areas and the convoys.74
Thus, the Ldnderrat declaration seemed to suggest a much more robust
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perspective for international intervention in the Bosnian conflict, while still maintaining a
strict rejection of any German participation. Even that was declaration was a
compromise that garnered only two-thirds support among a small group of leaders.
However, as the October 1993 Bonn Party Day will show, the views of this small portion
of the leadership were out of touch with that of the rank and file membership. In large
part due to their fact-finding missions the necessity of involvement, and with their
perceived evolution of the axiom "never again Auschwitz," became further internalized
for some leaders, but not yet members. This would be the first indication, though to be
sure not the last, of a growing rift between leadership and grass roots in the use of force
debate.

The Bonn Party Day
In preparation for this October 1993 Party Day conference, the arguments for and
against military intervention in the Balkans were clearly laid out in a series of essays in
the August/September 1993 issue of Punkte Vier, the magazine of the Green Party. "The
military intervention in the former Yugoslavia is unavoidable in order to force a cease
fire, which would bring an end to the death and aggression and, free from new militarily
created faits accomplis, could be used to search for a political solution." With that
sentence, members of the Greens in favor of military intervention, led by Helmut Lippelt,
began to lay out their case. With the brutalities in the Balkans that filled Europe with
"shame" in the background, these realo Greens felt that a limited political intervention
could no longer succeed. Indeed, to do nothing meant the situation in the Balkans would
only worsen. As such, the value inherent in the Green Party's pacifism, that force leads
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to more violence and victims, had to be called into question. They decisively rejected the
traditional argument of escalation, which would become a common practice for many
realos.
To stop the genocide in the region, they called for the UN to become an mediator
with some power, to include military force. For the first time, and in stark difference to
the policy during the Gulf War when the Greens rejected force even with a UN mandate,
the Greens would begin to argue for the empowerment of the UN. As such, they
supported a UN military intervention, with a strengthened peacekeeping mandate, to
protect and supply the civilians in the Bosnian controlled area. The use of "coercive
measures" could no longer be "categorically rejected." Limiting intervention simply to
humanitarian help meant more violation of human rights and possibly even the
acceptance of further genocide.75 By this point for the realos, not only had the two
axioms of "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz" ceased to be the same side of
a coin, but the latter began to trump the former.
Though this relatively small group of Greens was calling for the use of military
force, its premises did not include a blanket support of military strategies. The use of
force was designed to protect civilians, particularly those in the safe areas in Bosnian
controlled territory. Importantly, it did not support a large intervention force designed to
stop the war; rather it hoped to create the space for a political solution. Moreover, these
Greens did not support the use of German troops, believing that it would be politically
counterproductive. Relative to their cousins of a decade later, these original supporters of
the use of military force were still quite distant from later Green realo views on out of
area policies.
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The ideas laid out in Punkte Vier in favor of military options were not appearing
for the first time. Indeed, they were quite similar to those in early July 1993 from a group
led by Gerd Poppe, foreign policy speaker of the eastern German Alliance 90 faction in
the Bundestag. He along with other members of the Green Party had visited Washington
DC and attempted to push the Clinton Administration for a stronger engagement of the
US in Bosnia. They appealed for an expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate to ensure the
protection of humanitarian supply convoys, an increase in the number of UN troops in
Bosnia, as well as the creation of parity between the warring parties by destroying the
heavy weapons of the Serbs and Croats by "suitable military methods based on Chapter
VII of the UN Charter."76
Much like the earlier qualification Claudia Roth issued, Poppe's aggressive
comments were qualified two days later after a report in the left wing paper taz. He
denied that his delegation had pushed for a US military intervention in Bosnia, clarifying
that they had spoken of UN actions rather than US actions. Moreover, Poppe cited the
need to protect the civilian population from "terror attacks" as a reason to extend the UN
mandate and increase its troop presence. He tempered the call for the destruction of Serb
and Croat artillery pieces, whom he primarily blamed for the "terror attacks" against the
civilian population, by stating the belief that it could be done without leading to a further
77

escalation.
With this press declaration, Poppe likely sought to assuage some of the pacifist
elements of the Party. First, he sought to ease the fears of escalation, which remained
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omnipresent among the Greens. Moreover, the inclusion of the phrase "terror attacks," a
phrase not used in his original declaration, was likely included to highlight the dangers to
the civilian population, which resonated well within the Party. The need to clarify such
statements reflects the distinct divergences within the Party at this point when discussing
the use of force in Bosnia.
The essay against military intervention in Punkte Vier, written by the prolific
writer and future MP Ludger Volmer, focused on the fact that such interventions would
be directly contrary to Green Party values. Volmer asked how the party could support
military intervention while at the same time continue to speak out for disarmament.78
Indeed, Volmer and other opponents were maintaining the strong Green belief that
military intervention would only lead to further escalation. From this perspective,
supporting military force damaged the believability of the Party.
Instead of military action, they argued that the ideas inherent in civil conflict
intervention had not been or were only partially used to date in Bosnia. Noting the weak
status of the embargo and blockade, Volmer believed that they should finally be
strengthened to the point previously envisioned, which could lead to success. Though
these non-military mechanisms had not been totally effective to date, this was not a
reason to "resignedly" reach for the military option. Still, Volmer argued that the
international community had to get involved with an active human rights policy.
A—W. Schulz, Akte Nr. 168, AGG.
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As the delegates assembled in Bonn in October 1993 amid the violence in Bosnia,
the Party stood poised for an intense debate. Two decisive perspectives had been laid out
in the Party's magazine. Moreover, there were rumblings amid both the grass roots and
the leadership for a clarification of the June 1993 Landerrat's proclamation that had
suggested a possible use of military forces. Local groups saw it as a severe distortion of
the Party's essential roots and had called for this special conference to address the
difficult issue.80 Unlike the earlier June conference, the Bonn BDK debate involved the
entire constituency of the Party. In the end, three distinct "currents"—radical pacifists,
supporters of peacekeeping operations, and those who appealed for stronger military
oi

intervention—aimed to determine the future direction of the Party in military affairs.

It

is with this Party Day that the three distinct groups within the Party begin to become clear
enough for decisive distinction.
Though there were numerous position papers offered by divergent groups within
the Party, only eleven were officially put forward as proposals for adoption at the
October conference. In the first round of voting, all four realo proposals in support of a
military intervention along the lines of that proposed by the Landerrat were dismissed, by
receiving more no than yes votes. From such leaders as Gerd Poppe, Hubert Kleinert,
and even Joschka Fischer these ideas often rested along the premise of providing
protection to endangered people in the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, the title of Gerd
Poppe's proposal blatantly argued for a humanitarian intervention. In it, he suggested
government. See "Tendenzbeschluss des Kommisarischen Landerrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993."
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that supply convoys should be protected even with "armed force" if necessary.82
While adhering to the traditional green values of rejecting war as a means of
politics, demilitarization, and the apparent militarization of German politics, Hubert
Kleinert, Joschka Fischer, and others offered a new twist to traditional Green lines.
Entitled "For a Non-violence Policy in a Violent World" their proposal paid special
attention to the German responsibility based on its history for preventing a recurrence of
fascism. As the authors contended: "No one can with definitive certainty and for all of
the future rule out that such a situation could repeat itself." Though they did not believe
that such a possibility should guide foreign and security policy, its potential necessitated
that the international community should maintain means and ways to subdue future
dangerous states, without resorting to military means.

In the case of Fischer, the mantra

of prevention of genocide and fascism was clearly becoming dominant though his support
for military operations was still limited.
Despite some of its commonality with the final adopted resolution, the paragraphs
of the Fischer declaration that argued that there could be exceptions to the Green
perspective for intervention, and that the Party should be prepared for them, proved
decisively unpopular with other Green members. The proposition, though not openly
supporting military actions, left the door open for future possibilities. Still, it was
diametrically opposed to the grass root beliefs of the majority of the Party at the time,
which largely held to strict pacifism and remained unwilling to jettison its pacifist views
in favor of an active intervention policy, putting Fischer then on the fringes of the realo
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perspective at this point.
While they majority of the Party did not want military measures used, the Bonn
Party Day did demonstrate that the strict adherence to the tenets of early Green pacifism
could also be tempered. Reimer Hamann's proposal, for example, rejected any
discussion of the use of military force. He questioned how Greens could speak for
disarmament while simultaneously proposing military intervention. In his view, the Party
should not disappoint its largely pacifist constituency. The three radical pacifist
proposals brought before the Party Day were, like the intervention ideas, rejected by a
majority of the Party, thus suggesting that absolutist ideas in the face of brutality in
Bosnia was also a minority opinion.
Of the remaining four proposals that received a majority of support in the first
vote, two were dismissed in the second round voting, leaving only those from Barbel
Hohn and Ludger Volmer. Hohn's was more similar to the radical pacifist ideals with
some important differences, while Volmer's fell into the category of supporting
peacekeeping operations, though still a far stretch from the realo perspective. In the third
round of voting, Volmer's received a significant majority, though not enough for formal
adoption. These two in effect were setting the boundaries of what was fast emerging as
the swing group.
The proposal from Hohn and others leaned heavily on early Green principles. It
fiercely decried the principle of international responsibility being floated by some
German leaders as a means of securing interests through military action. Moreover,
though the proposal supported the UN, it rejected the use of UN military force of any
"Ausserordentliche Bundesversammlung von Blindnis 90/Die Grunen."
84
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kind to secure human rights, believing it would more likely endanger them. Though the
authors recognized that wars were occurring, they did not believe any military actions
were a means of solution. Rather conflict prevention, disarmament, and global
development provided the method of stopping wars.85
Despite these general radical pacifist ideas, Hohn's proposal did depart from some
elements of traditional Green pacifism. As the war in Bosnia raged, the authors struggled
to come to grips with it. They passionately argued that nations must balance between the
suffering of the people in Bosnia and the dangers of a possible escalation in determining
a policy for the region. For Hohn's supporters, preventing the war from spreading and
escalating as well as directed sanctions were the means to stop the war; military action
could only further the difficulties. At the same time, the authors insisted that Germans
actively help the situation in Bosnia by opening its borders to refugees, as well as
preparing a non-military help group that could deploy to the region.
This more pacifist based proposal did not have enough support to be adopted, but
it did force the evolution of the favored proposal set forth by Ludger Volmer. In the end,
traditional pacifist ideas were integrated into Volmer's proposition, thus developing a
compromise between radical pacifists and those who sought a more active approach for
the Balkans short of military intervention. In the final vote, the diluted Volmer proposal
received a strong majority of the votes, with only a small handful of opponents and
abstentions. That such a large number supported the measure also indicates that the
Bundesversammlung von BUndnis 90/Die Griinen."
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realos supported the measure as well.86 The swing group had thus solidified its hold not
just on the leadership of the Greens, but also on the direction of the Party.
The Bonn Party Day Resolution (Volmer's Proposal) in a strong adherence to the
traditional values of the Party, argued that the logic of foreign policy based on military
tactics must be supplanted by the that of non-military conflict prevention methods. It
recognized the problems inherent in Bosnia, but remained wedded to traditional Green
values to solve them. Foreign policy had to be civilized, meaning national power politics
must be eliminated. Moreover, in light of the continued goal of the demilitarization of
international politics that was again enumerated here, it criticized the maintenance and
use of military force against human rights violators. It decisively rejected any use of
German soldiers in military operations under any auspices. The fear of a possible
escalation of the conflict with outside military intervention remained potent. As such, the
resolution steadfastly declared: "We therefore reject military preventive or punishment
87

actions. There can be no exceptions."
Such elements were clearly based on fundamental Green ideals—fear of
escalation, demilitarization, and the desire for a pacifist Germany. In an adaptation to the
radical pacifist proposal at the conference, the new declaration clearly opposed any
military intervention in Bosnia, since violations of human rights could not be stopped
with military force, even as the events there were labeled genocide. Though opposed to
military intervention, the resolution also opened the door for such a possibility over the
long term in saying: "Where power and violence are the only language, force must be
used against it. Against Fascism, appeals to humanitarian values do not help, and against
86
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genocide (Volkermord), the calls to respect human lives do not help. In such a case,
swift, hard, effective, and consequential, but not military action must come." 88 Yet in
the face of a violation of fundamental human rights, as the conflict in Bosnia clearly was,
the resolution argued that states cannot remain aloof from the violence.

A PARTY IN TURMOIL AMID A WORSENING CRISIS

A quick glance between the June 1993 leaders conference and the Party Day of
October 1993 clearly shows that the Green Party did not have a lucid, defined view of
how to act in the Bosnian crisis. The difference between the two declarations suggests
that the direction of the Party during this period was not at all unified. In what would
become a consistent theme within the Party, the leaders were often on a different level
from that of the grass roots members. With the introduction of a number of new factors
in 1994, the Party would be thrown into increasing turmoil.
The Party's leaders of the Landerrat passed a resolution that supported an
expansion of the UN mandated peacekeepers, without including German soldiers, while
avoiding any possible militarization of politics. Their declaration appealed for an "active
international intervention to protect human rights." For them, based in no small part on
personal observation, the calamity of Bosnia required intervention, even to a small extent
the use of military forces. The resulting declaration was thought to represent the majority
and firmly rooted in Green philosophy.89 Seen within the context of the intra Party
Grundlinien von Btindnis 90/Die Grilnen."
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division, the realo philosophy was a significant aspect of this declaration.
The events of the Party Day only a few months later firmly belied that
interpretation from the Party leaders. With the integration of local members, all four
realo perspectives were decisively rejected, clearly discarding the resolution from the
Landerrat. Yet at the same time, the antithesis of the realo perspective, traditional,
radical pacifism, was no longer the only option on the table. Even the three proposals
from the radical pacifists were soundly rejected at the Party Day. Instead, the swing
group forcefully emerged under the auspices of Ludger Volmer's proposal, which called
for political action to stop the genocide in Bosnia.
Though later tempered by traditional pacifist elements, the resolution emerging
out of the Bonn Party clearly indicated splintering of the Party into three elements. The
realos remained a minority, but the call for some form of action now resonated through
all levels of the Party; the debate was on the method and type of intervention. Yet as the
declaration clearly denoted, the majority of the Party opposed military intervention. In
many respects, the declaration from the Party Day does clearly state the Party's desire to
become involved in the crisis. Even the Hohn proposal declared the necessity of
Germany's responsibility for conflict regulation.90 By the end of 1993, the Party was
divided, yet considerably evolved relative to its stance during the Gulf War.
The year 1994 brought three new events that would have clear impacts on the
debate—the election platform, the Constitutional Court's decision recognizing the
legality of deploying German forces, and the first real debate for the Greens surrounding
Kommisarischen Landerrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993." Interestingly, an original draft of the final
declaration included a sentence supporting active intervention for humanitarian operations under UN
auspices. It was later withdrawn so that it might be further discussed.
Volmer, Die Griinen und die Aufienpolitik, 505.
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the possible deployment of German combat and support forces to Bosnia. This year was
one of both continuation and change, as the Party splintered itself even more. The
election platform focused the Green ideals more, while the Court's decision
fundamentally altered their context. The debate on the possible deployment of German
forces to help protect UNPROFOR at the end of the year brought the discussion within
the Party to new levels with the realistic possibility of deploying armed German forces
for the first time.
The election platform of 1994 was agreed upon at the February Party Day in
Mannheim and aimed to return the Party to the Bundestag. The section on foreign policy
was in part predicated on the idea that the current Kohl government had failed in its
handling of the "challenges of our time." It had done little to contribute to development
help for needy nations; it had some responsibility for the current war due to it recognition
of Croatia and Serbia; and had not done enough to stop the export of weapons.91
A primary pillar of the Green principles for foreign policy in this election
platform rested on that of human rights. Described as an "urgent" goal of the Greens,
they proposed that the instruments for improving these rights should be developed in the
context of the CSCE and European Council. Yet, as the pleaded for improving human
rights, the election platform remained largely devoid of real solutions for the ongoing
crisis in Bosnia. The war was only mentioned in the opening paragraphs, only
recognizing the horrors of what was occurring. While offering little to slow the war in
Bosnia, the Greens did speak out decisively against the belief that the Kohl government
was attempting to militarize German foreign policy and reiterated that they opposed any
91
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use of German forces.

The traditional, though slightly less radical, pacifist elements of

the Party remained dominant.
For the most part then, this election platform deviated little from its earlier cousin
of four years ago. However, the program does illustrate that there was a growing
consensus within the Party as a whole that remaining aloof from international problems
was no longer possible, a point borne out of the October 1993 Party Day. Speaking of
responsibility and the world community this Green platform took a substantive step
forward into the international system; its events now radiated down to the Party. Even
more important for later, the Greens began to think more of the possibilities of being
involved in the government. As Ludger Volmer noted, not only were the Greens
preparing for a return to the Bundestag, but they were also preparing for possible
coalition negotiations with future partners.93 With their successful election into the
Bundestag that year, the international context began to filter down even more to the
leadership elements of the Party.
In July 1994, however, the dynamic of the internal Green debate was altered with
the Constitutional Court's decision allowing for the use of German forces in operations
outside of the NATO area so long as they were under a UN mandate. The decision to
deploy German forces was left to a simple majority within the Bundestag prior to the
deployment. With this decision, a series of criteria were developed that would define any
German participation. Accordingly, there had to be a clear international mandate; the
military tasks must be accomplished within a specific timeframe; military actions must
only come in the context of a political framework for solving the crisis; Germany must
92
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have a clear role in the decision making process; all participation must be joint in nature;
and Germany must have a clear interest in the crisis.94 The result of the decision and the
subjective political constructs was to create the potential for tremendous debate within
the polity.
This decision also engrossed the Greens into a new level of debate. Within the
Party the decision was heavily criticized. Immediately following its announcement in
July 1994, the Green Defense Speaker, Vera Wollenberger, described the decision as a
"step backwards" that "strengthenfed] the government" to pursue the increased role of the
military in German foreign policy. It had given the government "carte blanche
(Persilscheiri)" to send German soldiers all over the world. The Greens, according to the
statement, rejected all forms of the use of the military as an instrument of power.
Prominent member Ludger Volmer added that the decision was a "legal cover of a shift
to the right."95 To them this Court decision ushered in a new perspective on the use of
military power that envisioned its usefulness to foreign and security policy crises, which
they viewed as both dangerous and diametrically opposed to Green values.
The statements issued by the Party after the Court's decision were very consistent
with the Greens' overall stance. Unlike the debate over the use of military force in the
Bosnian context, there was strong consensus within the Greens on this issue. Even many
of the realos remained opposed to the use of German forces abroad. As the long
simmering debate within the German polity on the use of German peacekeeping forces
for the protection of a possible withdraw of UNPROFOR raged after this decision, the
94
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Green leadership, in an obvious rebuke of the Court's decision, declared that a
government must not always do what is allowed by law.96
Most importantly, the Constitutional Court decision in 1994, according to
Volmer, led the swing group to begin to separate themselves even further from the radical
pacifists in suggesting a role for the peacekeepers, though still not German forces.
Indeed at the Potsdam party Day in December 1994, the resolution championed by the
swing group clearly stated the positive role such peacekeepers could play. According to
the declaration, given the "impasse" in Bosnia, "there was no alternative to the deescalation role of the peacekeepers."97 Ludger Volmer later described this moment as the
time when the swing group began really to separate themselves from the traditional
pacifists, though they lacked the coherence, or perhaps the desire, to move the position
OS

even further toward the realo position.

Now, unlike the traditional pacifists, the swing

group was beginning to see more practical uses for military forces, rather than automatic
rejections of any use of the military.
The Constitutional Court's decision moved the discussion on the use of German
forces for out of area operations from the legal to that of the political arena. The political
debate reached a crescendo in late 1994 amid the question of whether to send German
Tornados to Bosnia. In November, NATO requested six to eight Tornado electronic
warfare aircraft, which would require support from German forces, to protect NATO
combat air patrols from Serbian Anti-aircraft facilities. While there were some
supporters, even the CDU led coalition was beset with strife, leaving the German
government to wiggle out of the request diplomatically. The request for German forces
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for support to combat aircraft in normal day to day operations proved too much.
With the request from NATO a month later for a quick reaction force to cover a
possible withdraw of UNPROFOR from Bosnia, however, German leaders were more apt
to acquiesce. Chancellor Kohl stated that these forces would be used in "very specific
circumstances." With the future of NATO at stake, which clearly reverberated with
German interests, in the summer of 1995 Germany offered up to 1800 personnel to assist
in the protection of the UN forces, including the combat aircraft that had previously been
rejected, in what the Economist would call a "Rubicon" decision." The ground
personnel would act exclusively in non-combat capacities and if their participation was
required, the Bundestag would vote as mandated by the Constitutional Court. Though
this decision was a "leap," it was indeed carried out with "due German caution."100 In
this case there was broad support within the government, including a minority from the
SPD. For example Hans-Ulrich Klose, a rather hawkish SPD member, believed that it
could not be "humanitarian or moral" to hold back when people were dying.101
At the time, the governing coalition members—the CDU and the FDP—made
quite clear that they supported this deployment, largely viewed in the context of the
expanding concept of reality on the ground. For the Greens, however, the decision to
deploy the Tornados and possible ground forces was rejected; however there remained a
potent minority voice that called for supporting that decision, which led many in the press
to consider whether the Greens even had a Bosnia policy. According to The Economist,
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the Greens, in general, viewed this decision as "a blank check for the entry of Germany
as a warring party."102 The Party's security policy speaker, Angelika Beer, in an official
press release forcefully rejected any Germany participation in this rapid reaction force,
claiming that thought in invoked the idea of a humanitarian reaction, it instead pushed
Germany down the path of a "foreign policy supported by the military."103
As conditions in Bosnia worsened in the early months of 1995, the Green Party's
debate began to increase in earnestness. The Party had already deemed the events in
Bosnia as genocide and though the most recent Party Day declaration remained opposed
to using military force, it still left the issue unresolved when it recognized that at times
force might have some usefulness. Unlike the later debate after Joschka Fischer's rather
famous letter in the wake of the massacre in Srebrenica, the debate in early summer 1995
was focused more on possible participation of German forces, especially in the wake of
the decision to deploy the German forces as part of the quick reaction force, and with it
the political decision on whether to support that deployment or not in the Bundestag. The
possible use of German forces had far fewer adherents than the general use of the
military.
On the other side like before, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a realo Green member of the
European Union parliament, and as such more socialized by international dynamics,
supported the use of these German forces. He believed that Germany had to remain
capable of action in foreign policy. He believed the Greens should develop a strategy of
a common foreign and security policy that incorporated both civil and military
some who rejected the use offeree within the SPD.
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intervention possibilities. Such a policy would then work in cooperation with the idea of
demilitarization.104 Moreover, the foreign policy speaker of the Party, Gerd Poppe also
decidedly pushed for the possible use of military force.105
Similarly, the MP Marieluise Beck in a press declaration argued strongly for
using force, invoking the memory that Auschwitz was freed by military force, rather than
pacifist principles. That was the lesson he took from the Nazi defeat. Though war would
never be born on German soil, intervention to save those being attacked is "required
given the legacy of our fathers." In the case of Bosnia, Germany should take the side of
the victim. From his perspective, the use of the quick reaction force was to save the
people in Bosnia.106 This was a clear reflection of his giving the ideal of "never again
Auschwitz" precedence over "never gain war." Though this idea was still in the minority
at the time, it would continue to gain supporters in the coming months.
The new German Party federal speaker Jurgen Trittin, a swing group adherent,
believed that the Greens must recognize that interests, which are the defining feature of
foreign policy, may not necessarily be contrary to human rights, suggesting there could
1 07

be an interest in a form of military intervention.

Some of the realos and an occasional

swing group adherent were thus far ahead of the later conception of the Greens, bringing
in interests, a stronger concept of human rights and in seeing the large ideal of German
responsibility, though they remained largely opposed to the use of German forces. Still,
they were a clear minority in the Party. Indeed, Ludger Volmer argued that those such as
Poppe were thoroughly isolated within the Party and that there was a clear majority
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against any participation by German forces.108
The faction leader for the Greens in the Bundestag, Joschka Fischer was
decidedly against this German participation. Based on the historical baggage associated
with the Nazi intervention in that area, Fischer believed that a German intervention in
Bosnia would give the Serbs a new propaganda front that could be exploited, which could
possibly make the situation worse. At this point, Fischer was opposed to the use of
German combat forces as part of peacekeepers. However, he did not believe that German
military forces could not play a part. Indeed, he supported the possible use of the
German air force to supply the Bosnian people.109 Such positions clearly place Fischer
within the swing group at this time, since he accepted limited uses for the military. Such
a placement is critical for examining the role of the shock of Srebrenica and his personal
evolution after that pivotal event.
Others were also decisively opposed to using German military forces. In a theme
that many in the Green Party would use both at this early stage and throughout the course
of the decade, Kerstin Miiller and Trittin, both swing group members, argued that the
German leadership's (CDU-FDP) call for Germans support was in fact a means to
militarize Germany's foreign policy, possibly to the extent of using the military to
national interests.110 The Green Party's pacifism was completely at odds with a
militarization of German foreign policy.
While the federal level officials were debating this in the open press, the grass
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roots elements of the Party, in the guise of the regional organizations, also weighed in
heavily against any German participation and were especially vocal against those in the
Party that supported the use of German troops. The Brandenburg Greens criticized that
some members of the Party diverged from the decision made at the October 1993 Party
Day that had opposed the military intervention in Bosnia and the so-called militarization
of German policy. The tainted history of German troops in southeastern Europe and the
belief that this conflict could not be solved with military force guided their position.
Significantly they called on the Members of the Bundestag of the Green Party to remain
wedded to the ideals put forth in the Party Day declaration, which represented the voice
of the entire party, and vote against any bill that would send German troops to Bosnia.111
Such arguments were echoed, in what could have been a coordinated letter
writing campaign, by the Greens in Alzey-Worms. In their 12 June open letter, they
invoked the memory of the Nazis, claiming that Helmut Kohl would be the first
Chancellor to deploy German combat forces since Adolf Hitler, an obvious reference
meant to compare, even if only tangentially, the current possible deployment to the horrid
memories of the past.112 In a similar approach, Winnfied Hermann in coordination with
the local leader from Baden- Wurttemberg, Barbara Graf, argued to the members of the
Bundestag faction that they were duty bound to follow the position on the Bosnian war
adopted by the Party during the December 1994 special Party Day, which
overwhelmingly at the time rejected the use of any military force. To change such a
111
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position, as Fischer was indeed arguing for, would require another meeting.

CONCLUSION

The debate between 1990 and early 1995 amid the challenges posed by events in
the Balkans set the stage for the impacts of the more ghastly shocks of the summer of
1995. From the near absolute unity during the Gulf War, the Party was now clearly
fractured into three distinct groups, as conflict raged in Europe's backyard. Though the
line between the fundis and the swing group remained blurry, their differences were
nonetheless there. The swing group often saw a use for the non-German military, for
example in supplying the Bosnian people or in peacekeeping forces. Still a minority, the
realos were gaining a voice, particularly as the images of Bosnia appeared daily.
Moreover, the strong differences between the leadership and the grass roots had become
painfully apparent given the variances between the Ldnderrat and the BDK.
The crux of the Green Party debate was the collision of traditional perspectives
and their clash with evolving principles in the wake of the end of the Cold War, the
unification of Germany, and the crisis in the Balkans. In a nutshell, the traditions of Cold
War style pacifism simply proved too shallow for the new challenges of ethnic conflict
and, perhaps more importantly in the long run, evolving German interests. Coming to
terms with this dilemma would be even more prominent after the Srebrenica massacre.
Still, some issues had been decided in these years. Whereas the Gulf War had
113
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brought almost universal calls for abstention, the events of Bosnia awakened a desire for
involvement within the Greens. As the majority based BDK resolution confirms, action
was now a matter of degrees. The watchword of "responsibility" that had been shunned
as means of militarization earlier, now became a prominent part of the Party platform.
Indeed, the 1994 election platform spoke of the "responsibility for the world community"
as the pillar of Green foreign and security policy.114 Though not the developed form of
responsibility that would be a watchword a few years later, this new idea was a
significant step forward.
The 1994 election platform illustrates two critical elements of later Green Party
change. First, the platform and the Party's later inclusion into the Bundestag, both
illustrated and facilitated the greater inclusion of the international dynamic on members
of the party. Members now not only speculated about international events, but were
forced to debate them with the possible necessity of voting on future German military
deployments. Second, the Greens were now thinking of more grandiose policy impacts
and with it the necessity of working with other parties. During the Gulf War, the Greens
had shunned the international consensus for the use of force to evict Iraq from Kuwait.
Yet, by 1994 as the election platform illustrates, the dynamics of international
socialization and Regierungsfahigkeit were very becoming elements, if yet still
unconscious, of the Green Party dynamic. While there is no evidence here of actual
negotiations for changing the Green stance on the use of force, the seed had been lain.
By late 1994, some Greens deemed the radical pacifism of the days past to be a
relic amid the turmoil of Post Cold War Europe. This suggests indeed some numbers
within the Party were considering the necessity of change. Drastic alterations, however,
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were not possible given the differences within the Party and the strength of the grass
roots base. Important issues such as the necessity of stopping the violence in Bosnia and
great debates, particularly that on the future role of a unified Germany within Europe,
essentially forced the Greens to adapt. The traditional pacifism of the Greens was
beginning to wither slightly, evolving into a new reconstitution of Green Party pacifism
in reaction to a new environment. Many green ideas remained, including a desire to
avoid use of force and avoid militarization of German security policy. The shocks of
Srebrenica, however, would inject a new vigor into the debate.
This chapter has defined the baseline and early phases of the Green Party's debate
on the use of force by highlighting several key elements. First, with the first so-called
post Cold War crisis, the traditional values of "nuclear pacifism" remained preeminent in
the Party; not even a UN mandate could push the Greens from this idea. Second, the
violence in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia, would be a minor shock to those that would
compose the redo section of the Party and would lead to some change. This violence,
moreover, would provide the seed for an ever increasingly sharpening debate within the
Party that would help to begin the process that would highlight the intra Party division
and usher in a role for the swing group. Third, the early phases of the war in Bosnia
would also see the emergence of a common theme throughout the debate—the disconnect
between the federal leadership and the grass roots. Finally, though there would be a
slightly broader acceptance of the possibility of a positive use for military force in
general, there was a near unanimity of opposition to deploying German forces.

CHAPTERV
THE SHOCK OF SREBRENICA

As the situation in Bosnia worsened, the Green Party leaders continued to be
confronted with the daily bombardment of images from the battlefield, spurning constant
discussion. Yet, it was the massacre in the Muslim dominated tows of Srebrenica in the
summer of 1995 that in a way forced the Greens from their relatively relaxed debate into
one of its fiercest ever. In addition to the impact of that direct shock, the violence in
Bosnia led to direct actions from an evolving international system that added an element
of international pressure to the Party's domestic decision.
As the situation deteriorated in Bosnia, the UN designated the town of Srebrenica,
in the eastern portion of the Serb side of Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with five other
locations (Zepa, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Bihac), a so called safe-haven. Designed
to create some international cover for refugees fleeing the fighting, the minimal
international forces deployed and the restrictive rules of engagement, however, did little
to stop Serb forces from acting with impunity. Indeed, dismissing the protection of
Danish peacekeeping forces surrounding the town, Serb forces took over the town of
Srebrenica in July 1995. The ensuing massacre, which left over 8,000 Muslims dead,
filled television screens in Europe and has widely been seen as the most single
devastating event of genocide in Europe since the events of the Second World War.
The German government led by the CDU, in tune with Germany's evolving level
of responsibility outlined earlier in this dissertation, began to push for a German
involvement in the international response to the conflict in Bosnia. Even several months
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before the massacre in Srebrenica, the CDU led government was pushing for the use of
German troops, saying their involvement was a "question of European solidarity" that
was necessary amid the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.' The CDU
in particular firmly believed that Germany could no longer hide in the background, but
rather must do more in the international realm, though at the time these international
actions were restricted to interests in and for Europe. From this perspective, the evolving
idea of responsibility incorporated protecting others in need, developing collective
security structures in Europe that maintained a capability to act, which did include
NATO, and the development of German capabilities to support NATO operations.2
With the worsening of events in Bosnia and a CDU led government proposing a
more active German military participation, the Greens were in essence forced to address
the challenge domestically within the political mechanism and internally within their own
consciousness', a process made all the more pressing by the massacre in Srebrenica. The
Green Party had long been discussing the events in Bosnia, as the previous chapter
clearly demonstrated, but there lacked a clear resounding personification of the conflict.
There remained a perception that events were to an extent still far away.
That aloofness would change with the massacre in Srebrenica, as certain elements
within the Party now became aggressive agents for change. Scholars widely recognize
that Srebrenica was the turning point for the Greens. Fischer's open letter of August
1995 suggesting the use of force to prevent genocide was viewed by many as a critical
1
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turning point in the debate on the use of force.3 It was both the "learning ground" and a
"test case" for all of the security and peace policy concepts anchored in the Green Party.4
Many, such as Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich as well as Nina Philippi, point to the
importance of Srebrenica as a turning point, especially for Joschka Fischer, one of the
leaders of the realistic wing of the Party. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen argues that Srebrenica
left the German pacifists, including the Green party "speechless," as the disparity
between anti-militarism and support for human rights was "exposed in the most gruesome
manner."5
This shock caused "soul searching and re-thinking" for many on the realo side of
the so-called swing group.6 For many of them and some of the realos in the Party,
Srebrenica was a new zero hour for their views on war in the modern era. Indeed, the
realo Hubert Kleinert called the events of Srebrenica a "point of change (Wendepunkf)."1
For many in Germany, and especially the Green Party, the Serb massacres in the UN Safe
zones brought with them "another quality" that separated them from other events in the
o

region. At the most basic level, Bosnia would clearly display that those who saw the
preeminence of human rights over that of never using military force viewed the
developments in Bosnia through an entirely different prism, in turn assigning each a
different level of priority.9
Each of the three groups within the Party, the realos, fundis, and the swing group,
all had varying perspectives on how best to approach the challenges posed by the
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violence in the wake of the Srebrenica massacre. Issues such as the extent, if any, of
military force that could be used, whether it should be under a NATO or UN flag, and the
participation of German forces in any possible actions were hotly debated. At times the
debate became very heated and indeed quite personal. Though several in the Party had
already been advocating military force to stop the violence well before Srebrenica, it was
this massacre and the impact it had on the primary de facto leader of the Green Party,
Joschka Fischer, that provoked a new level to this debate. He would be an enabler and
champion of change.
The intense shock of the massacre also combined with a more evolved and direct
German government position to send German troops to Bosnia that forced the Greens to
bring focus to a debate that had been devoid of such articulations. The requirement for
significant and earnest policy decisions necessitating the Party to take a clear stand and
translate their developing approach into a policy to guide MP votes at the Bundestag level
were for the most part only in its infancy. After the Srebrenica massacre, issues such as
German participation in the NATO stabilization and later implementation force (SFOR
and IFOR respectively) now played a forcing function.
Within this debate, the schism between the federal level leaders and the grass root
masses emerged and began to have an impact. Federal level delegates, as those most
affected by the international realm, were forced to react in particular to the debate
spurned by the international calls for action. The grass roots level, however, had the
luxury of remaining more steadfastly adherent to their principles, as the political
ramifications remained largely outside of their zone of interest. The increasing
socialization of federal levels leaders helped to push them quicker in their personal
9
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reflections as actually votes in the Bundestag were required to address clear policy
ramifications.
Though there would be no finality to the Green debate over the use of force and in
even over what to do in Bosnia during 1995, the Party's sharp debate on Bosnia and
international or even German participation was a critical element of the overall evolution
of their stance on the use of force. For the first time, active German participation was
being considered by some in the Green Party. Moreover, even some of the more
traditional elements of the Party began to realize that there were some positive gains that
the military brought with it and using it as a tool could bring successes on the ground
where it mattered most. Over the course of this section of the debate, though the Party
was still divided, as a whole it began to move its overall perspective on the use of
military force closer towards acceptance. The shock of the massacre in Srebrenica is a
clear departure point for the Greens in general and for this phase of the debate in
particular.
This chapter will introduce and discuss in depth the first of the two intervening
variables—external shock—by examining the Party's rancorous debate during the
summer of 1996. Through a detailed narrative of the positions held by the major players,
especially Joschka Fischer, it will also begin to show the growing differences between the
realo section of the Party and the remainder of the Party, in large part based on their
different reactions to the massacre in Srebrenica. Finally, it will also begin to
demonstrate some of the challenges for the leadership and its actions at the federal level
relative to the desires of the Party's grass roots.
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A PARTY TORN ASUNDER

The event that changed the tone and the intensiveness of the debate within the
German Green party was the massacre in Srebrenica. These tragic events were a
definitive shock to the people of Europe and Germany; indeed, polls about the possible
deployment of German Tornado aircraft to Bosnia taken before and after Srebrenica,
showed a jump of 19 points , from 39% to 58%, for support of the deployment with the
German population.10 In many respects, the debate within the Green Party mirrored that
occurring within the population as a whole. The clear shock, made particularly personal
by the television pictures and the refugees in Germany,11 created a new level to the
debate that unequivocally had a clear impact on the overall evolution of the Green Party's
stance on the use of force.
On the heels of the events in Srebrenica, the German Green Party exploded into a
debate it had never seen its history, moving beyond the identity crisis debate of its early
history. This debate, which the Suddeutsche Zeitung at the time called the "disorientation
of the Greens,"12 would rage for months with no resolution. Matthias Geis postulated
that this would be the Party's last "identity conflict," a reference to the long festering and
as yet unresolved debate between the realo and fundi factions, who had been arguing
over the principles of the Green Party for years.
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argument, however, would not reflect reality.
Some saw this debate as an advancement into the future for the Greens. Norbert
Bicher of Das Sonntagsblatt believed that the debate about a new course of the Greens
meant a "departure from the Puppet House" of peace politics.14 And Christiane
Schlotzer-Scotland of the Siiddeutsche Zeitung argued that Joschka Fischer's combative
argumentative paper in the wake of the Srebrenica massacre would never be put away
again; the questions it posed were here to stay.15 These and numerous other
contemporary sources clearly demonstrate the decisive impact of this particular debate.
One of the principle underlying themes of the Green Party debate after Srebrenica
focused on two of the defining principles of the psyche that defined the Greens—"never
again war" and "never again Auschwitz." Though already coming under fire within the
past two years, these values of the past, for so long seen as unassailable, now collided
with anew with the challenges associated with the new world order amid the collapse of
the East Bloc. Erich Fritz, a CDU MP involved in foreign policy issues at the time,
suggested that history presented a dual edged sword to German policymakers considering
how to respond to the events in Bosnia and in particular Srebrenica. Many in Germany
saw the ideal "never again war" as meaning no aggressive warfare emanating out of
Germany, though many Greens and some in the SPD, as we shall see below, took this
perspective one step further and believed Germany should never use military force for
any reason.16 For the Greens then, there was an evolving debate on what exactly this
normative perspective, "never again war," actually meant when it came to the use of
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force in general and German forces in particular amid the violence in Bosnia. That
variance in perspective would have profound resonance within the Green Party.
The concept of "never again Auschwitz," similarly, brought forth challenges for
the Greens. It also posed two conflicting questions that would be especially hard on the
Green Party's debate—Does Germany's history of genocide require it to become
involved to ensure it is not repeated; or does its history in the Balkans mean that
"prohibits" German actions in the region? For the majority of Germans writ large
accepted the conviction that Germany has a "special responsibility," given its murderous
17

history to prevent genocide, even through the use of military force if required.

The

majority of Greens, though by no means all, in the mid-1990s, however, strongly resistant
to this idea of a "special responsibility" and thus rejected the first question.
However, with the realos accepting both the new concept of "never again war,"
and this special responsibility that created a new, proactive version of "never again
Auschwitz," especially after the Srebrenica massacre, that put them decisively at odds
with the majority of the Party. The latter of these two ideas was a strongly ingrained
norm accepted by practically all Party members and, as will be discussed in greater detail
below, would eventually function as a facilitating norm providing a commonly held
principle that in essence helped to ease the transformation for absolute rejection to a
gradual acceptation of the use of the military in response to genocide or humanitarian
catastrophes over time. While the available literature clearly notes the role of the shock
of the genocide on Fischer's personal belief, his invocation of a direct linkage to the
memories of the Holocaust was the equivalent of a trumpet call for support within the
16
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Party.
As will be discussed below, the Greens debate amid the Srebrenica crisis was
punctuated by intense discussion on the role of history, encapsulated in these two
internalized ideals, and how they conflicted, or in some cases, supported Green ideals.
Jiirgen Trittin accurately described the Green dilemma in an 11 August 1995 letter to the
Party: "Both positions appeal to the ideals of a non-violent and anti-fascist party."18 The
challenge would be applying them to the current security challenges of a very violent
world. Joschka Fischer's letter to the Party after the Srebrenica massacre would be the
first major shot of this new phase.
The debate within the German Green Party practically tore the party asunder.
However, it was not the end. Nina Philippi, in one of the main secondary research works
on this subject, has argued that Srebrenica was the "decisive turning point for the Green's
stance" on out of area operations.19 As will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter
and in the following chapters, this perspective of a decisive turning point is shortsighted,
even from the perspective of when she wrote her book in 1996-1997. The Party was far
from any type of a clear decision; in fact this was just the beginning of a long, acidic
intra-party debate. Indeed, the resurgence of the debate amid the ramp-up to the NATO
bombing of Serbia in 1999 and the debate after the 9/11 attacks clearly demonstrates that
the Greens still had not come to any consensus of the use of force as a viable policy
option.
18
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The Realo Argument and Joschka Fischer's Letter
The debate on the use of force in Bosnia exploded to a new level with Joschka
Fischer's open letter to the Party in the wake of the massacre. His letter and the reaction
to it were the apex of the crescendo that surrounded the entire Bosnia debate for the
Greens. Written on 30 July 1995, mere weeks after Srebrenica, Fischer began to present
a much more bellicose argument in favor of protecting these safe areas with military
force. Though he was not the first to make this argument, his clear leadership position
injected a spark into an already festering debate. Indeed, the traditionally conservative
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung argued that there was nothing new in Fischer's letter, as
this argument had already been circulating within the Party for some time.20 However,
what the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung omitted was the fact that it was Fischer himself
that was the real story not the argument.
As Fischer was clearly not the first to argue in favor of a military intervention, it
is useful to briefly outline what others had said prior to Fischer's letter. In a joint letter
from July 1995, nineteen Parliamentarians, of whom eleven were from the Greens,
argued that military protection was the only means to save the people of Bosnia. The
signatories also pointedly said that they "as Germans" were ready to "take a risk" to save
91
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participation in the quick reaction force and, in a radical position, even pressed for NATO
bombings of Serb positions. Indeed, Gerd Poppe argued that NATO action would be the
main element that could create the chance for peace.22
Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a leading figure among the Greens at the European
Parliament level, had long called for this intervention.23 Waltraud Schoppe, an early
member of the realos, argued that a new position of the Greens in favor of military
protection was in essence the end of the Petra-Kelley position, which had been the
dominant argument for the first fifteen years of the Party.24 Rezzo Schlauch decried that
"finally" the debate had begun.

Ralf Fucks argued passionately that it was the politic of

non-intervention that in fact "legitimized injustice and encouraged the fanatic
nationalism."26 In a similar vein, Krista Sager believed that Germany's participation as
part of the Western alliance was in fact in concert with Green values of conflictprevention.27
In one case, in an argument that was well ahead of its time within the Green Party,
Waltrud Schoppe appealed to the new developing German responsibility, claiming that
German soldiers had a responsibility to act as a part of Europe. In effect, he jettisoned
the argument that some in Germany and the majority of the Green Party still clung to—
Poppe, could be considered among the leadership of the party. All eleven, however, were attached to the
realo portion of the Party.
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that Germany's murderous past precluded any participation. In fact, he stood this
argument completely on its head, claiming that in the fight to stop genocide, German
soldiers would no longer operate independently, but instead would be in the service of the
international community. As such, there was no difference between a German soldier
and that of another nation.
One of the more aggressive members of the Green leadership that spoke in favor
of an intervention was Reinhard Biitikofer. Immediately after the fall of Srebrenica, he
argued not only for a military intervention to protect the security zones, but, following the
path blazed by few others in the Party, publically believed that such an intervention could
eventually see the participation of German soldiers in certain circumstances. In an eleven
page public letter, Biitikofer claimed that this was not a complete rejection of the
fundamental Green principles of pacifism. Though he pushed for economic and political
solutions, he also believed that such efforts would not succeed without military force
given the chaos of 1995. He likewise dismissed the dangers of escalation, claiming that
even without any intervention, the crisis would escalate;29 in essence there was nothing to
lose.
Fischer's twelve page detailed letter to the members of the Green Party, in which
he enunciated his position on the issue of the use of force in Bosnia for the first time
publically,30 showed a distinct evolution in personal perspective for the Green leader.
Entitled "The Catastrophe in Bosnia and the Consequences for our Party, the Biindnis
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90/The Greens: A Letter to the Bundestag Faction and the Party," the letter
fundamentally questioned the Greens' concept of pacifism amid the brutality of the war
in Bosnia. From Fischer's perspective, the Greens had to solve this final conflict of
values in order to avoid completely collapsing at the heart of their ideals.
Fischer's primary purpose in writing the letter was to stir a strong debate within
his party on the situation in Bosnia.

However, he was not alone in the desire to stir a

discussion on the carnage in Bosnia and the Green Party's reaction to it, particularly in
the context of defining an overall security policy. The need for such a debate was a
position also held by Ludger Volmer who was an important member of the swing group,
and others such as the Party speaker Antje Vollmer.33 Winni Nachtwei, one of the
Party's leading authorities on national security, however, feared that Fischer's letter
would bring the Greens back to the "conflict culture of the 1980s."34
It is worth noting that Volmer, though he accepted the necessity of debate, would
later suggest in his book written several years after the debate that Fischer's letter, in fact,
essentially "rolled over and choked" the already developing and "constructive" ideas that
had started with the swing group earlier during the Bosnian conflict.

In actuality,

however, Fischer's letter proved to be the catalyst for a wider party debate that involved
all possibilities for actions and was not just limited to more traditional Green values of
the type the more traditional arms of the Party were suggesting. In this case, Volmer's
comments must be viewed through the prism of his position as one of the leaders of the
31
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swing group, who viewed Fischer's ideas as a direct challenge toward their leadership
and perspective being laid out at the time.
The importance of Fischer's letter for a massive Green Party debate was echoed
in the press and even some senior Green leaders. The political scientist Mohssen
Massarrat in the left leaning newspaper, the Frankfurter Rundschau, argued that with this
letter, Fischer "opened the flood gates" within the Party for a massive debate.36 At the
same, time there was considerable speculation within the press and within the Party that
Fischer argument had a secondary purpose at attempting to make the Greens
regierungsfdhig. Significantly, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung similarly argued that
inherent within Fischer's letter was in fact the vein of domestic politics and the push for
•2*7

Regierungsfdhigkeit.

As we will discuss in the following chapter, that theme will

indeed be an important part of the overall grand scheme of the argument presented by
Fischer over the course of several years. For our purposes here, it is more important to
focus on the letter and its immediate effects.
In an interview given shortly after the letter's publication, Fischer argued that it
was vital for the Greens to address the challenges posed by the new Fascism in the
Balkans, yet stay true to the Party's values.

In a different interview with Der Spiegel

shortly after the publication of his letter, Fischer noted: "After the conquest of
Srebrenica, I wanted a discussion."39 That the war was "factually before our front door,"
meant that it required immediate attention.40 As Fischer very poignantly noted in a
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discussion several years later: "I was a non-interventionist until Srebrenica, until the mass
murder following the seizure of the UN enclave, where people had put their trust in the
security guarantees. This was where my position as a non-interventionist was shattered.
Not only out of humanitarian considerations, but also out of very real political
considerations, non-intervention can be far more dangerous than intervention."41 From
his memoirs in 2007, it is quite clear that Fischer's personal journey of inner conflict,
began in earnest with this escalation of the war in Bosnia.42
Secondary sources at the time echoed Fischer's later admissions. The Guardian
(London) noted that Srebrenica was the reason for Fischer's "overcome[ing]" of his green
and pacifist principles.43 Ludger Volmer, reflecting on the situation later, suggested
rather provocatively that Fischer saw Srebrenica as a "signal" to re-think the pacifist
position.44 As we will see later, the Party's interpretation of his ideas as being "Green"
varied significantly based on each member's personal perspectives.
As the leader of the Green Bundestag Party faction, Fischer's arguments carried
significant weight. Until this letter, the Green political leader had remained largely,
though not completely, mute on the challenges in Bosnia; with it, however, he now
enunciated a clear position.

A common theme that emerged in this examination is that

Fischer's shift in policies toward Bosnia was in many respects not as extreme a departure
from Green principles as some presented. His shift did not suddenly make him a member
of the CDU/CSU, a hawk member of the SPD or even the most hawkish member of his
41
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own party. In essence, Fischer reordered his policy and personal priorities in concert
with Green principles and to an extent he used Green arguments to push for these
changes. Such usage of principles that would resonate within the Green Party reflects
first that Fischer was indeed a true member of the Greens and second, most importantly
for the analysis here, that grounding of his evolutionary strategy in Green ideals meant
many aspects of the Green platform acted as facilitating norms in the evolution of the
Green position on the use of force.
The letter begins with a quote from Michael Thumann of the influential German
periodical Die Zeit. In this citation, "The Bosnia war is above all else a conflict of armed
criminals against unarmed civil populations. The Serb occupation of Srebrenica has
again displayed the methods: selection, expulsion, herding men of warfighting age
together like cattle and—when the evidence agrees—murder. Location—a UN safe
haven," Thumann directly references the atrocities of the Nazis, and relates them to
current events in Bosnia. He claimed that the Serbian occupation of Srebrenica had again
brought forth the echoes of the past—selection, expulsion, and murder. And all of this
occurred amid the so-called UN protection zone.46 Fischer's choice of this quotation and
its explosiveness set the tone for his own perspective as laid out in the letter.
For Fischer, the events in Bosnia caused a direct conflict with the internal values
of the Greens. The long history of pacifism and support for human rights, as embodied in
the concepts "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz," had always been
complimentary. But the events of Bosnia, and in particular those in Srebrenica, had
45
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brought those values now into an apparent contradiction for Fischer and as he noted, in
the conflict in Bosnia "life and freedom stand against the principle of non-violence."
Indeed, in his 2007 memoirs, Fischer noted that the conflict in Bosnia in many ways
forced the need for a decision between the two ideas of "never again Auschwitz" and
"never again war."

In his letter, Fischer passionately argued that there could be no

absolute pacifism; when faced with the atrocities of the Nazis or those in the Balkans in
the 1990s, there must be action.

Indeed, the events of Srebrenica were the casus belli of

the evolution of Fischer's position from the idea that the Greens could be capable of
governing without using military force, in essence the purer pacifist position, to the
position that no longer rejected the use of force, which in turn changed the calculus on
governance.49
Fischer begins his essay by claiming the West's Bosnia policy, particularly its
political-military aspect, had failed. More directly, the Green Party's policy of nonviolence has been "helpless" to affect change. Unlike any other event, it was the fall of
Zepa and in particular that of Srebrenica that demonstrated this failure. From Fischer's
perspective, three main reasons prohibited the possibility of using a political solution to
stop the killing: there was no ground for compromise; there was no political will from the
West to affect a solution; and the UN deployment was a tool being used by both sides for
their own benefit. In particular, the lack of interest from the West made Bosnia a "ticking
time bomb." Using drastic words, Fischer claimed that Bosnia was the "bloody price for
the dramatic failure of the Western powers." Twelve years later, Fischer was more
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47
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direct, noting that the catastrophes of Rwanda and Bosnia were "the current example of
an historical failure of the United Nations, international law, and the West."
Fischer distinctively blamed the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic for the
conflict, believing that he had incited the Serbian nationalism, whose hostility infected
and ignited the Balkan powder keg. Moreover, the national borders that for so long had
been muted under the federated Yugoslavian rule, now no longer matched those of the
current, fragmented states in the wake of the numerous declarations of independence and
ongoing wars. In essence, from his perspective, border and minority questions were at
the center of the post-Yugoslavian problem. With those complexities, an independent
Bosnia could never succeed given its ethnic composition.
Yet Fischer also attacked the German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991
as an important catalyst for the conflict, for it spurned the dissolution of the federation.
He likened the Western diplomatic recognition to a military "written guarantee" for the
two republics to fight within their borders. The German recognition of these republics
went "ghastly" wrong, as the violence it generated clearly demonstrated. Such an
argument was quite consistent with fundamental Green values.
According to the Green leader, the dissolution that emerged out of Western
recognition of the new independent states emerging out of the Yugoslav federation
combined with the aggressive Serbian nationalism, brought forth four distinct results:
ethnic cleansing through murder and expulsion, barely "viable" Croat and Muslim states
bordering the Serbs, minority conflicts within Serbia, and a total political order of
"extreme instability" in the region that could lead to another war.
"Interview Joschka Fischer," 2.
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The reference to the last result fits neatly within the grounding ideals of the
German Green Party. In this case, Fischer references the possibilities of another war
amid the concept of Serbian nationalism. To him, the Serbs were an "unstable construct"
in an unstable region, whose presence would lead to a "loss of peace." Moreover, Fischer
debunked the idea proffered by some that if the Greens accepted the use of force in
Bosnia that it would re-legitimize military force. He countered that doing nothing would
not only fail to bring about a political solution, but also bring forth a "joint responsibility"
with the Serbian persecutors. Building off of these perspective, Fischer believed that
Serbian nationalism would soon mean that war would encompass Kosovo and Macedonia
as well as Bosnia, given the minority populations there and as such required some form
of action, to include military force.
In the past, the Greens had always rejected the use of military force as a means of
preventing further escalation. In this case, however, when confronted with the possibility
of further escalation and a worsening of the human right situation, the principle of
escalation within the Green lexicon was stood upon its head. As Fischer noted in an
interview with Der Spiegel, violence always breeds more violence, but at times survival
is sometimes dependent on violence; that was the "contradiction."51 Utilizing such logic,
Fischer saw the events of Srebrenica as a catalyst to call for an intervention. Military
force no longer led to escalation; instead it prevented escalation.
Here is a the most effective and significant example of the concept of a facilitator
in the evolution from one norm to another. With both ideals so ingrained within the
Party, it would be impossible to simply jettison one. Rather, changing normative
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perspectives required an appeal to something that a group, in this case the Green Party,
already believed to be of particular value to them. In particular, the developing ranks of
the realos and to an extent the swing group were affected by these facilitating norms
during the Bosnian debate and its follow-on amid the ramp up to the bombing of Serbia
in 1999.
As Peter Ziller of the Frankfurter Rundschau argued, preventing genocide is a
concept that had "wide room" in the Green party.

By appealing to those in the party

who believed so firmly in the concept of the prevention of genocide, Fischer and other
realos facilitated change. It is highly doubtful that the Greens would have seen such a
significant evolution through the incorporation of these shocks, such as Srebrenica, into
their identity, without a firm belief in preventing genocide. Had they been a strictly
pacifist party for whom genocide was not an issue of concern, the Greens would not have
changed as they did.
Moreover, to return to the ideas presented in the letter, the impacts of the violence
and extreme instability in the region, Fischer suggested, would not be restricted to the
immediate area. It would also have a dire impact on Europe itself in that it would
threaten the future goals of a unified Europe. In particular, if the Serbs were allowed to
succeed, that could lead to the perception that the use of military force to obtain strategic
objectives was again an accepted means of politics. Such a shift would mean an end to a
peaceful Europe. Bosnia, Fischer argued, was also about "fifty years of integration
advances and peace in Europe." As such, the European continent stood "stunned" before
the fact that in Bosnia "the common European future is threatened by a victory of the
nationalistic past."
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Much like the earlier reference to escalation, there are clear German Green Party
values to be seen in Fischer's statements above. His reference to maintaining the future
of Europe speaks directly to the goal laid out in the 1994 election platform that expressed
support for the political integration of Europe. That vision incorporated an enlarged and
deepened Europe, which would include the troubled region of southeastern Europe
currently beset with ethnic conflict. Indeed, the platform, much like Fischer's letter,
referenced the "new nationalism" as a large and significant challenge for modern
Europe.53 Similarly to the facilitative properties of the "never again Auschwitz" norm,
Fischer's ideals on a greater integration within Europe appealed to already ingrained
normative perspectives within the Party that could find some clear resonance.
Like the commonality in Green values expressed with European integration, the
fear that the new wars of the Balkans could lead to a new militarization of politics was
also a common Green ideal. But whereas earlier, such as during the Gulf War and during
the onset of hostilities in Bosnia, when European involvement of military forces was seen
by many in the Green Party as a possible catalyst for increased militarization of politics,
Fischer now saw the wars of the Balkans themselves as a possible new wave of
militarization of politics, especially among non-western nations.
Such a differentiation, while in basic form consistent with Green values, lowered
the bar for the realization of what constituted the militarization of international politics
for many in the Greens. Whereas the traditional Green perspective on escalation rested
within the construct developed during the Cold War of great power, often nuclear,
violence capabilities. Fischer saw the violence of smaller nations and its prevention as an
Ziller/'Grilnen furchten ZerreiBprobe."
"Nur mit uns," 56-57.

141
important means for preventing such large scale escalation. He now recognized the
dangers of smaller regions, in particular those rife with ethnic conflict, in leading to a
greater militarization of politics in the global context.54
With the reasons for the conflict clarified and the enunciation of the potential to
have a negative impact on Europe itself and international politics in general, Fischer
directly attacked the usefulness of the UN military mission in Bosnia. While he did
characterize it as a humanitarian success in its ability to deliver food to displaced persons,
he decried its usefulness as a political-military operation, opining that it threatened to
become a "debacle." It had no political viability and even worse, its military actions
were anemic at best, as the failure to protect Srebrenica clearly demonstrated.
Importantly, for Joschka Fischer and many other realos in the Green Party, the failure to
protect these safe areas provided the most clearly demonstrable representation of the
failure of the UN and its policies in Bosnia, and with it the failure of the best chance for
success.55
In what would become his mantra of sorts, Fischer argued that though the UN had
created these six protection zones, it did not have the will or the capability to actually
protect them. The UN military forces were attempting, and failing miserably, to create
peace in a hot war. Even worse, though they were supposed to remain neutral, they were
actually becoming pawns in the war. They were used as hostages by the Serbs to protect
against UN air strikes, thus permitting the Serbs to act with impunity. The UN mission
54
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then was from its onset "contradictory and very dangerous."
The "bloody reality" of Bosnia and the deficient policies of the UN mission there
meant that the UN was facing a "strategic" and "historic" defeat. From Fischer's
perspective the UN, and by proxy the West, faced two alternatives—to give in or to resist
the events—and either choice would bring with it a high price. From his perspective,
"nothing would be worse" than having to share responsibility for further catastrophes and
more victims through inaction. Joschka Fischer, a pacifist for most of his life, now
believed that something militarily had to be done to stop these atrocities.
With this personal reorientation, Fischer challenged the Party to engage in debate
and question the absolute nature of pacifism. Simply being upset about the situation
would not bring a solution; action was required. He directly asked the Party whether a
pacifist, embodying the position of non-violence, could simply accept the "victory of the
brutal, naked violence in Bosnia." Further, he asked "What can be done when all
previous efforts—embargoes, protection zones, control of heavy weapons, trade
solutions—simply screwed up or at best did not adequately function relative to the
military violence?" Such direct questions framed the very questions facing the Party—
which of the two ingrained normative perspectives, "never again war" or "never again
Auschwitz" would maintain prevalence? As will be discussed below, for Fischer and his
colleagues, though they stood torn between the "never again war" and "never again
Auschwitz," the latter "had to prevail, even at the cost of NATO's first hot war."56
Despite his rancor for a new approach, Fischer rejected calls that he was
abandoning the traditional aspects of pacifism. Belying the idea that pacifism had
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become old fashioned "complete nonsense," Fischer rejected any change of the
foundation of Green pacifism; instead he looked for an evolution of policy.57 As we will
see later, his opponents would not buy such an argument.
In his letter, Fischer, seeing all other options as exhausted, proposed two general
options to address the situation in Bosnia—UN withdraw or support military action. He
thoroughly rejected the first of these, a UN withdraw, as it would "probably intensify" the
war, if not lead to its expansion. Moreover, it would mean the end of the humanitarian
mission of the UN, which Fischer had always seen as a success in Bosnia. A withdraw of
the UN could lead to a complete failure of the UN concept as a broker in conflict
resolution, meaning states could simply ignore the UN when it came to international
conflicts. As Fischer noted: "The end result of a UN retreat would be [the prevalence of]
national power politics and not international conflict resolution through the UN." Further
debunking the withdraw option, Fischer believed that such a step would not protect
Europe from other consequences, as the politics of national violence would not end with
Bosnia. Indeed, in his opinion Europe would not be able to accept a UN withdraw
without "enduring a heavy moral injury with wide-reaching results."
Here, as in cases before, Fischer's logic resonates with Green principles. An end
to the humanitarian successes would further impinge on the human rights situation in the
region, thus again resonating with the principle of "never again Auschwitz."
Furthermore, preventing a failure of the concept of the UN, which would lead to a return
to national power politics, also linked to Green principles. Indeed, as the 1994 election
platform noted, the Greens believed that the UN was the most important platform for
79.
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solving international problems.
Fischer further utilized the concept of "never again Auschwitz," sometimes
referred to as "never again Fascism," by directly highlighting the events in Bosnia as a
form of fascism that would not stop. Rhetorically, he asked whether the German left
would lose its "moral soul" if it "cowered away from this new fascism and its policy of
violence." Going even further, Fischer directly related the situation to the Nazis,
claiming that today's generation faced the same dilemma as those of the 1930s: What
must be done in the face of such violence? Fischer, according to The Economist felt
"passionately that the misery caused by Hitler's war has landed the Germans with a
special responsibility to help unite the continent."5
This argument however was denounced by some. In an opinion piece for Die
Zeit, Franco Zotta argued that the comparison between the Nazi atrocities during the
Second World War and the genocide in Bosnia was "too simplistic," in particular given
the smaller scope of the events.60 However, there was significant resonance, as will be
outlined below, within the population with these events to the Nazi past that suggests
there the relationship was in fact quite involved.
Fischer also challenged the Greens using their own principles. "How should a
non-violent party, who clearly and unequivocally recognized the right of self defense in
its foundation program, behave?" he asked rhetorically. With the Muslims fighting for
their very existence, can the German Left deny them their right of self defense, a policy
that had been ordained even in the Green Party's origins? Such logic rejected any form
58
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of non-action on the part of the West. As Fischer articulated in a speech before the
Bundestag on 12 June 1995: "Between the solidarity for survival and the requirement for
non-violence—that is our [the Green Party's] contradiction."61
The conflict in Bosnia especially after the Srebrenica massacre then brought the
Green Party to a definite conundrum. The idea of non-violence stood diametrically
opposed to that of the protection of life. In other words, the norms of "never again war"
and "never again Auschwitz" again found resonance in the Green Party debate.62 Only
this time, they were no longer mutually supportive of one another; instead they were
mutually excluding. As Karsten Voigt, a prominent leader in the SPD noted, the reality
of the violence in Bosnia collided with the Party's vision for a peaceful world.63
According to Fischer, the guiding principle of pacifism that had guided the Party in the
1980s, opposing nuclear war was not valid amid the current ethnic conflicts.
How then would a traditional pacifist address this new form of violence? For the
most part, many pacifists profoundly rejected any use of military force, choosing instead
to focus on non-military means to counter the rising violence. However, Bosnia still had
an impact on the most ardent pacifists. One of the more prominent traditionalist pacifists
in the Party, Winfried Hermann, importantly noted that even his perspective on the use of
force was altered by the events in Bosnia. The primary paradigm shift within the
traditional pacifists rested more along the axis of the recognition that war was no longer
restricted to state on state violence, but instead could directly impact citizens and in turn
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lead to similar results as that in Auschwitz.64 Though he and the other traditionalists did
not change their perspective and accept the use of force, it is very clear that their
perspectives and the context of their decisions were altered by the shocks of Bosnia.
After thoroughly debunking the option of withdrawing throughout the essay,
Fischer argued for support to the increased military protection of the protection zone and
acceptance of all the inherent risks. From Fischer's perspective, despite the fact that this
action would not create a political solution, it would help to protect the civil population.
Indeed, as he enumerated: "I am convinced that given the situation of the civil population
trapped there, we [the Greens] must support the military protection of the UN protection
zones." This key statement, which encapsulated Fischer's argument, immediately let the
"alarm bells ring" for many in the Party according to Die Woche.65
It is important to note two distinct reservations about Fischer's position. First,
unlike others of his realo colleagues, he did not support the use of German troops in any
response. He remained convinced that the historical arguments against any German
military participation in the region were quite sound. Interestingly in an interview given
around this time, though he rejected the use of the Bundeswehr as an international
intervention force, Fischer did hesitate and resist answering the question of whether
German troops could act in areas outside of where there was a history of Nazi action.66
He did, however, implore for German humanitarian help in Bosnia, but not German
peacekeepers.67 This distinction, of not pushing for German involvement, would be a key
point of criticism from others in the Party. Second, he was not arguing for the creation of
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peace through aggressive peacekeeping initiatives. Such would have been a much
broader expansion of the use of military forces and would remain taboo for the majority
of the Party for three more years until shattered amidst the Kosovo crisis.
The argument that Fischer put forth in this twelve page letter is clearly a new
dynamic on the use of military forces for a Green Party member. As the commentator
Matthias Geis of the Suddeutsche Zeitung argued, Fischer was in essence trying to create
consensus within all German political parties on foreign policy, in particular the use of
/TO

the military, by bringing the Greens toward the mainstream.

In effect, he chose to

protect the sanctity of life over the Party's prohibition on using military force.
However these ideas were not new, nor were they a complete departure from
Green values, as such ideals are clearly reflected within his argument. Indeed, at the end
of his essay, Fischer claimed that the Green values of non-violent cohabitation and the
protection of human rights still remained. What was different however was his
interpretation of these values and the importance that he attached to them. He rejected an
absolutist perspective of pacifism in favor of a more nuanced approach. As a champion
of change, Fischer had clearly taken some dramatic first steps.69 But even he had further
to go on his journey, as the evolution to his later positions clearly demonstrates.

The Response
Reactions to Fischer's letter from the non-realo sections of the Party were strong
and quick. Denounced as a traitor to Green Party values, as a militarist, and even
68
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implored to grab a weapon and go to Sarajevo, Fischer was attacked first in the press by
his party and later with more official letters from Party members. The traditional
pacifists responded with outright vehemence, while the swing group reacted "extremely
acrimoniously."70 Indeed, Fischer found only a few supporters from the Greens. For
several months this debate raged, with no clear resolution. Instead it was overtaken by
the cessation of hostilities, only to reemerge in a new form several years later.
Examining this portion of the debate, the reaction to Fischer's letter, highlights in
particular the three groups emerging with clearer distinction and is especially relevant to
an overall understanding of the use of force debate within the Greens.
Within days there was a flurry of activity within the press, as political operatives
and commentators on all sides of the Green spectrum took to the airwaves. The political
writer Mohssen Massarrat believed that any attempt by the Greens to distance themselves
from their non-violent principles through the acceptance of Fischer's argument would
prevent them from other fundamental reforms they wanted to accomplish.71 From his
perspective, accepting the use of the military would weaken the Green soul and prevent it
from achieving its higher goals.
Ludger Volmer of the swing group was one of the more prolific voices in this
debate, publishing numerous pieces in several media from the swing group perspective.
Generally, he argued that Fischer's and the other realos' current arguments were
fundamentally turning the Greens away from their anti-military roots.72 He called
conclusions can be inferred, only a detailed examination of his personal files, which at this point remain
sealed, will provide the definitive data required.
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Fischer "irresponsible" (Verantwortungslos).

In a rather sarcastic article, he implored

Fischer to pick up his own weapon and head to Sarajevo. Focusing on Fischer's choice
to have others, especially the UN, conduct a robust defense of the safe areas, he
mockingly rebutted Fischer claiming that he had made it clear to the entire world that the
German Greens were ready to protect these safe areas "to the last Frenchman." He
believed that Fischer's choice of defending the safe areas was a best "symbolic."
Others in the so-called swing group also demurred on Fischer's argument.
Jtirgen Trittin, one of the co-authors of the long response to Fischer to be discussed
below, argued that there was no way for Fischer's idea to gain a majority within the
Party. Angelika Beer, a security policy specialist and Member of the Bundestag who
would play a prominent role during the Kosovo and 9/11 debates, argued that Fischer's
ideas "helped neither the people in Bosnia, nor our Party." Kerstin Miiller argued that
Fischer's rush to use military forces had "little to do with real options" and was "cynical
and absurd." In the longer term, his proposed policies would be "devastating" for the
Party.74
Some in the swing group were somewhat closer to Fischer's arguments in this
particular instance. Winfried Nachtwei recognized the challenge at the crux of the
debate—between the anti-fascist ideals of "never again Auschwitz" and the pacifist
foundation of the Party endemic in "never again war." Rhetorically he asked how the
Party could rectify the ideals of action to protect human rights, solidarity with victims
and non-violence in the context of Bosnia, without ignoring the concept of "never again
war" through either collaborating with the aggressors or using military force.
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He called for the implementation of typical Green non-military mechanisms such
as embargoes to stop the war, but at the same time recognized the need for long-term
solutions that may or may not incorporate Green Party principles. He rejected the
proposed withdraw of the UN peacekeepers from Bosnia and the direct attack on Serbia
aggression, yet was only lukewarmly supportive of the idea of using the military to
protect the protection zones, as it brought forth the chance of escalation.
Antje Vollmer, in a very revealing statement for the swing group that represented
both the desire to hold to traditional values, yet adjust for the future said: "We are and
will remain a pacifist party. We will always push for non-military solutions. However,
our foreign policy program must become contemporary."

Though many in the swing

group recognized the need for a debate, there were few that recognized at this early stage
that foreign and security policy in general needed to adapt more directly to the current
crises.
The swing group, especially Volmer and Mtiller, rejected Fischer's argument
citing the belief that the dangers of escalation were in fact quite genuine, which was a
typical Green tenet. Volmer worried that this "crisis intervention" could in fact lead to a
"punishment expedition,"77 which would lean then toward the use of the military to
achieve state goals. Using the military would then become a "next best solution," instead
of a last solution. Indeed, he argued that Fischer's position was a legitimization of
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military force and actually pushed the Green Party in the direction of the conservativebased CDU. If the Party were to follow Fischer's arguments, it would lead eventually to
•70

the "disorientation" of the Party.

Intervening with military forces to stop genocide

would be a "blanket clause for military interventions of the Bundeswehr."79
The pacifist wing of the Party also engaged in the debate. Some members of the
Party from this wing even threatened to leave the Party.80 One of the more pacifist
01

members, Winfried Hermann, recognized some of the analysis from Fischer, but
demurred when it came to even the mere mention of the use of military forces. From his
perspective, the use of military force could not bring any form of peace. In a voice that
would be echoed among others on the Left, Hermann, in a direct contradiction to the
suggestion put forth by Fischer that previous efforts had already failed, argued that Green
ideas had never been truly tried. He suggested an option in concert with Green foreign
and security policy ideas that would utilize a "consequent, enacted, and sanctioned
embargo," the hindrance of weapons exports to the warring parties and a strengthening of
the peaceful opposition. He believed that none of these efforts had ever been forcefully
implemented from the UN or the EU. As Hermann clearly noted, the Green Party's ideas
of "civil intervention remained [unutilized] as before and awaited enacting."
Hans Christian Strobele, a Member of the Bundestag who was one of the more
vocal, argumentative, and indeed colorful of the fundis, also weighed in on the debate.
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Calling Fischer's letter a "document of helplessness," Strobele argued that Fischer's call
for military action to protect the safe zones was not compatible with Green values. He
did, unlike other strict pacifists, recognize that the voices within the Greens in support of
military action had grown within the past decade. Adhering to traditional Green values,
Strobele believed that if the UN intervened militarily, they would no longer be seen as
neutral, but instead be viewed as an enemy by all sides.
The primary differences between the three sections of the Party rested along the
axis of how they defined a military action and in turn what level of support they would
give to it. The traditional pacifists rejected any and all forms of the use of the military at
this point, to include the use of peacekeepers. The realos proffered the use of military
force to stop the violence, though generally not German forces, while the swing group
accepted the possible use of peacekeepers in a permissive environment, as outlined in the
1994 Potsdam Party declaration. An interesting and key indicator of the debate at the
time was reflected in the agreement between both the realos and the fundis that even
peacekeeping was considered a military function. Each used their own slightly different
perspective on peacekeeping and used it to support their own goals—the realos to push
for using military forces and the fundis to decisively reject it.84 In doing so, however,
that made it much harder for the swing group to hold this current position of a foot in
both camps and in essence forced them to evolve their position over the course of the
following years if the Green Party was to reach any sort of consensus.
By far, the most compelling and organized response to Fischer's letter to the Party
came from Members of the Bundestag and swing group authors Kerstin Miiller, Claudia
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Roth, Jurgin Tritten and Ludger Volmer, who penned an eight page letter on 31 October
1995. An official reaction to his letter, which they viewed as problematic enough, it also
incorporated their opposition to Fischer's proposal at the Bonn Party Congress that they
believe took the proposals of his letter one step further—a requirement to intervene in the
case of genocide. Combined, Fischer's proposals in both mediums invoked this strongly
worded response.
From the onset of this letter, Mtiller and her group of fellow authors (hereafter
referred to as Mtiller, et al.), were heavily steeped with the influence of traditional Green
values. The authors criticized Fischer' call for military intervention in Bosnia and more
so what they perceived as his call for an intervention requirement in the case of genocide,
claiming that he did not consider the dangers of escalation or even the possibility that
such a military intervention could be unsuccessful. The letter largely echoed a sentiment
Volmer vocalized—that even is such dire cases, any mechanism of action must remain
civil.85 Moreover, there was considerable consternation that the call for intervention
would be a clear "first step" (Einfallstor) for a "practically comprehensive support for
combat operations."86
For Mtiller, et al., there was strong opposition to the call for action in the case of
genocide, for they believed that genocide could be neither adequately defined, nor would
there be any element of oversight or authorizing agency to determine when to intervene.
Citing the over forty currently ongoing regional wars, which this faction of the Greens
believed were not being fought with any sense of justice, Muller, et al. asked rhetorically
85
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when should there be intervention if all wars are unjust. In the face of such numerous
conflicts, Muller, et al. argued that the definition of genocide must be clarified. From
their perspective, they feared that genocide would become the raison d'etre for big power
intervention and by proxy, the further militarization of world politics.

Unlike Fischer,

who saw the violence of small states as leading to future militarization, these authors
remained wedded to the Cold War perception of trying to avoid the re-militarization of
the great powers of the world.
Muller and her fellow authors went even further in questioning Fischer, asking
him whether the UN should actually do these types of intervention, especially given the
UN's limited capabilities. There was clear concern among Muller and others in the
Greens that this call for intervention requirements would give NATO a further reason for
existence. Indeed, the authors believed that Fischer's call was in fact a "subtle support
(Befurwortung) of NATO." Moreover, Muller, et al. believed that giving NATO a new
mission would negatively impact the process of demilitarization.
It is important to recall here that in the mid-1990s a significant part of the Party,
as suggested by the Party's 1994 election platform, firmly believed that NATO should be
dissolved and that demilitarization and disarmament were the means of achieving
peace.89 With NATO as the only credible intervention capable organization, from
Muller, et al.'s perspective, Fischer was in essence calling for the resurgence of NATO
and with it fundamentally opposing Green values. Though Fischer never made direct
reference to using NATO and in fact denied that NATO would be the only institution
capable of acting in situations of genocide, events would dictate that in fact the genocides
87
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in southeastern Europe did provide a primary justification for NATO's continued
existence. The fears and concerns of Mtiller and her fellow authors were thus clearly
justified.
The strongest arguments against Fischer's proposals rested in their rejection of the
claim that it was a moral imperative to intervene in the case of genocide. From their
perspective, those who called for intervention in the case of genocide must intervene to
succeed "rigourousfly] and consequently]" or risk sharing in the culpability of the
genocide.90 In essence, Mtiller, et al. stood Fischer's argument on its head—arguing that
there could be no chance of success without full engagement, which was largely
impossible. In an earlier article, Volmer had echoed a similar vein, asking who would
define fascism, if the Greens and others were morally compelled to act against fascist
regimes.91 Such rejections of the moral aspects of intervention largely debunked parts of
Fischer's appeal to traditional Green values and the empowerment of "never again
Auschwitz" for the swing group at this point.
Quite damningly, Miiller, et al. compared Fischer's policy then to that of
American interventionalism, which was largely construed at that point as acting only
when there was even a chance of success and in tune with the nation's interest. Indeed,
invoking Woodrow Wilson's liberal ideas of spreading democracy and linking them to
the later Kissinger intervention policy (noting this justified the Vietnam War, Desert
Storm, and the Cuban Blockade among others), the authors argued that American
intervention policy had always been about freedom and the people—much as Fischer's
"Nur mit uns."
Miiller, et. al.,5.
Volmer, "Wenn Grime Kampfen."

156
idea proposed to do.

In keeping with traditional Green ideas, the authors rejected any

such policies that were remotely linked to action based on the interests of the country.
The authors then spent over a page of the eight page letter laying out specific
examples and asking whether and how a military intervention would function from the
Green perspective. Responding to Fischer's call that the UN should have intervened in
Rwanda, they asked whether an operation in Rwanda in 1994 could have had any more
success than the bloody failure in Somalia in 1993. How could a mission in Somalia to
save the starving in 1993 have been successful, assuming it was genocide? What about
the possibility of intervention in the south of Sudan, in Kurdistan, and in East Timor? Or
were such issues, respectively, a domestic issue not worthy of international intervention,
too much of a challenge given NATO member Turkey's involvement, or simply too far
away? How should a practical intervention occur in Afghanistan, given the complicated
history of interventions there? And, finally, what should happen in the case of Tibet?
Would engaging the great power of China simply rule out any possibility of responding
to the challenges in Tibet?
In the final analysis, according to this logic, there was no need to intervene
against small criminal style elements, while at the same time interventions against larger,
perhaps more heavily armed groups of perpetrators could have no effectiveness
whatsoever. In cases of so-called "middle" conflict areas, the authors argued that there
was no guarantee for success, thus reducing any high claim of moral imperatives. Again,
the authors had spun Fischer's original argument one hundred eighty degrees by
questioning the purity of the morality card. In other words, if you choose to intervene in
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one place, why not in another, when the need is just the same? If the chances for success
are limited in most areas and success thus likely defines your decision to intervene (at
least from their perspective), how does this definition differ at all from a great power
political decision to intervene for power and interest reasons?
This argument was one that Fischer, and indeed the entire community of
proponents for humanitarian interventions, were unable to come to grips with. In many
ways, the purity of the moral card was diluted within the preeminence of a nation's or
party's interest, even if the traditional, anti-establishment elements of the Greens still
chose to believe that acting based on a nation's interest was still anathema. In essence,
the so-called "moral card" can thus only be seen as a means of facilitating a particular
involvement and could not be seen as the sole reason for supporting a change in policy or
an active engagement.
However, that said, the "moral card" vastly helped to emotionalize the debate
within the Greens on two levels. First, it caused individuals of the Green Party to rethink
their perspective on the rejection of the use of military forces. Fischer's and others'
letters during the public discourse attest to that. Second, it provided an element of
"visual ammunition" through the pictures and video displayed in the press that gave a
much clearer elucidation of shock and, indeed, emotion to sway members of the public
and within the Party. While it was not the sole reasons to evoke change, it cannot be
removed from the calculus of change. Though the moral card did not change the
perspectives of the traditional and swing groups members overnight, it did indeed
facilitate change over the course of the debate.
The authors also challenged this so-called moral argument by questioning some of
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the Western policies occurring in Bosnia, in particular the gradual creation of "ethnically
pure zones'" as a result of the Dayton Peace accords. If this was indeed a moral
argument, how could the western powers in the wake of an intervention accept the end
results of the original genocide that precipitated the intervention?94 Moreover, Winfried
Hermann argued that it was neither realistic nor moral to suggest intervention by others,
an eerie echo of Volmer's call for Fischer to deploy to Bosnia himself.95 From their
perspective, the entire moral argument utilized by Fischer to gain traction in the push for
change to become more regierungsfdhig (as some viewed it) was illegitimate in its basis
and could not even be fulfilled in the current geopolitical context.
The strong criticism of the moral basis of Fischer's argument, its comparison to
general great power intervention decisions, especially that of the US, and its perceived
revitalization of NATO were strong arguments that had significant resonation within the
Green Party. All of these were in effect cornerstones of the liberal Green base. By
appealing to them, Mtiller, et. al. hoped to remove the emotional pull of the events in
Srebrenica and keep the Party's base focused on the primary tenets of Green foreign
policy. As events will later show, there was some element of success in this action,
though it was to be short lived, as the emotional events of Kosovo rekindled the
emotional moral card and in the end demonstrated the facilitating nature of the moral
argument in changing the Greens' perspective.
In effect, this debate clearly demonstrates that the shock of Srebrenica as a means
of change was never internalized by the swing group or the liberal wing of the Party. In
effect then, the facilitating norms had only limited immediate effect. The effect of these
94
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facilitating norms, however, must be seen in the context of the entire debate. For the
swing group, the events in Bosnia combined with the later humanitarian crisis in Kosovo
to create an internal re-examination that would then empower these facilitating norms.
The traditional pacifist element of the Party, however, will likely never accept as part of
its identity the need to react with military force to shocks of the kind described here, as
the challenges associated with the violence in Kosovo and the later 9/11 terrorist attacks
effectively demonstrate. For them, these facilitating norms paled in comparison to their
firmly held pacifist values.
Significantly, however, neither the extreme pacifist wing of the Party, nor the
swing group ever offered their own coherent version of how a Green Party should define
its foreign and security policy amid such crises. They did offer snippets of ideas, but
nothing coherent. In one case, Volmer did call for the creation of a blue-helmet
peacekeeping force that German soldiers could participate in under the auspices of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), though it was never really
followed with any gusto. However, Volmer did eventually show significant evolution by
suggesting that the Greens must now distance themselves from the desire to dissolve
NATO, as it could play a significant role in the eventual integration of Europe.96
Muller also left open the door a bit for some changes, but did not follow through.
In an interview shortly after the release of Fischer's paper, she pointedly noted that she
was no longer "per se" opposed to the deployment of strictly peacekeeping forces.

In

both of these cases, Volmer and Muller showed their distance from the strict pacifists,
who at the time were unwilling to support even peacekeeping missions. These statements
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demonstrate the differences between the strictly pacifist fundis and the more open-tochange swing group. Their sharp divergence will become even clear in the context of
the reemergence of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and amid the context of the Greens
joining the governing coalition in 1998
Instead, for the most part only the tired rhetoric of calling for demilitarization and
a clear international structure, avenues which had failed in the Balkans, remained
prominent in the Green opposition to the realo ideas.

Hermann echoed such rhetoric,

calling on the Green's "historical mission" for an "anti-militaristic, civil and non-violent"
political mentality to be pushed into German foreign policy, while at the same time
resisting any calls for the use of military force." There was no mention of finding new
mechanisms to cope with the new challenges within Muller, et al.'s letter, nor in other
press pieces. Indeed, Volmer said publically that Fischer's overall letter should in no
way be about the provocation of an internal debate on foreign and security policy as a
whole.100

Fischer's Missive in Response to the Muller Letter
Within a month of the open response to his earlier letter, Fischer wrote a scathing,
sixteen page missive attacking the authors. Filled with exclamation points and at times
condescending, argumentative and even competitive language, Fischer's letter rebutted
their arguments, clarified what he believed were inaccurate assessments and near the end
even laid out his perspective on the way ahead for Green foreign and security policy.
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Though it was largely overcome by the cessation of hostilities, his second letter only
served to heighten the debate for a time and even spilled into several Green Party
membership meetings.
The primary guidepost of his rebuttal was his belief that the UN, if not the
international community as a whole, had a necessity to intervene in the case of genocide,
to include militarily as a last resort. Indeed, to emphasize his point he even signed the
letter "with international greetings." Importantly, he decried the view of the Miiller, et.
al. letter and statements from others that he was reacting with emotion to the events in
Bosnia,101 instead focusing on clear reasoning for the evolution.
For Fischer, the wars in Bosnia and more so in Rwanda made an "active
international politic against genocide irrefutable." Using the context of the 1948 UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Fischer noted,
with emphasis in the original text, that genocide had to be stopped. "Here it is in black
and white: The United Nations and its member states are required by treaty to the
prevention of genocide." With stark clarity, Fischer argued that with the "danger" of
genocide, the UN had the responsibility to intervene. Most importantly, he again
reiterated his direct challenge to the Party, stating that the Greens, and their ideals of nonviolence, must change when confronted with genocide.
Fischer spent considerable time expounding upon the case for reacting to
genocide. Yet, while his critics had immediately assumed that his call for intervention
meant military force, Fischer directly and sternly contradicted that, laying out the a more
multi-discipline approach. Rather mockingly, he cited that even the German dictionary
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Duden defined intervention as engagement in another state's activities as including
diplomatic, economic and military actions.
In a direct answer to his critics, Fischer believed it was the direct American
involvement in Bosnia that led to the successes of the Dayton peace deliberations; the
economic boycott and sanctions, which had long been the modus operandi for Green
security policy leverage, had not been the deciding factor in the eventual agreement
between the warring parties. Fischer took particular effort to highlight the effectiveness
of the military in the intervention process, even at this early date. For Fischer, the call for
using military force was not a call for the militarization of German security policy; it was
genocide that drove him to change his perspective. Indeed, even at this point he still
soundly rejected interventions in Somalia and the Gulf War.103
Fischer, moreover, defiantly noted the clear definition of genocide within the
1948 convention, a direct challenge to Muller's argument that linking intervention to
genocide would lead to an expansion of its definition to facilitate the further
militarization of international, if not German, policy. Indeed, he noted that the October
1993 majority resolution from the Bonn special party day, authored primarily by Ludger
Volmer and approved by the strong majority of the Party, had clearly stated that the
actions against the Muslims in Bosnia had expanded to genocide with fascist
tendencies.104 That there was a clear definition of genocide would also forcefully play
out in the public debate, as realos such as Hubert Kleinert made stark reference to it.105
By clarifying that the Greens themselves had in fact recognized the increasing likelihood
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of genocide in Bosnia and that there were clear requirement to act in the case of such
genocides, Fischer was reminding members of his Party, to say nothing of those in direct
opposition to him now, that the concept of genocide was well established and carried
clear legal ramifications for action.
For Fischer, the role of Germany's past was a "substantial political argument in
the present," which remained an omnipresent factor in all of Germany's actions. As
noted in earlier sections, the decisive events of the Nazis and the calamity of the Second
World War contributed starkly to German Green ideals, especially "never again
Auschwitz" and "never again war." In this letter, Fischer invoked the Nazi past and
linked it to modern international law. Fischer argued that it was the Holocaust, especially
Auschwitz, that led directly to the above mentioned 1948 convention on the prevention of
genocide. Rhetorically, Fischer asked where the difference in the foundational ideals
between the proceedings in Nuremberg and the current reaction to genocide after the end
of the Cold War arose. For Fischer, they were one and the same, with each requiring
punishment of those who committed those acts.106
In addition, in the context of the role of Germany's history, he addressed the
perception he garnered from Miiller's letter of a deep suspicion of US policy. Whereas
Miiller's letter presupposed advancement of UN based military intervention as a
precursor to a more active, great power style US hegemony, Fischer decisively rejected
that argument, claiming that the swing group and traditional pacifist wings of the Party
had a "negative obsession with the US." Here, Fischer again used this as an opportunity
more information.
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to further define the linkage to Germany's Nazi history as a primary reason for action.107
Fischer also made some considerable efforts to define his new vision of what
Green security policy should be. After the waning of the Cold War, the Greens were
defined by freedom, justice, peace and equal chances for life; in essence the Left as a
whole was defined by the rule of law in this new post Cold War era. The responsibility
of the Left and by proxy the Greens was to fight all of its opposites.

This is perhaps

one of the best examples of the impact of the change of the system on the Greens, as the
Party's leader flatly laid out a change that evolved as a result of the collapse of the Cold
War.
For that new view of foreign and security policy, Fischer recognized that the Left
necessarily included non-violence as a core principle. Yet at the same time, he noted
another requirement to help those in need, particularly in the case of genocide. His
argument here is reflected by others in the realo section of the party. Hubert Kleinert, a
self-identified realo argued that to be "Left" brought with it the requirement to "help the
weakest" and protect "elementary human r ights."109 Such help and protection, according
to the realo argument, must also include military assistance in the most extreme cases.
As such, and here Fischer was quite adamant, the Left has an element of solidarity with
those in need and thus must get involved.110 According to one author from the
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, a perspective such as this could very well fall under the mantra of
Green philosophy.111
In speaking of the events of Srebrenica, for which he did accept some of the
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blame, Fischer again reiterated that the massacres were a clear reflection of the failure of
UN conflict prevention. Earlier intervention could have prevented the loss of life.
Indeed, Fischer made what to some Greens could only have been seen as a preposterous
argument. Viewed through the lens of solidarity with those in need and the desire to
prevent conflicts, the "only" criticism, according to Fischer, could be that the UN acted
after instead of before the massacre.112
Fischer's words were an echo of the argument made earlier by a leading Green
realo, Ralf Fticks. In a position paper from late August 1995, Fucks asked rather
sarcastically since when the idea of "without us" had become entrenched in the Green
lexicon when emergency help against genocide was codified in the UN and, significantly
from his perspective, when the defeat of National Socialism in the Second World War
was directly the result of active interventionalism.113 Even in this argument, Fischer was
well behind the curve of many of his new realo brethren. The invocation of this
solidarity with those in need was a direct manifestation of the transformative norm. No
other concept provides a direct linkage to the actions of the Nazi past that have had such
a clear resonance for every Green Party member and the current calamities affecting
numerous regions throughout the world.
In addition to the linkage to Germany's past and the solidarity with those in need,
Fischer also outlined some more practical, if not realist, reasons for supporting active UN
intervention. First, he believed that the wars in southeastern Europe could hinder the
development and further integration of Europe. At the most essential level, he was
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arguing for empowering the UN and furthering integration.114 Interestingly, such
arguments were often heard by members of the SPD or the CDU, who had considerable
more experience in, and thus more socialization from, the international realm.115 As
events would later dictate, Fischer was in many respects part of the leading edge of the
Greens who eventually began to realize the importance of the "completion" of Europe.
To end his letter, Fischer laid out ten tenets of a future Green security and foreign
policy. Some, such as strong conflict prevention, the creation of an international
commission on the prevention of genocide, reducing the power of the individual states,
the rejection of German global intervention capabilities, the shrinking of the Bundeswehr,
the further reduction of arms production and distribution, and the rejection of any nuclear
German nuclear ambition were well within the bounds of normal Green values. Indeed,
none of these, with the exception of the genocide commission, were new.
However, Fischer did make three suggestions that were beyond normalcy for the
Greens and really set him apart as a trendsetter for the Party. First, he argued for an
increased transnational integration, instead of "traditional military alliances." While not
exactly new, this was a clear attempt to empower the UN and reduce the fear among
many in the Party that NATO would achieve primacy in intervention. Evidence at this
time does not offer any clear indication whether this was a genuine appeal on the part of
Fischer or whether it was merely a tactical suggestion to appease many in the Party.
Given the significant weaknesses of the UN, which Fischer pointedly noted in his letter, it
is likely that this was more of an appeasement tactic aimed at his fellow Green Party
members.
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Second, and directly related to the first one listed above, he proposed the
strengthening of the civil and, importantly, the military capabilities of the UN. Third, he
proposed limiting German participation to so-called blue-helmet activities, i.e.
peacekeeping. He went even further and proposed that certain elements of the
Bundeswehr should be trained in such practices and offered to the UN. He was quick to
note though that such forces would not be offered for Chapter VII, peacemaking
operations.116 Both of these ideas were clearly new and were a direct affront to the
traditional Green values that generally abhorred all forms of military involvement,
especially German forces. These suggestions were by far the most provocative and
represented the most direct distancing from traditional Green values. As events will
show, this debate on the wake of the Srebrenica massacre was a critical step of Fischer's,
and to an extent, the Green party's journey of change.
Of course, Fischer's missive did spark some responses from his opponents,
though the debate was largely overtaken by events as the war finally came to a close
when the Dayton Accord was signed in November 1995. For example, Ludger Volmer in
late November 1995 retorted that Fischer had "talked right by our argument in wild
rhetoric," failing to answer any of the questions posed by Miiller, et al. From his
perspective Fischer's answer was proof that his underlying purpose was to elicit a
principal voice of support for military action, for which the primary enactors would be
NATO and the Bundeswehr. Indeed, he was quite concerned that even though Fischer
had only proposed support for UN action, he feared that the Bundeswehr could soon be
deployed worldwide, and that the Greens would have to support such actions. In a
Green leaders. See the next chapter on Kosovo for more detailed information.
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somewhat sarcastic conciliatory tone, Volmer bemoaned that the Greens would someday
117

say "yes" to military deployments.
Fischer's response to the members of the Greens was by no means the end of the
debate, as it would continue in the press and in the public discourse. Nor would this
missive convince too many Party members of the need for change. It did, however, lay
out a vision of Green party security policy that would largely forecast the direction that
Party would move. It would take, however, some clear successes in Bosnia with military
forces and a second disastrous resurgence of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the
Balkans—this time in the Serbian province of Kosovo—for change to advance further.
This short, but intense, debate in the fall of 1995 was thus a step in the process, spurned
by the events of Srebrenica, but only a precursor to the even more rancorous debate amid
the debate prior to the NATO attack on Serbia in March 1999.
CHALLENGES AMID PARLIAMENTARY DECISIONS

The debate that had for so long encapsulated the Party soon crept into the realm
that actually required the Greens to make a decision at the Bundestag level, as the
German government led by the CDU began to push for German participation in the war
in Bosnia. The Party position reflected a party in the throes of a debate. There was
consensus on some issues, but strong disagreement on others. The end result was that
making any decisions as a group at the federal level was riddled with challenges.
As the fall 1995 decision on German deployment to Bosnia approached, Nina
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Phihppi has suggested that the realos had gained increasing support from the Party, due
directly to the situation in Bosnia. Moreover, she argues, this realo perspective, based on
local surveys, represented the "the desire of the majority of Green voters."118 To an
extent this is true, for the more realistic elements did gain some support. However, the
element that would decisively shift the overall opinion of the Greens, the swing group,
remained uncommitted to the realo approach in the summer of 1995. Philippi, however,
is quite incorrect to argue that this position represented the majority of Green voters. As
the events surrounding the Kosovo crisis will clearly demonstrate, many Green voters, in
particular those that would call themselves members of the grass roots, would remain
firmly entrenched in traditional pacifism, shunning the use of military force. As the
following chapter will highlight, the Green debate was far from over. Thus, to say that a
majority supported the policy is an oversimplification.
Contrarily Ludger Volmer quite correctly has suggested that as the debates that
fall came to fruition, the Greens remained fractured, citing the fact that no common
decision could be arrived at on whether the Greens should support or reject the August
and September 1995 NATO attacks on Serb positions. The realos saw it is a necessary
step to bring the Serbs to the negotiating table.119 Indeed, Waltrud Schoppe and Gerd
Poppe argued in an open letter on 31 August 1995 that the air attacks over the previous
few days had proven quite effective and had been "necessary."120 The pacifists and the
swing group rejected these arguments based on their principles of abhorrence to the use
of military force, some even suggesting that the attacks had long been planned as
118
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retaliation for the massacre of Srebrenica.
While there was tremendous discord on support to military operations in general
in Bosnia, there was considerably more symmetry within the Green Party, especially
between the federal leadership and the grass roots, on the choice to be made when it came
to the German government's proposal to deploy German Tornado aircraft to participate in
the rapid reaction force in Bosnia. Only four of the almost fifty Green Members of the
Bundestag supported the government's position to use German forces in the Bosnia.
Even Fischer, who spurned this hefty debate chose to reject the use of German forces.122
That unity within the Green federal level leadership, however, fractured when the
government proposal for the use of German participation in the initiation peacekeeping
force IFOR (NATO Implementation Force) came before the Bundestag. It is important to
note here that this was a NATO implementation force and not a UN instigated effort,
which would provide a different twist to the debate, as many in the Greens still held
reservations about the future relevance of NATO. Moreover, there was a stark difference
between the earlier decision on the deployment of German tornado aircraft that could
take part in actual combat operations and this decision on a proposal that would support
the deployment of strictly peacekeeping forces. The latter perspective had considerably
more supporters within the Party, to include many in the swing group, thus allowing it to
gain more supporters.
In this case, with the inclusion of a future role for peacekeeping for NATO which
still had many detractors within the Party, the planned agreement to the government's
August 1995, Bestand A—Winfried Nachtwei, Akte Nr. 3724, AGG.
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proposal by the federal leadership was seen as a "massive provocation" for many in the
Party. Though this desire to support the proposal was rooted in the reality in Bosnia,
which required an international peacekeeping force for which no other organization
except NATO could fulfill, many were concerned that this would create a new role for
the North Atlantic alliance, which the 1994 election platform still firmly rejected.

As

Green votes were not needed for the successful passage of this proposal, the conflict was
put off until later in the year when a strategy session again raised the issue of NATO's
role.124
This portion of the policy debate—focusing on who should intervene and what
level of intervention should be used—continued into October and November at a strategy
conference in Bonn and at the leadership group meeting. In both cases, the realos pushed
to accept the role of NATO, while the swing group and to an extent some traditional
pacifists chose to look at a wider collective security system to send peacekeeping forces
into Bosnia that would utilize the UN or OSCE as the overall umbrella for the operation.
This debate reached a crescendo during early December 1995 at the Party Day in
Bremen. The Party voted on two fundi proposals, one realo and one swing group
proposal. The more extreme version of the traditional pacifist and the realo proposals
failed to receive enough votes to advance past the first round of voting, thus showing that
the two ends of the spectrum in the Green Party had little chance of being enacted. The
two remaining proposals, that of Ludger Volmer and the other traditional pacifist group,
were eventually combined into one proposal that many of the swing group and the
Indeed, an SPD proposal to support the deployment was firmly rejected by the SPD overall.
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traditional pacifists could approve. The primary dissonance between these two proposals
focused on whether deployed forces should be allowed to use force. While the swing
group pushed for the use of weapons for self defense, the fundis wanted the German
soldiers to be unarmed.125
In the end, in a vote of 278-223, the Green Party in their Bremen Party Day
approved a compromise resolution that brought forth elements of both major remaining
proposals. It was instigated by the swing group, in particular by Ludger Volmer, as they
were forced to compromise to ensure support from the traditional pacifists. Following
traditional Green values, it suggested that non-military methods were the method of
choice; however it moved away from those traditions by accepting a role for German
soldiers in a peacekeeping environment. While it strictly rejected the use of German
forces in combat deployments (Chapter VII), which many of the more radical elements of
the realo camp had supported, it did allow the deployment of "lightly-armed" German
troops to international trouble spots in & peacekeeping capacity (i.e. chapter VI), so long
as all those deployed were volunteers and could only defend themselves in "extreme
cases." It moreover, focused on the UN and OSCE as the primary purveyors of collective
security operations. Significantly, those who supported this motion made it clear that this
agreement was not to be seen as step toward militarization.
While Volmer's proposal was eventually adopted, the realos and Joschka Fischer
had proposed a motion of their own in the early stages of the debate—one that saw the
use of military force as a realistic approach to stop genocide. Though Fischer's proposal
was eventually rejected, he did perceive a reason to be optimistic that more elements of
his Party were accepting the need for force in some instance, one that the national press
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would pick up on. Fischer had proposed a motion that would have allowed for the use of
force in cases when war would be the only means of preventing genocide. In the first
round of voting, his proposal got approximately 38% of the vote from the Party, which
was far more than he had expected and claimed that it was a "excellent" result. Ludger
Volmer in his book recounting these events, however, points out that the 38% was in fact
a false measure of success. That percentage came from the first vote, in which every
delegate has four ballots to cast, thus precluding any delegate from having to make a
clear choice. Moreover, in a sharply critical rebuke, Volmer suggests that Fischer and the
other realos "allowed" this news to be distributed to the Press.
As the vote on the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) neared, the party
leadership again broached the issue of NATO versus UN or OSCE leadership of the
force. Both the realos and the remainder of the party proposed various alternatives, with
the latter suggesting that although they were not against the use of peacekeepers, they
were opposed to its incorporation into NATO's operations. The party leadership's 27-16
decision to support the redo idea of using NATO, led to what Volmer called the
leadership's "break with the Party" being complete.127 Whereas the Party at the Party
Day had just voted in support of a motion that used the UN and OSCE, the federal
leadership had rejected that notion and accepted the concept of an operation under a
NATO umbrella. Again there was a dissonance between the leadership and the grass
roots.
Yet, when it came time to vote in the Bundestag on 6 December 1995 for the
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deployment of German forces to support the IFOR for peacekeeping duties in Bosnia,
which would be a Chapter VII mandate, the federal level of the Party chose not to worsen
the debate and bring on the wrath of the party. In a tactical maneuver, the vote amidst the
Green members of the Bundestag was 22-22, with four members, in a subtle political
move, abstaining from the voting to ensure an equal vote. Doing this meant that the
federal level Green federal leadership choose to avoid coming down on one particular
side of the rather pernicious debate. But in so doing, the leadership largely ignoring the
position developed in Bremen, in net effect still causing some of that consternation they
had hoped to avoid.

That the Greens had offered such support and the overall strong

support for the IFOR mission in the Bundestag (543-107) suggests that that the debate
over the use of force had migrated from a division between Left and Right to one within
the Left, in particular primarily within the Greens.
Though this delaying tactic was effective for a short while, events in Bosnia
continued to have an impact on the debate. A year after the initial vote on IFOR, the
mandate for the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) came to the Bundestag and again
instigated debate in the Greens. Building on what Fischer perceived as the success of
IFOR, though not all in the Party would agree to this, Fischer argued that the Party would
support the NATO SFOR only so long until the UN force was ready to take its place.
However, many in the Greens believed that supporting the ruling coalition's proposal for
support to SFOR was in essence an effort to transform the mandate of NATO in Bosnia,
Aufienpolitik, 520-21.
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which returned to the argument inherent in many in the Party of a fear of militarization of
NATO's overall presence. As such, the federal leadership of the Greens rejected the
government's proposal, with only two voting in favor and sixteen abstaining.

CONCLUSION

The events in Bosnia in the summer of 1995 pushed the Green Party to a new
plateau in the way they thought about the use of force. The earlier internalized values of
traditional pacifism that had guided the party for so long had begun to show some signs
of weakness in the early days of the Bosnian war, as outlined in the last chapter, now
began to show some serious cracks after the events in Srebrenica and the collapse of the
UN actions. More members of the Party began to move toward the realo group, in
particular the prominent leader Joschka Fischer. However, the swing group as a whole,
in large part to preserve their hold on the power within the Party, appears to have shifted
very little overall.131 Despite some defections, they remain largely intact and clearly
linked to the traditionalist tradition. Indeed, as the following chapter will show, it would
not be until a number of other factors exhibit their influence that the swing group will
change their perspectives.
Some of the central ideals of the Green party were shattered against the violence
of Bosnia. No longer were the tenets of "never again Auschwitz" and "never again war"
compatible; rather they became mutually exclusive for many who moved toward the
129
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realo perspective—to stop the genocide, which for many was the most important
concern, meant military action. In effect, as Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen noted, for some, the
very concepts of "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz" underwent a an
"inversion," literally changing what mattered most to each individual and to the pacifist
movement.

For many, the strict adherence to non-military measures lost its appeals to

the brutality of the present, as the memories of Auschwitz cast a long shadow. For the
realo section of the Greens now, as well as the SPD, the eventual support by some
members of the Party was rooted in two primary factors—the view that something had to
ITT

be done and a moral responsibility to act in the case of genocide.
Still, despite this divisiveness between the new realos and the remainder of the
Party, there remained some commonality. Though the immediate aftermath of Srebrenica
saw a growing chorus of voices that supported the use of the military in Bosnia to stop
the violence, there remained almost zero support for the use of German combat power to
enforce or create the peace under a Chapter VII mandate. Only as the Greens edged ever
closer to a possible coalition government with the SPD, and by proxy an incorporation of
the German responsibility, did the Green leadership, though not the majority of the Party,
start to suggest more often, the possible use of German forces.
Moreover, with the evens in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace accords and in
*

particular NATO successes in keeping stability in Bosnia,134 the Party significantly
shifted its position to recognize the greater role of NATO and the possible use of even
131
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German Chapter VI peacekeepers, such that there was now a general level of acceptance
within a significant majority of the Party that supported the use of peacekeeping forces.
These sentiments followed the trends that were occurring in the population, as the support
for peacekeeping operations in the NATO context steadily rose, indicating, as Nina
Philippi suggests, a "learning process."136 By the time the Party agreed on the 1998
election platform, there had been a clear evolution in particular for the entire party with
the role of NATO. No longer were the Greens seeking to dissolve NATO, but instead
they saw it as a possible mechanism for a new collective security system in Europe.
Indeed, there was now no longer a reason to pull Germany out of NATO.137 More
importantly, these successes tended to weaken, though not destroy, the traditional pacifist
argument. For example, the decision to seek parity in the federal leadership vote before
the Bundestag in the IFOR vote and the decision not to support the transition to SFOR in
1996, soon evolved in late 1997 and early 1998 into outright calls by Joschka Fischer to
support the extension of the SFOR mandate, suggesting an empowerment of the realo
138

wing.

All of that said, there are some who saw the Green debate amid Srebrenica and
the challenges posed by Bosnia as of little importance. Dr. Wolfgang Biermann of the
SPD believed that the debate in the mid 1990s was "more symbolic than real." It lacked a
specific strategic context, instead focusing on only one portion—that of the use of
force—of the overall debate. As such, from his perspective, it was a simplified debate
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with only minimal importance.

However, Dr. Biermann overlooks the role the dispute

played in the overall context of the evolutionary debate. It may indeed have been
somewhat simplified, but it focused on the issue that was front and center. Debating this
issue first was critical, as it was one of the more challenging aspects of the Green foreign
and security policy. Moreover, Dr. Biermann also omits the impact that even this focus
had on later iterations of the debate, for example how the Greens' perspective on NATO
changed with the evolving use of force debate. To fully understand the overall debate,
this scuffle over using force in Bosnia was a necessary, even if a bit simplified, step along
the entire evolutionary process.
Still, despite some military successes and a rising tide of support and inertia for
the realos, the debate was far from over. The massacres in Srebrenica had pushed the
debate to a new level and had highlighted the schism not only between the three groups
within the Party, but had also clarified what would become a growing rift between the
federal level delegates and the grass roots of the Party. The worsening situation in the
region, defined in large part by Srebrenica, and the later successes on the ground in
Bosnia in keeping a tentative peace forced many in the Party to rethink their perspective
on the possible use of the military140 and thus continued the evolutionary process even as
the heat of the debate had resided.
Though the Party could in no way be seen as speaking with a common voice on
this issue, neither where they completely fractured. The majority still remained opposed
139
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to the use of military force to stop violence. Both the swing group and the traditional
pacifists within the Party's leadership still remained opposed to using military force in a
peace enforcement or peacemaking mission, though the former was beginning to accept
the possibility of the use of the military for peacekeeping or logistic missions. As swing
group member and Party Speaker Jurgin Trittin said, the Green Party foreign policy was
"neither pacifist, nor militaristic (Tschingdarassabum)."
The realos remained a loud minority, but had only minimal support in the grass
roots and could not effect major change in the Party's overall stance. They did, however,
have the capability to influence the federal level debate well beyond their numbers, given
their prominence at that level. Their involvement with the international community
helped to engage them more and in essence created a forcing function that pushed for a
re-evaluation of personal beliefs for those at the federal level. For those at the grass roots
level, however, the principles of their ideology continued to trump the international
events that only permeated their lives through the television. Such vast differences of
experience contributed starkly to the ever growing rift between the federal and grass root
levels.
As the conflict in Kosovo arose, the lack of a coherent plan on foreign and
security policy in general and a clear policy on how to address such crises in particular
would hamper the power of the swing group, as events in the region and the possibility of
a Red-Green coalition would force the Greens to take a stance. The pacifist and swing
group portions of the Party had been very slow to react to events on the ground in the
Balkans and within the capitals of Europe during the mid 1990s, choosing instead to
remain wedded to the values that guided them in the past. The swing group was a few
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steps behind the realo wing of the Party and Europe, and with the resurgence of violence
in the Balkans would eventually evolve and adapt to meet the challenges of the post Cold
War era. It is their evolution that would help to define the overall position of the Party in
the use of force. For the strict pacifists, however, who incorporated a much deeper
philosophical internalization of the values of pacifism, they would remain loathe to give
up, even as their reaction to the events after 9/11 will demonstrate.
This chapter has directly integrated the first intervening variable—external
shocks—into the analysis. The Srebrenica massacre, a clear and decisive shock, would
have its most important impact on Joschka Fischer, who, as clear leader in the Party,
would push the debate to a new level. Moreover, this chapter has also highlighted the
differences of the minority realos and the swing group and traditionalist thorough an
analysis of the discourse of the acrimonious debate in the summer of 1995. In particular,
the realos were the only ones to internalize the effects of the shocks; the swing group
importantly remained on the side of the traditionalists. Finally, this chapter also noted
that the post conflict decision requirements in the Bundestag demonstrated that the
leadership was similarly fractured and that the realo part of it, somewhat paradoxically,
still had power that exceeded its numbers, resulting in some level of support for
peacekeeping operations.
The year 1998 would add two particular elements to this debate that would bring
it to a new level—the worsening crisis in the Serbian province of Kosovo and the distinct
possibility of the Green Party's participation in a governing coalition with the SPD.
Though the Party was no longer purely pacifist, it still had no defining identity or clear
policy on the use of force. Both of these two new elements would build on the evolutions
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of the 1995-1997 and lead to a situation in late 1998 that few would have fathomed only
a few years before—that the Green Party would support the deployment of German
combat troops to an active peacemaking mission. It was a long, arduous journey that
would push the Greens further from their pacifist roots and closer to identifying a clear
policy. Though its final evolution was still years away, the debate on the use of force
would continue to escalate during the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999.
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CHAPTER VI
THE STRATEGIC CALCULATION TO GOVERN

Whereas the crisis in Bosnia would see the evolution and development of the
realo perspective within the Greens, the crisis in Kosovo would focus on the changing
views of the swing group. The challenges in Bosnia had brought the Party a long way
from their traditionalist roots. The shock of Srebrenica, which galvanized Joschka
Fischer to change his position, led to a firestorm debate and shifts in some positions. By
the end of 1995, the Party was split between the minority realos and the rest of the group
that largely remained wedded to the traditional Green, pacifist values. The evolution of
the crisis into active combat with Green support meant that a generation of Green leaders
who had been reared in the late 1960s "lost their military virginity" with the Kosovo
crisis.1
The years since the Dayton Peace Accords had seen the continuation of the
foreign policy debate, but on a rather low simmer given there was little calling for any
direct policy contrary to Green values. To be sure, the Greens, as the source documents
suggest, maintained an interest in the events in the region. But it would not be until 1998,
in particular as the violence surged to shocking levels in Kosovo, that the Greens would
again begin to debate the merits of the two ingrained ideals of "never again war" and
"never again Auschwitz" in the context of their adherence to pacifism.
Relative to the earlier debate, however, there was a distinctly different variable
that would have a profound effect this time on the Greens, in particular the swing group.
The chance that the Greens could soon join the SPD to form a majority in the executive
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portion of the government, a so-called Red-Green coalition, raised direct requirements
and positions the Party as a whole had to support. Encapsulated in the German term
Regierungsfahigkeit, this new variable introduces a new strategic, calculating aspect to
understanding the Greens' evolution. In order to be a part of the governing coalition, as
clearly enunciated by the SPD, the Greens had to change their overall perspective on
many issues, especially the use of force, and support Germany's international
responsibilities. For many in the swing group, the ideals inherent in Regierungsfahigkeit,
especially the conscious will to govern and the effect of being in the government, both of
which required some element of change, were major reasons for their evolution.
It must be noted that the majority of the information on this section comes from
newspaper accounts, speeches, and personal interviews. With the exception of some
documents from early in this critical process, there are few primary sources and even
fewer secondary sources that can provide direct evidence, since many of the documents
were still sealed at the time of research. It is clear there was indeed a definitive process
to this evolution though the ideas presented here are but snippets of the entire process that
likely occurred. The complete story will remain a mystery for now, requiring more
detailed interviews and examinations of primary source documents. However, it is quite
clear that the pull of the desire to govern played a clear role on the evolution in the Green
Party and, as we shall see later, will have a decisive impact on the staying power of the
Red-Green coalition.
Unlike the situation during Bosnia where converts to the realo perspective made it
quite clear why they changed their views, it is very difficult to separate the varying level
of impact of the two intervening variables amid the shock of the resurgence of violence
1
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and the strategic calculation demanding change to be a part of the governing coalition.
At the federal level, comparing speeches and articles of several major federal level swing
group members will clearly demonstrate their evolution, though that may not provide a
definitive answer as to their personal reason for change.
The evolution of the Party is a bit easier to judge. In creating the election
platform at the Magdeburg Party Day, there were no pressures from Regierungsfahigkeit,
thus leaving the Party to remain wedded to pacifist principles. Yet, eighteen months later
during the Bielefeld Party Day, as the Greens were six months into their new government
and two months into the shooting war in Kosovo, the change relative to the earlier Party
Day can be easily measured. Examining in detail the Bielefeld conference provides an
important understanding of how the Party as a whole moved closer to the swing group
perspective and in turn the demands of Regierungsfahigkeit.
By the end of the war in Kosovo, the Green Party had weathered the storm,
supporting both the Green leadership and the Red-Green coalition. The swing group, as
the purveyor of change, had evolved their guiding ideas to choose the strategy of
influence in the government over the principles of pacifism and opposition. Two years
later, these values would again be put to the test in Macedonia, only this time the military
mission would be a preventive deployment without it being a response to a particular
shock. That difference provides an opportunity to measure the effects of being in
government. For the Greens, but also the SPD, there would be enough dissonance to lead
to the necessity of relying on the Opposition for passage of the deployment proposal,
setting up the circumstances of the difficult debate after the 9/11 attacks.
Whereas the last chapter focused on the role of shocks to change the Greens, this

one will look primarily at the role of the second intervening variable—
Regierungsfahigkeit—and to a lesser extent the role of shocks and Fischer to understand
the changes during the Kosovo crisis. The chapter will be divided into three distinct
sections. The first section will define the primary parameters of Regierungsfahigkeit in
depth and discuss the debate within the Greens on the necessity and importance of this
idea. The second section will focus on the changes in the Party during the Kosovo crisis.
It will examine specific Green postures from various players in all groups to different
aspects of the crisis. Most importantly, it will highlight the changes within the swing
group that arose particularly out of the tenets of Regierungsfahigkeit by examining the
evolutions of two important leaders (Volmer and Beer) as well as the Bielefeld Party
Day. The final section will examine the challenges presented by the deployment of
German forces to Macedonia, in particular the new parameters it outlined for German,
and by proxy Green, security policy and the impact of Regierungsfahigkeit on the
decision process.

A REGIERUNGSFAHIG GREEN PARTY?

Throughout the mid 1990s, the newly unified Germany developed a growing
sentiment of a responsibility within international relations. The SPD, like the CDU,
accepted the need to continue this new responsibility and contribute to the "Western
powers," such as NATO, with troops or money as part of the multilateral process.
Deploying German military forces was a necessary component of this responsibility. The
SPD's desire to maintain continuity in German foreign policy meant that the acceptance
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of this policy, among others, would become a measure of the ability to govern, or
Regierungsfahigkeit, for any potential coalition partner with the SPD. As the SPD looked
at options to replace the CDU in the governing coalition, many in the SPD leadership,
especially Karsten Voigt, were extremely interested in setting up a coalition with the
Greens, to the point that they even refrained from talk of a grand coalition with the CDU,
which was a change relative to the past.3
The Green foreign and security policy at the time, however, remained steeped in
the traditionalist pacifist perspective, with only small minorities accepting the idea of
German international responsibility, to include the deployment of German military
forces. The intellectual sparks after Fischer's letter in the wake of the Srebrenica
massacre had only started the much needed debate; by the Bremen Party Day in 1995, the
Greens still remained officially opposed to deploying German forces. Such a stance was
not compatible with an SPD policy of continuity of German security policy.
This led to a collision at the nexus of the conscious desire by the SPD for
continuity with German international responsibilities and Green policies that still argued
for ideas such as the dissolution of NATO. As will be outlined below, the concept of
Regierungsfahigkeit was the second, and perhaps most important, major variable
contributing to a change in the Green policy and eventually to a successful Red-Green
coalition.
As outlined in the early stages of this dissertation, Regierungsfahigkeit, loosely
translated, refers to a political party's capability to govern and its ability to act
responsibly within the German government. Joachim Raschke defines the term
2
3
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specifically as the "strategic capability to act as a governing party;" in other words, from
his perspective, the idea is to bring a conceptual strategy into the coalition. By the latter
definition, as Raschke argues, it would be hard to imagine the Greens as regierungsfdhig,
as torn as they were on foreign policy issues.4 That definition is for the purposes here too
narrow. As elegantly argued by Ludger Volmer, Regierungsfdhigkeit was not simply an
objective category, but was rather more of a "political" issue for many Greens. Thus a
more nebulous approach is required to understand its impact on the Greens.
In defining Regierungsfdhigkeit this dissertation moves beyond just having a
strategy to bring to the government. First, it integrates a conscious decision aspect into
its definition—a will to govern and have an influence on policy by the Greens. That
desire was clear for some in the party in the mid 1990s, especially in the realo section.
As Fischer would later explain approvingly in May 1999: "The more we pursue our
interests multilaterally, through Europe, the more we'll get for ourselves."6 Yet
governing as part of a coalition for the Greens meant adhering to the desires of the SPD.
As will be discussed below, the two parties' views on foreign policy, perhaps the most
contentious issue between them, differed enough that bridging those differences made
this a very political issue for members of the swing group.
Overcoming these differences, however, was not simple in execution. As
Christoph Egle argues, the goals of participating in the governing coalition and ideals
inherent during the development and execution of the Party's politics are often
conflicting. In other words, a party's guiding principles may be at odds with the demands
4
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of government. For the Greens in the foreign policy realm that will to govern conflicted
with the traditional pacifist principles. Yet, pressure excerted by the coalition partner, the
necessities of adhering to the state's politics, and other factors can challenge a party's
defined principles prior to joining and while in a governing coalition. This is especially
true when a state's responsibilities are so strongly defined. Indeed, as the consummate
Green MP and writer Winfried Nachtwei would later describe, the dependability of the
Greens political decisions within the NATO alliance were a "cornerstone" of
Regierungsfahigkeit. As this cases here will clearly demonstrate, there were a number of
specific interactions, events and leadership elements that helped to counter the political
friction between the parties and in turn the discord within the Greens between the desire
for government participation and party identity.8
The second aspect of Regierungsfahigkeit that will be examined is its impact on
the Greens once they are in power. The necessity of continuity, as outlined by the SPD
and enshrined in the coalition contract, had a powerful influence on many Greens, in
particular on their voting patterns and political speeches. An essential element of
pressure inherent in the idea of Regierungsfahigkeit, what could loosely be described as
discipline, hovered over all Green decisions on the use of force. In the cases of Kosovo,
Macedonia and to an extent 9/11, this pressure would have a profound effect on the swing
group in particular.
Reduced to its most basic element, this disciplining pressure of
Regierungsfahigkeit gained its strength from the precarious Green electoral situation after
7
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1998. After receiving only 6.7% of the votes in that election the Greens had only a
minimal majority to form a government with the SPD. As a result, their grip on power
was tenuous at best. As Joschka Fischer noted, the SPD could have very easily worked
with the CDU in a grand coalition if the Greens failed to live up to their expectations.
That fact, along with a dismal performance at the Hessen local election in late 1998, led
Fischer to suggest that the Greens' precarious electoral position actually had a
"disciplining" effect on them within the government.
Taken a step further, this uncertainty translated to a clear choice for many in the
Green party. As Ludger Volmer would note in March 1999, the ability of the Greens to
garner only 5-7% of the vote with any regularity did not make them a "great power." It
was enough to help build a governing majority, but clearly not enough to define
government policy. Moreover, it would be an "illusion" to believe the Greens could find
a "new strength" in the opposition. The dictum was "influence," not "assertion" of
policy.10 Thus, in order to achieve domestic goals and have a decisive "green" effect on
Germany's foreign policy, the Green leadership and the Party as a whole had to accept
some very difficult decisions, especially in the realm of foreign policy. Achieving
environmental changes or developing a preventative foreign policy became linked with
an acceptance of the continued presence and efficacy of NATO. In at least two very clear
situations, with the Green Party day in Bielefeld amid the Kosovo war and later during
the Bundestag vote on the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan, the decision was
even clearer. Either accept combat deployments of the German military or return to the
SchrQder, 1998-2002, 93.
9
Fischer, Die Rot-Griinen Jahre, 136.
10
Ludger Volmer, "Auto-Biopsie—Thesen zum DurcrMnger der Grtinen," 26 February 1999, Y096,
AGG.

190
opposition and lose the opportunity to achieve political goals, which would be crucial to
the continued success of any political party. In the final analysis, it would be this element
of Regierungsfahigkeit that would have the most profound impact on this part of the
Green evolution.
To get into the government, however, meant first dealing with the political issues
that separated the two parties—in effect dealing with the challenge of the first aspect of
Regierungsfahigkeit. For the SPD and the Greens in the mid 1990s, there were a number
of issues that needed to be gulfed—immigration, environmental policy, and international
trade. Relative to other parties, the Greens still lay outside the norms of German political
ideology in many areas.11 But by far, the most challenging and the one the public most
focused upon was foreign and security policy, in particular the varied positions on the use
of force.12 Those differences covered specific issues such as the future of NATO, the
future of the Bundeswehr, and of course out of area operations. On some, such as the
future of the draft and the Bundeswehr, the Greens were not politically strong enough to
push through their position; they thus decided not to make it a major issue.

For the out

of area operations problem, however, there was a necessity for Green change. As that
change struck at the most basic of Green core principles, any effort to change it would
require considerable effort and thought.
To understand the early aspects of this process, it is useful to look at the varying
perspectives of how the SPD and the Greens perceived the potential of the Green party's
Regierungsfahigkeit. According to two of the leading SPD MPs in the foreign and
11
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security policy section, Gerd Weisskirchen and Karsten Voigt, the Greens quite simply
were not regierungsfahig in the mid 1990s because they did not support deploying
German military forces in out of area operations like Bosnia. According to Voigt, it was
the single toughest issue between the SPD and the Greens.14
This realization did not suddenly arise, but had been under careful study by the
SPD since at least the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Karsten Voigt of the SPD, a
leading proponent of a possible coalition with the Greens, argued even in a 1989 paper
entitled "The Peace Politics of the Greens: Between Fundamentalism and Half-Realism"
that the Greens were not capable yet of being in a governing coalition with the SPD. Five
years later in a joint article with Wolfgang Bruckmann, Voigt went even further,
declaring again quite empathically that the foreign and security policy was not
acceptable; only this time, in an indication of his interest in working with the Greens, he
offered means to address that problem. Though these documents are clearly only the tip
of the proverbial iceberg of the SPD's perception of the Greens as a potential coalition
partner and their efforts to address those shortfalls, there is indeed much that can be
gleaned from them.
At the early juncture of 1989, though both parties at the time shared similar goals
for the international sphere, the SPD's issues with the Green Party's security stances were
largely driven by the challenges from being on the front line of the Cold War. Chief
among them was the latter's failure to recognize the importance of Westbindung,
Germany's integration with the West, in particular through NATO. Moreover, their
rejection of weapons procurement, the nuclear weapons strategy of NATO, and military
maneuvers in Germany provided further friction points. Voigt lamented the fact that the
14
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Greens strove only for disarmament and not for solutions to other, pressing security
challenges, a necessary skill for any governing coalition party.
The Green ideas such as unilateral disarmament that would be taken outside of
Western and NATO counsel, what Voigt called "national unilateral actions," did not fit
with the concepts of a responsible Germany. As such, the multilateral tenets of German
foreign and security policy as well as the "contractual requirements" were "neither
understood nor a consequence of [German] history" for the majority of the Greens. The
concept of "nuclear pacifism" that still defined the Greens at this point was from the
perspective of the SPD incapable of being a part of the governing coalition. Simply put,
what the Greens would actually do as part of a governing coalition could not be
calculated.15
Five years later, the situation had changed considerably. A unified Germany had
to react to significant challenges in the Balkans and its responsibilities, especially in the
area of using German military forces, were becoming increasingly expanded and
concrete. Moreover, unlike five years earlier, this time there was a distinct chance for an
SPD led coalition without the FDP or the CDU. There was renewed attention placed on
the Greens as a possible partner, even though Fischer later would note that this
constellation came with a "high risk" and was not guaranteed to maintain a stable
majority or dependability.16
Even with these changes, foreign and security policy remained the most likely
trouble spot for any potential Red-Green coalition. Still concerned about possible Green
obviation of German responsibilities if it became part of the governing coalition, Voigt
15
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and Bruckmann, in an article entitle "Responsible and Regierungsfdhig? A Critical
Analysis of the Foreign and Security Policy Positions of the Greens," remained
convinced that the Greens were not capable of governing with the SPD. Voigt and
Bruckmann named six specific areas where Green policy would not support maintaining
continuity with the current German foreign and security policy; the Greens' position on
out of area operations was one of the major sticking points. At this juncture the authors
admitted that the Greens at heart still held firm to a "traditional anti-western and pacifist
world view" and continued to lack a vision of security policy.
The authors did recognize, however, that the Greens were in the middle of a major
foreign policy debate, in particular over the steadily worsening war in Bosnia, that
created particular openings that could be exploited. In fact, they believed that the result
of that debate, and importantly whether the Greens were flexible and programmatically
"ready to change," would determine the Regierungsfdhigkeit potential of the Greens. The
SPD authors believed that the end of the Cold War had brought a "loss of meaning" of
foreign and security policy for the pacifist base of the party that now opened some "room
to maneuver" for intra-party debates and in turn SPD influence. The potential success,
however, hinged upon how strong particular interests and dogma in the Greens remained.
From their perspective then the goal should be to engage the Greens and lead
them to revise their foreign and security policy positions. Voigt and Bruckmann believed
that without a "push" from outside, perhaps utilizing the strong acceptance of the
protection of human rights, inherent in the "never again Auschwitz" ideal in the Greens,
there would be no chance of change, even with supporters of change already in the Party
and several opportunities to address reform in the Greens.
Fischer, Die Rot-Grunen Jahre, 24.
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They gave five specific recommendations for this engagement. First, the SPD and
the Greens should hold a personal and open debate on the basis of German foreign and
security policy to clarify the specific guiding principles of a potential Red-Green
government. Second, both sides must have clarity on the expectations of the German
government in the international affairs. Third, these agreements on foreign and security
policy must be codified in the coalition treaty. Fourth, and importantly for this
dissertation, the Greens should be pushed between 1995 and 1998 to support Germany's
multinational political and military roles as an international partner. Finally, the SPD
should work with the Greens to achieve some Green political goals, such as the reform of
NATO and the strengthening of OSCE among others.17 As will be described in more
detail below, it does appear that several of these recommendations were acted upon.
Where the SPD saw an opening was not with the traditionalists, but rather the
swing group, those who saw the chance of joining government as potentially more
important than holding firm to the traditionalist vales.18 The realos, even as early as the
1980s, never ruled it out, while the fundis would only "tolerate" it if allowed for a greater
airing of their criticisms and for changing the SPD,19 a position they would not really
change until much later. Behind the successes of governance at the state level, the Green
realo leadership between 1994 and 1998 made a conscious decision to strive to become a
part of a governing Red-Green coalition.
The purveyor of change in the Greens then, as the SPD correctly identified, would
17
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be the swing group. As a contemporary article and a later interview with Volmer
suggest, the swing group was quite interested in joining the governing coalition;21 what
remained was simply the execution of how to adapt them to the requirements of
Regierungsfahigkeit. Given the SPD's clear delineation that the Green's were not yet
regierungsfahig under foreign and security policies defined by the swing group in 1995,
achieve governing power meant both jettisoning their strict adherence to pacifism and
their typical oppositional approach. For the swing group then, who would now define the
direction the Party would take, their politics would have to trump their principles.
Choosing politics over principles, especially one so dear as pacifism, was clearly
not easy. Adding to the conundrum, however, was the challenge such a shift posed
within internal Green party politics. The swing group's power came when they supported
the traditionalist base. As Joschka Fischer noted in his 2007 memoirs, any compromise
99

with the realos or with reality meant an end to the swing group's leadership.

For the

swing group then it boiled down to a simple equation: Choose to join the governing
coalition that brought influence on Germany's domestic and foreign policies and allow
the realos to gain the primary leadership role within the Party, or maintain leadership in
the Party and remain in the opposition, thus limiting their chances of affecting Green
political goals. That was the fundamental challenge as the wars in the Balkans raged and
the 1998 election loomed.
Though the war in Bosnia, as highlighted in the previous two chapters, did change
the views of many in the Greens, there remained a wide chasm with the SPD perspective
outlined above. Most in the swing group during the Bosnian crisis strongly opposed
21
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relinquishing pacifism to be able to become capable of governing. At this point in the
debate, the traditionalists and the swing group continued to walk together in lock step. In
fact, strong leaders from each group, traditionalist Winfried Hermann and swing group
member Ludger Volmer, believed the Greens were regierungsfahig already in 1995,
despite their rejection of the deployment of German military forces, suggesting they did
not see their principles at this point as inhibitive. Indeed, in a 1995 editorial in taz,
Volmer argued that foreign policy would not be the issues that would destroy a potential
Red-Green coalition, meaning that no Green Party ideal must be jettisoned.23
Moreover, both the traditionalists and the swing group publically criticized
Fischer, suggesting he used the Bosnian crisis and his July 1995 paper arguing for a
military engagement solely as a method of making the Greens regierungsfahig. In a joint
paper Kerstin Muller and Jurgen Trittin, both adherents to the swing group, argued the
following right in the middle of the Bosnian crisis: "A yes to a [German] combat
deployment [to Bosnia in June 1995] is no pass (Ausweis) for Regierungsfahigkeit, but
rather a political declaration of bankruptcy for a party of peace."24 At the very
precocious Party Day debate in Bremen in 1995 referenced last chapter, others, such as
the MP Ursula Schonberger strongly criticized Fischer's acceptance of the military as in
fact simply an opening for joining the governing coalition at the expense of Green values.
Going even further, Muller in fact argued that the Greens should remain a part of the
opposition while Germany should practice a self-limiting foreign policy, in effect
22
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shunning the very argument of power over principle.

During the Bosnian crisis, the

majority of the Green Party remained opposed to relinquishing the principle of pacifism
in favor of a gaining the SPD as a coalition partner.
Though the swing group and traditionalists remain wedded to the traditional
principles, the realos, out of the horrors of the war in Bosnia had already changed their
defining principles. Moreover, they had largely aligned with the SPD position on the use
force and, taking the next step that had long been a goal of leaders like Fischer, began to
argued quietly that the rest of the Greens must evolve their position to become capable of
governing. Daniel Cohn Bendit, the early leader in the realo wing, argued in 1995 that "a
party that wants to be regierungsfahig at the federal level must find a principle in foreign
policy that can be accepted by the federal partners in the German government."26 That
idea of evolving the foreign policy politics, though not necessarily the core principles, of
the swing group in particular was an important mantra among many who pushed change.
By far the most important player in this evolution, though by no means the only
one, was Joschka Fischer. From the mid 1990s, Fischer had the goal of joining the
governing coalition; indeed, according to Klein and Falter, Fischer had the goal of being
Germany's foreign minister since 1992. Karsten Voigt believed that this goal was
"always" on Fischer's mind. Volmer believed that Fischer had the goal of joining the
government as early as 1983 and he brought that idea to many others in the Party.
The exact nature of Fischer's specific role in pushing the idea of
Regierungsfahigkeit remains open to some conjecture, given the lack of primary
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resources. Frank Pfetsch argues, without a plethora of details, that Fischer indeed had
been making direct attempts to make his party regierungsfahig with the SPD.
Contemporary newspaper accounts, moreover, often made reference to Fischer's effort to
9Q

make the Greens a regierungsfahig party.

The Green MP Winfried Hermann believed

that Fischer was always one step ahead of the party on this issue and the party followed
if)

him.

Ludger Volmer, on the other hand, believed that the Greens as a whole undertook

a "learning process," in which Fischer played a central, though not decisive role. Klein
and Falter make particular emphasis of Fischer's overall leadership in the Party, for
which there is no doubt that he played a large role here as well. Karsten Voigt made
numerous references to the strong role of Fischer during this process in a personal
interview.31
What is clear is that Fischer's decisions and actions had profound effects on the
course of the process. He believed that the Party would only change its guiding values if
^9

a discussion were held before the Greens became a part of the government.

Amid the

debates during the Balkan conflicts, Fischer looked at reality and pragmatically, out of
principle, made a new decision and many followed him. His letter after the Srebrenica
massacre clearly opened the floodgates for a debate the Greens needed both for internal
purposes, in coming to terms with the challenges posed by Bosnia to its own version of
pacifism, but also, in hindsight, for external purposes, as a first step toward a foreign
policy position that was more acceptable to the SPD. His leadership position during the
27
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1998 election and later as the foreign minister also provided substantial opportunity to
lead and push members of the swing group on both the political and principle front.
In public, however, Fischer kept the idea of change to become regierungsfahig on
a low key. In an interview at the height of the internal party crisis over his letter in 1995,
he clearly stated in an interview that the issue of out of area operations would not lead to
an end to a possible Red-Green coalition. Instead, he criticized those who argued his new
argument was about internal political change. He decried those suggesting that he was
"instrumentalizing" the tragedy of Srebrenica and spoke more of the need for an internal
Green Party debate. He even sought to change the political subject, suggesting only that
Germany needed a Red-Green coalition to replace the Kohl government, not how to
actually accomplish the goal.
However, it is also clear that Fischer was keenly aware of the need to shift the
Green position on the use of force. According to both Hermann and Voigt, Fischer knew
that without a change in the Green perspective on the use of German military forces, the
primary sticking point, there would be no chance of a coalition with the SPD.34
Moreover, at the height of the Green Party's debate on Bosnia, the SPD's leading
politician, Rudolf Scharping, opined to Fischer that he should bring in a military
dimension to the discussion on foreign policy,35 suggesting that Fischer was also talking
with the SPD about this potential and was aware of the SPD requirements. By early 1998
when the chances of a Red-Green coalition were on the doorstep, Fischer clearly saw the
challenges for attaining Regierungsfdhigkeit. As he outlined in his memoirs, foreign
policy, in particular that of out of area operations, was the primary "question of
33
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confidence" for the Greens.

In many ways then, Fischer was a key enabler of the

acceptance of the Regierungsfahigkeit ideal within the Greens.
Though Fischer's leadership was likely the most decisive important part of the
acceptance of the idea of Regierungsfahigkeit by the Green Party, there were also other
parts to this equation. Despite all of his attempts to change the Party, they only
succeeded, according to Ludger Volmer, when the swing group changed their mind on
the use of force.

7

That the swing group did indeed consciously make this decision is

suggested by Volmer's comments in June 1999: "When one says that we will not join the
government because we cannot solve the [foreign policy] problems, than one is
historically finished."
For some swing group Greens, it was a tactical decision that trumped their
convictions; for others their convictions, which had already been tested in the Balkans,
led them to embrace deploying German military forces as the crisis in Kosovo deepened.
For some, conviction and political strategy were inseparable, as the two intermingled and
had compounding effects.

Though there were some evolutions amid the swing group

between the end of the Bosnian war and the ascendency to the governing coalition, as
will be demonstrated below, it is important here to understand all of the factors at work
that influenced this change both before and after joining the government.
One important element, that exhibited its power primarily after the Greens joined
the governing coalition, was the purposeful integration of Green Party members,
especially of the swing group, into senior government positions. Fischer suggests that
35
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integrating Green swing group members in particular into the actual mechanisms of
government, as opposed to being just a part of the opposition, brought with it a chance to
evolve perspectives. This exposed them to the international environment more and most
importantly put them in a position of serving the state, as opposed to the party, which
provided a stronger impact for Regierungsfdhigkeit.
Moreover, keeping the Greens integrated, especially as the Kosovo crisis heated
up, would both prevent resistance and instability within the Greens and prevent an
immediate disconnect between the coalition partners. Indeed, Fischer cites the
appointment of one of his arch rivals, Ludger Volmer, to a leading position in the foreign
ministry as an important opportunity to "strengthen his integration." Though it was not
an easy decision for Fischer, he believed that leaving Volmer in the faction would make
him a "not to be underestimated disrupting factor" who could cause considerable angst at
the first international crisis.
In a personal interview, Karsten Voigt highlighted a second element at play
here—a conscious attempt by the SPD to change the Green perspective though personal
and enduring discussions between both parties prior to the formation of the Red-Green
coalition. Held daily in restaurants, in the Bundestag, and other forums, SPD members,
including some former Green members such as Otto Schily, exposed Greens at all levels
to the specific arguments in the debate, in particular the idea that without a change in the
Green stance in some aspects of foreign policy there could be no chance of a coalition.
Such interpersonal debates can demonstrate considerable effectiveness in political
settings, especially when future potential is seen relative to present hurdles. By late 1997
Voigt, interview by author.
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and early 1998, according to Ludger Volmer, the regular discussion group between the
SPD and the Greens prior to the election had determined that the divergence on foreign
and security policy would no longer pose a problem; however, though the current
evidence available does not discount that possibility, his perspective must be seen with
some suspect given his earlier perspectives on the capability of the Greens to govern.
A third reason for this evolution rests with trips to the region by the Green Party,
in particular an October 1996 visit to Bosnia by fifteen members of the Green Party
faction. Fischer, one of the leaders of the trip, wanted to show the "concrete reality" and
leave the theoretical debates behind. Though he cited no names, Fischer argued that as
the delegation stood over the hills of Sarajevo and met the survivors of Srebrenica, some
from the Party's left wing recognized the brutality of the war and, importantly, that it was
the West's and Germany's military that had ended the violence.
The delegation's trip report pointed to the successes occurring in Bosnia, in
particular the return of refugees and the Dayton Peace Treaty. Without exception,
everyone (Serb, Muslim, NGO, or foreign government official) that spoke with the Green
members on the trip offered their strong support for the current operation and the
continuation of IFOR in Bosnia, even as those same people decried the UN operation.
They even wished for a continuation of the German presence there. Without IFOR, the
successes seen to that point in Bosnia would not have been possible. These trips,
according to Karsten Voigt, had psychological effects that moved individual politicians to
change their perspective on the use of military force.42
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This idea is also supported to an extent by a similar idea proposed by Ludger
Volmer in his 1998 book. Though he offered no "tipping point" or specific names, his
"learning process" idea suggested that some in the swing group learned from the tragedy
of Bosnia and adjusted their strategy accordingly through an evolution in their principles.
Bosnia created a new security reality for the Greens that went well beyond any theory.
Their inability to have any real impact on the situation in Bosnia due to their status in the
opposition in turn contributed to the acceptance by parts of the swing group that
participation in the government would give the chance for the Greens to drive the security
agenda.43 Indeed, as the short case study of Macedonia will later demonstrate, there
would indeed be numerous opportunities when the Greens' philosophy would have
considerable impact in international affairs once they were in the government, especially
given their prominence in the foreign ministry.
All of these methodologies were at play here, but in the end it was the Green's
entrance into the government and the resulting discipline that would play the most
significant role in the change. Even Joschka Fischer suggests this was one of the main
ways of instilling change. In a harshly worded section in his memoirs, Fischer strongly
suggests that members of the swing group were willing to change only after the Greens
made it to the governing coalition. Until then, there would be no "programmatic or
power politics compromises in the Party." As Fischer decries: In the Greens, "the
principles were more important than the power."44 Christoph Egle cites a similar
argument, suggesting most Greens would rather "be right than govern." From his
Bundestagsfraktion von Bundnis 90/Die Grunen," Bestand A—Christa Nickels, Akte Nr. 243, AGG; Voigt,
interview by author.
43
Volmer, interview by author; Volmer, Die Grunen und die Aufienpolitik, 584.
44
Fischer, Die Rot-Griinen Jahre, 29, 33.

204
perspective, the Greens, and by proxy the swing group, "learned under stress" during
their time in government, which led to a change in their principles. Indeed, he argues
overall that this participation in government led to a general movement away from a strict
pacifism and toward the acceptance in the program of international responsibility.45 As
will be demonstrated in the Kosovo and 9/11 case studies, the necessities of politics
would have the potential to trump the luxury of principles.
The effect of joining the government on the swing group can be clarified by
looking at the changes it had on the some group members, in particular those who held to
the traditionalist principles just before joining the government. Though the positions
during the Kosovo crisis as the Greens were in government will be described below, it is
useful here to look back at where the Party stood just prior to the election to offer some
points of comparison. The election platform and the Party Day in Magdeburg in March
1998, mere months from the election, clearly suggested that the swing group remained
wedded for the most part to the traditionalist values and still needed to change to meet the
demands outlined by the SPD. The results of the Party Day would provide a serious
challenge for the redo wing in particular and demonstrated to many that the Greens as a
whole still remain well outside the norms of politics. Indeed, public polls at the time
showed the clear damage, with only 8% of the public seeing the Greens as "unlimited
regierungsfahig" and almost half seeing them as incapable of governing out of
principle.46 To get elected, the Greens would have to overcome that perception and the
election platform would not help.
The Party Day and the election platform contained several positions that were
45
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decisively opposite what the SPD required of them. Most importantly, through a very
slim majority, and despite the attempts by the realos, the traditional pacifists prevailed in
a vote on SFOR, arguing against the continued deployment of German forces as a part of
the protection force. Both sides blamed each other, though it was clear that the grass
roots of the Party, and with it enough of the swing group, would not accept the
deployment.47 The realos viewed this perspective as "suicidal," believing it would
weaken the overall Green position in a potential Red-Green coalition. At the Party Day,
the realos tried to find a formula for foreign policy for the Party Day declaration that did
not "completely rule out" a possible military mission to the Balkans, but the all important
swing group would not accept such a change. Even a decade later, Fischer could never
rationalize the swing group policy, asking rhetorically in his memoirs why the Party
would so jubilantly damage its own interests.48
The election platform also held firm to other traditionalist perspectives—the
demilitarization of international affairs, the idea that lasting peace could not be achieved
with military force, the eventual dissolution of NATO, a clear declaration of a rejection
of military peacekeeping and combat operations, and an opposition to restructuring the
Bundeswehr to become capable of international operations.

Even at this point,

prominent swing group member Ludger Volmer noted that he believed the Greens could
clearly succeed on this foreign policy perspective, a belief that Fischer publically
rejected.5 Christoph Egle suggests that the Greens on the eve of the election had not yet
come to any sense of clarity on their defining principles; they were still struggling with
47
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an internal conflict on foreign policy. Indeed, he notes that it took until 2002 for the
Greens to replace the Base Program from 1980 that updated their defining principles.51
That the swing group won out in the election platform and the Party Day made it clear
that on the eve of the election, the Greens as a party were still in turmoil and had a long
way to go to meet the SPD guidelines outlined by Karsten Voigt.
In an attempt to alleviate what Fischer called the "fatal public impression" of the
Magdeburg Party Day, the party leadership convened a small Party Day consisting of a
primarily federal leadership. The final resolution, proposed by both Jiirgen Trittin, a
member of the swing group, and Fritz Kuhn, a realo, supported the continued presence of
the SFOR in Bosnia. Though it was not a binding resolution of the entire party, when the
federal leadership did vote for the extension of the SFOR mandate on 19 June 1998, the
majority of the faction supported the extension, suggesting that the federal leadership was
much more willing to accept peacekeeping operations than the rest of the Party and, as
such, more open to some change as part of a governing coalition.52
Despite the calamity that was the Magdeburg Party Day, the Greens nonetheless
prevailed in the 1998 elections, gaining 6.7% of the vote, which was enough to form a
clear majority with the SPD. With that victory came the challenges of forming a
government—agreeing on disposition of ministers, political positions and goals. The
guiding document of this agreement was the so-called Coalition Contract. Encompassing
twelve separate sections, it defined the way the Red-Green coalition would move
forward. Despite the recent reversal in direction with the Greens, the foreign and security
50
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policy section, worked out by the later undersecretaries in the foreign ministry, Volmer
and SPD MP Giinter Verheugen, made clear that it would be a coalition guided primarily
by the SPD's goals, though with some clear Green influence. While an examination of
the extensive section on foreign and security policy is not necessary here, it is worthwhile
to examine how the two parties saw the baselines of the future and rectified their
differences over the use of force.
Both accepted that there would be continuity with the previous German foreign
and security policy, though there was now to be a renewed emphasis on conflict
prevention and an expansion of the concept of human rights. In the first paragraph of this
section, the contract noted that Germany had a "special responsibility" for stability in
southeast Europe, a clear reference to continued support for military operations in the
Balkans. Moreover, under the human rights section, the two parties would work to
prevent violations in human rights. The Bundeswehr would be recognized as a force for
stability in Europe that was available to defend the western alliance.
Despite this declared responsibility, the means of achieving it was spread through
a variety of organizations with no outright declared acceptance of any German out of area
deployments. Instead of arguing for an end to NATO, as had often been pushed by the
Greens, the contract did see NATO as a necessary aspect of achieving peace and stability
in parts of Europe, but deploying German forces under its auspices was not mentioned.
Instead, the Red-Green coalition would work to strengthen the role of the UN in conflict
prevention, recognizing that German forces could be available to the UN so long as their
deployment was approved by the Bundestag.
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The contract was at best a compromise that set the basis for a Red-Green
coalition. It largely avoided the most contentious issues, such as direct support for the
use of German forces in out of area operations, yet it provided mechanisms for their
eventual deployment. Instead of codifying the specifics positions of the coalition, it left
them unresolved, providing the setting for tremendous political discord and debate
whenever such major issues arose. Kosovo, Macedonia and 9/11 would all bring calls
amid the press that the coalition was in danger of collapsing.
Yet as events will show, there was enough common unity and, importantly, a
common desire to continue to govern together that the coalition was able to weather the
challenges that it could not clarify in its coalition contract. The Green Party swing group
at this point held the future of not only the Party, but to a large extent the coalition, in its
hands. It was their desire to continue to govern once they joined the government,
resident in the ideas of integration and Regierungsfahigkeit, that would provide the real
staying power of the Greens in the coalition. Hanging over all of this was the
omnipresent fear that any rejection of the inherent principles of Regierungsfahigkeit
would mean an end to the coalition and possibly even a failure of the Greens to make it
back into the Bundestag.54
The question thus becomes how to measure the impact of the will to govern on a
change in policies. Aside from interviewing all of the major players in the Green Party, it
can be quite useful to look at how the perspectives of some of the key players in the
swing group changed once they became a part of the government. While this is not a
foolproof method, as personal records that may indicate changing personal convictions in
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the intervening years between the end of the Bosnian crisis and the start of the Kosovo
crisis may not always be available, examining statements in the later crisis can provide
clues as to the reasons for their evolution and even demonstrate a clear change. In
addition, speeches and declarations from those who already accepted the role of German
forces out of conviction can show the new influence of the pull of the will to govern. An
examination of the Kosovo crisis and the Macedonia deployment in this chapter and the
9/11 debate in the following chapter provide tremendous opportunity to measure this
influence.

THE GREEN KOSOVO CRISIS

Over the course of 1998 the two intervening variables in this dissertation, reaction
to shocks and the will to govern, collided for the Greens amid the crisis in Kosovo.
There is a general recognition in the secondary literature of the strong impact this crisis
had on change within Germany and the Greens. It was an "important step" in the
evolution of attitudes toward the use of force, particularly for the SPD and the Greens,
according to Hans Maull. Rainer Baumann agrees, though to a lesser extent, suggesting
that Kosovo was just "another step" in the evolutionary process that had begun in the
early 1990s. Nina Philippi argues, in a similar vein, that Kosovo made it clear that the
idea of rejection of military force had been replaced by the priorities of "solidarity" with
NATO and the protection of human rights.55 There are also a considerable number of
theories as to why Germany took part ranging from the pressure exerted by the US to
55
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participate as a responsible ally to the moral based need to prevent another genocide.56
Most recognize external stimuli, such as pressure or external shocks, as the cause of the
Green Party's change. However, as this section will demonstrate, though those aspects
were present, there was also a conscious internal, strategic calculation influencing the
Greens.
This section will dig deeper into those ideas and outline the specific reactions and
evolutions of the Green Party to the events in Kosovo. After first proving a detailed
overview of the process of events, highlighting general Green changes, this section will
examine two specific instances of change. First, it will trace the specific evolutions and
reasons for change of two major players in the swing group—Ludger Volmer and
Angelika Beer. Doing so will show the direct mechanisms of change and in particular
highlight the influence of the ideals inherent in Regierungsfahigkeit as outlined in the last
section. Second, it will look at how the Party changed as a whole with an examination of
the Party Day in Bielefeld. Such an analysis will clearly demonstrate how the priorities
of the Party shifted from adhering to convictions to adjusting to govern.

The Greens React to Kosovo
The crisis in Kosovo was nothing new to the Greens. For years, they had been
arguing for international, non-military involvement to prevent the region from becoming
a major humanitarian problem. In late 1996, the realos Gerd Poppe and Joschka Fischer
argued that the stability of the entire region depended on an equitable solution of the
Kosovar Albanian situation. Even Winfried Hermann, a pure traditionalist, argued after a
Power and War," 65.
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weeklong trip to Kosovo that the situation was so dangerous that something had to be
done. However, he did note that this should be done non-violently, urging economic
cooperation efforts and direct support instead of military force as the best way to attain
en

this goal.

Prior to the major spike in violence, there was only interest, as the crisis had

not devolved enough to spark a major interparty debate as had been the case in Bosnia.
Yet by early 1998, the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating amid the renewed
Serbian actions leading many Green leaders to rethink their perspectives, though there
was still no real push for active combat operations. In March, the faction leadership,
including such signatories as Joschka Fischer and Kerstin Muller, called for greater
international criticism of Serbian actions, suggesting the possibility of sanctions, and
even asking for an extension of the peacekeeping mission currently stationed in
Macedonia. By May and June, however, the position of some realos was becoming more
focused on the possible use of military forces. Gerd Poppe began arguing that stopping
the conflict in Kosovo, which he was now calling "ethnic cleansing," with non-violent
means was no longer capable of being successful; the means of intervention should rest
with the UN and not NATO, though preparations by the Atlantic Alliance were
necessary. However, even at this early stage, there remained a fear among some, such as
Angelika Beer of the swing group, that any potential NATO involvement that began to be
CO

discussed in 1998 lacked a clear political plan from the start.
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the Magdeburg Party Day, large swaths of the Party remained opposed to any direct
military involvement even as the crisis worsened.
As the Greens prepared to enter into the government, the worsening crisis in
Kosovo and a drive by NATO and the US to act to stop the bloodshed led to the need to
make a decision on the so-called NATO ActOrd (Activation Order). The Bundestag
approval of this order, which would allow German forces to be placed on alert with other
NATO forces for a possible attack on Serbian forces, was for the most part seen as a
means of raising the diplomatic pressure on Milosevic by showing NATO's unity and
capability to act. By this point, Germany was the one nation that had yet to support this
order, leading to enormous pressure from other NATO nations upon Germany, and by
proxy its political parties.59 That pressure would have varied impacts on individual
members of the Greens, as will be demonstrated below.
As the possibility of a vote on the ActOrd was discussed on the eve of a RedGreen takeover of the government, Fischer was hoping to delay a vote on it to gain time
and thus not force the Greens to make a decision, as the Party remained divided on the
eve of taking power. He believed that without the pressure of the integration into the
government, which still stood a few weeks away, there was no way to predict what the
Party would do. Fischer's wish, however, would be short-lived. Though the US had
agreed to postpone the decision when Fischer and Schroder visited Washington, President
Bill Clinton soon reversed that decision at the behest of his chief negotiator, Richard
Holbrooke, who feared Milosevic could use Germany's potential abstention from
Bundestagsfraktion, "Kosovo: Auf HandlungsfUhige Altemativen wie UNO und OSZE setzen,"
Pressemitteilung Nr. 0381, 12 June 1998, in "Der Kosovo Krieg," 34; Btindnis 90/Die Grttnen
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operations in Kosovo to withstand the diplomatic pressure. Fischer and the Greens were
thus forced to decide even before entering the government whether to preserve the unity
of the NATO alliance and offer one more chance for a diplomatic success or risk
collapsing diplomatic efforts and the Red-Green coalition before it even began.60
At the Bundestag special session on 16 October, right in the middle of the
coalition contract negotiations between the SPD and the Greens, the old Bundestag came
together one last time to debate a proposal from the Kohl government, though also
accepted by the incoming Schroder government, for support of a German deployment of
combat forces to Kosovo as part of the ActOrd. The Greens, who had only months
before rejected an extension of the SFOR in Bosnia, were now faced with the necessity of
approving the deployment of German combat forces for the first time since the Second
World War amid the context of demonstrating their Regierungsfahigkeit to their
incoming SPD partners and the Atlantic Alliance. They were so divided in fact that two
speakers, instead of the normal one, would speak as representatives of the Party.
Joschka Fischer, who The Economist referred to at the time as the "reluctant
statesman," spoke for the realo wing of the Greens and argued that the threat of force was
necessary, as it was the only possibility, outside of actual military force, that could
persuade Milosevic to stop his operations in Kosovo and prevent a further outbreak of
war in the volatile region. Moreover, Germany could no longer remain aloof from its
responsibilities and risk degrading the capabilities of NATO. It was a clear argument for
the Greens to accept the requirements of Regierungsfahigkeit.
Ludger Volmer, who was the designated speaker for the opponents to this
59
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authorization, followed the arguments of many in both the swing group and to an extent,
though not as strong, the traditionalists, criticizing it because it lacked a UN mandate and
it could be seen as a precedence for future operations.61 Indeed, even Helmut Lippelt,
who had actively argued for a military operation to help the situation in Bosnia, argued
against a NATO led attack failing a UN mandate, seeing it as a transition to the "rule of
force."62
When it came to the vote in the Bundestag there was general acceptance, though
also some resistance, from the Green Bundestag MPs. The results were twenty-nine
supporting, nine opposing, and eight abstaining from the vote. In general, the realos
supported it, the fundis opposed it and the swing group abstained. The majority support
for the proposal came with the perspective that the situation was an exception, rather than
a rule, and with Holbrooke's success in coming to an agreement with Milosevic that
made the possibility of a German participation a little less likely while showing the
effectiveness of the military threat strategy.
With the support of the new CDU led opposition, the overall results of the votes
were never in doubt; what was at stake, however, especially for the Greens at this critical
stage, was their Regierungsfdhigkeit. Even before they actually joined the governing
majority, their very ability to govern would be judged by how they viewed and voted on
this crucial policy decision. Though Chancellor Schroder publically suggested that the
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Greens and the SPD were consistent in their foreign policy and he would not preclude
governing with the Greens based on how many supported and how many opposed the
vote, Fischer knew that an outright rejection of this proposal would mean the end of the
Green participation in the government even before it started. Failing to meet one of the
SPD's deciding factors for participation on the eve of a crisis in Kosovo would not show
the party's dependability. An end to the coalition would in turn have far reaching
repercussions, as it would have a direct impact on the Greens' electability since it would
disappoint Green voters who had expected results.64
The swing group's decision to abstain from the vote reflects a clear decision to
maintain the Greens' Regierungsfahigkeit, even though many, such as Volmer, publically
opposed the proposal. Their abstention instead of an outright rejection was the first clear
indication of the triumph of strategy over principles, even if it was only a small change in
vote. Indeed, Angelica Beer, one of those who abstained, later publically noted that these
abstentions in fact represented declarations of complete loyalty to Fischer and by proxy
the Red-Green coalition. Even though Fischer believed that the swing group at this point
still remained uncommitted to the responsibilities of governance, he did see their
abstention as opposed to rejection as a "hopeful partial step forward" for the swing
group. 5 As will be noted below, it would take the direct integration into government
positions before many would accept the new course. This idea is quite measureable,
especially in the case of Ludger Volmer.
As the Greens joined the government, there was some hope of a possible
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settlement with the success of Holbrooke's mission. But even as political negotiations
continued, the violence in Kosovo "dramatically increased" in December 1998,
reminding many of the brutality so evident during the Bosnian war. Television pictures
and the presence of war refugees in Germany personalized the event for many Greens and
pushed them to take some form of action, including the traditional pacifist Winfried
Hermann. Indeed, as an advisor to then-Defense Minister Rudolf Sharping noted, "When
TV pictures of starving and freezing children appear, then we [the Germans] are on."66
This spike in violence in early 1999 registered with many Greens, in particular the realos
and some in the swing group, enough to be a clear shock that could lead to a change in
position, again bringing the variable of external shocks into the calculus.
The January 1999 shootings of civilians in Racak, however, escalated the crisis in
Kosovo to a higher level, "dramatically sharpening" it in the words of Fischer. The
tragedy, though significantly smaller than others executions even in Kosovo and far
smaller than the clear shock of Srebrenica, in part gained such resonance within Germany
and to an extent with the Greens because of the use of the word "massacre" and the
ubiquitous pictures and commentary on television. Indeed, as Gunter Joetze argues, and
Joschka Fischer agrees, the massacre in many ways ushered in a new quality of the media
that helped to influence policy development. Coming on the heels of the agreement
between Holbrooke and Milosevic to stop the attacks, it was a clear indication of the
£-1

Serbian duplicity.
The West reacted to the massacre quite decisively, ratcheting up the public and
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diplomatic pressure on Milosevic. Ludger Volmer, now in his position in the foreign
ministry, argued that the massacre required a decisive reaction in order to prevent giving
the perception to Milosevic that he would have the ability to act with impunity in
Kosovo, a clear position of a government official as opposed to a Green member. At the
government level the events at Racak had equal political effects, though far smaller, then
the massacre in Srebrenica. For the West, it exemplified the point that little room for
delay remained. As Fischer later noted, it invoked memories and lessons from Bosnia
and cemented the idea of drawing a line in the sand. Kosovo was to be "the red line;"
nothing like Bosnia should ever happen again. New ideas, including the possible
intervention of ground troops, now had to be considered and the time to act was fast
approaching.68
The strong resurgence of violence in turn again enabled the facilitating norm of
"never again Auschwitz," which had a strong impact during the Bosnian war and likewise
could now affect Green positions on the use of force in Kosovo.69 Gerd Poppe's notation
of the violence as ethnic cleansing was a direct reference to the brutal events of the
Bosnian conflict. As early as his speech before the Bundestag on 16 October, Fischer
made references to Milosevic's actions in Kosovo that compared it to the Bosnian
conflict. He noted both Milosevic's "aggressive nationalism" and being a "danger for
peace and security in the region," while clearly noting that Germany's need to act was
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dictated by its history, in particular the lessons of "never again Auschwitz."7
For the Party as a whole, as the Bielefeld Party Day would later show, the return
of genocide in the Balkans and the clear desire to prevent it, thus adhering to the "never
again Auschwitz" dictum, would also be an important reason for the acceptance of the
military option, which would in turn allow the Greens to stay in government. Though the
tragedy at Racak amplified the shock of the violence in Kosovo for the grass roots
Greens, the ideas inherent in Regierungsfdhigkeit remained the primary driver of the
evolution of Green policy at the leadership level vis-a-vis Kosovo. Indeed, as a
collection of essays two years after the campaign noted, though often seen in the press as
a primary justification for the bombing campaign two months later, the massacre was in
fact not the primary reason for the Greens' leadership support for the NATO bombing in
March.71
What the massacre very clearly did, however, was to impart a new energy into
finding a solution for the crisis. As Fischer noted several months later during a speech at
the Bundestag, the renewed violence that culminated with Racak would "compel" NATO
to find a solution first against Serbia and then in cooperation with it, as he so politely
phrased it. NATO members, especially the US pushed again aggressively, threatening
air, and possible ground, attacks if Milosevic did not stop his assault. For Germany, and
in particular the Green foreign ministry, there was now a renewed effort to prevent
NATO military actions through a final diplomatic round. Indeed, the Green faction
would note two years later that the massacre at Racak would actually be the primary
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reason for the Rambouillet peace conference, to be discussed in more detail below.
Less than two months after the massacres in Racak and amid the final diplomatic
push in Rambouillet prior to the war, the Greens held a smaller Party Day in Erfurt in the
first week of March that clarified their overall position. Much like the October 1998 vote
in the Bundestag, where the Green MPs were in some cases forced to choose strategy
over principle, the Erfurt Party Day forced more elements of the Party's leadership to
make a similar decision for the first time. The looming crisis led to considerable
dissonance within the Greens, threatening to limit the foreign policy effectiveness of
Fischer and by proxy Germany. In Erfurt, however, unlike the earlier larger Party Day in
Magdeburg, the Party chose to support Fischer and his Kosovo policy, which included
supporting a possible deployment of German forces to Kosovo. The declaration, written
by Angelika Beer and even supported by the strong pacifist Hans-Christian Strobele,
gained wide support at Erfurt.
At issue here was not just the Party backing Fischer, but rather the Party
demonstrating to the SPD and the international community, that it could govern and act
responsibly. The foreign minister made it quite clear to the opponents within the Greens,
addressing the forum with "you" instead of the more traditional "we," that the Greens
could no longer remain in the government if its principles could not adjust to the
requirements of government; the Party had to adapt its ideals.73 That the Party chose to
adjust to these requirements strongly suggests even at this early stage that most of the
Green party-wide leaderships' principles were malleable in the face of governance
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requirements. The support of the grass roots would only come with the much more
volatile, if not violent, Bielefeld Party Day two months later.
Less than three weeks after Erfurt, NATO began its attack with the support of
Green leadership. As the bombs began to fall in Kosovo and Serbia, the two leading
foreign and defense speakers, Lippelt and Beer respectively, argued that there were two
primary reasons for the NATO attack—the desire to prevent further expulsions and
massacres in Kosovo and the desire to prevent an expansion of the war to the surrounding
area. The Green party leadership in their declaration immediately after the beginning of
the attack argued it was the execution of a "long threatened consequence" that, though
hopefully short, could prove useful in bringing Milosevic back to the table. The
responsibility for the escalation of the conflict to this new level rested with Milosevic and
it required action. Indeed, Fischer later argued that the war did not begin with the NATO
attack, but instead had started when Milosevic's forces renewed their aggression in
Kosovo the week earlier. In fact, he strongly criticized the traditionalist Left in his Party
for failing to denounce the Serbs' assault and instead only criticizing the NATO attack.74
The leadership used both the argument of preventing genocide and fulfilling
German responsibility in support of the NATO campaign. In the days after the attack,
Helmut Lippelt, in a shift away from his earlier objection to an attack without a UN
mandate, recounted both the "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz" ideals
ingrained in the Greens, noting that the genocide in the Balkans was actually a threat to
world peace that required action. Moreover, Green values argued for action to stop it and
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from his perspective military action was the only possibility. A Party leadership
declaration mere days after the NATO attack suggested that the events in Kosovo were a
"tremendous humanitarian catastrophe" requiring a greater international and multilateral
involvement.

Ludger Volmer, as will be discussed in greater detail below, made

considerable reference to the role of Germany being in the government and the
importance of adhering to alliance goals as an important factor of the Green decision.
Though there was by no means complete support of the NATO bombing, there
was at least a reluctant acceptance in the early phases amid the expectation that it would
be a short campaign. However, within a few days of the start of the bombing campaign,
as it became clear that the NATO attacks were actually making the situation worse on the
ground, there would be considerable internal criticism within the Greens about the course
of the war. The initial justification—preventing a genocide—was now collapsing under
the weight of the turn of events on the ground. As the bombing campaign continued,
support for it within the Greens fell from 57% in April to 38% by May.

From the

leadership perspective, however, there was a general recognition that Milosevic remained
responsible for the continued need for NATO's operations.
In the case of whether to halt the bombing or not, especially as civilians were
increasingly suffering, there would be increasing public unity between the realos and the
swing group, especially now that the latter was thoroughly integrated in the government.
The Party leader and realo Rezzo Schlauch, though he understood the traditionalists who
wanted to stop the attacks unconditionally, argued that doing so would only embolden
75
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Milosevic and allow him to complete his already planned attack on the Kosovar
Albanians. Fischer followed a similar argument in his public pronunciations.
Though swing group adherents were quick to suggest new political strategies to
complement and perhaps supersede the military actions, they were hesitant to directly
challenge government policy. Their views effected a declaration from the leadership less
than a week after the beginning of operations that noted the growing uneasiness in the
Party and suggested the vigorous pursuit of possible diplomatic initiatives to bring the
ethnic cleansing to an end. Still, there was no direct criticism of the NATO attacks.
With the worsening conditions on the ground Kerstin Miiller, Angelika Beer, and Ludger
Volmer, and others, rejected the traditionalist idea of an end of the NATO attacks, and
instead followed the realo idea of rejecting any halt to the bombing, though the latter two
did recognize the possible use of a cease fire as part of a negotiation strategy. A week
after the original leadership declaration, a new one published by Angelika Beer again
renewed the call for political initiatives as a part of the NATO operation; unlike the
earlier leadership declaration, however, there was by this point an overt attempt to push
the military action to the background, even if it was not overt criticism.77
This unity can easily be seen as a part of integration in the government, one of the
ideals of Regierungsfahigkeit. Speaking out directly against NATO actions and by proxy
the government's policy would have caused a crisis of confidence within the governing
coalition amid their first major foreign policy challenge. By this point, the impact of
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being involved in the government, most particularly the successes of forestalling the war
with the Rambouillet conference, had demonstrated considerable value even at this early
state. The chance to further that impact with new diplomatic initiatives and the overall
desire for continued influence on German foreign policy would be a critical aspect of the
swing group's evolution.
There was considerable unity at all levels within the Party, however, when it came
to the possible introduction of ground forces as the campaign ground along. First
suggested by the US and Great Britain, the idea fell on deaf ears in all of Germany, not
just in the Green Party, and there was no chance of any German support.78 Within the
Greens there was practically universal condemnation, though both Fischer and Volmer as
part of the foreign ministry, tried to allay such fears, denying that there was a real
American drive for ground troops. Angelika Beer rejected such a possibility, calling it
the "painful border" past which the Greens would not go. The Party leadership, which by
organization did not include Fischer or Volmer at this point, as early as three weeks into
the campaign argued against any use of ground forces in Kosovo, saying it would bring
considerable danger of escalation while not helping to create any chance for a political
solution. That rejection would not wane for the duration of the conflict.79
This firm stance demonstrated the limits that the Greens, as well as the Germans,
were willing to accept. Prevention of genocide and even Germany's responsibility to
NATO and the western alliance would only go so far. Indeed, from Fischer's
perspective, it was quite fortunate that it did not come to a ground war, as it was doubtful
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that Germany would have participated for any reason. That would likely then have had
serious consequences for the NATO alliance and Germany's international position.80
Indeed, it would take the successes in Macedonia and the absolute shock of the 9/11
attacks before the Greens would entertain the idea of supporting the deployment of
German ground combat force elements.
Though the Greens would only go so far in the military sphere, with their control
of the foreign ministry and a focus on preventive politics, they were quite active in the
diplomatic sphere, as both the Rambouillet conference and the so-called Fischer plan
both illustrated. These initiatives were a balancing act for the Green leadership,
especially Fischer, between the traditionalist ideas and the Greens' new international
responsibilities. Both diplomatic initiatives would be exemplifications of the new Green
foreign policy in action—a desire to prevent the war, while also working within the
confines of the international community to achieve the final goal of stopping the ethnic
cleansing. They would illustrate the consummate influence of the swing group in
addition to the drive of the realos.
The Rambouillet conference, amid the escalating violence and shortly after the
Racak massacre, was a final attempt to create a political solution that both sides would
accept by using the threat of military force in a diplomatic setting. While the US and
other NATO partners pushed for an ultimatum methodology to compel Milosevic to
acquiesce, Fischer and Germany pushed for the idea of a conference along the lines of the
Dayton Peace Conference. Fischer, who held numerous internal meetings in the foreign
ministry, was convinced of the necessity of convening such a conference to prevent the
situation from reaching a state of "escalation automaticity," while at the same time
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avoiding the idea of "negotiation at any price" that, from Fischer's perspective, had
worsened the Bosnia crisis.
The entire Rambouillet process demonstrates several aspects of a Green approach.
As many Greens had argued since joining the government, one of Germany's primary
goals was to integrate Russia into the path to peace to ensure the UN was involved in the
final peace process. With Russia's veto in the UN Security Council any UN participation
could be rejected if their demands were not met. Though the conference would be
extended only to fail in the end, amid the departure of the Serbs and their massive attack
in Kosovo two days later, the Rambouillet Conference represented a sustained effort to
push Green ideas in German foreign policy.
In the middle of the conference, NATO took steps to prepare for possible events
in Kosovo, in particular by deploying an extraction force to Macedonia that would act as
a protection force if the conference succeeded. During the February debate in the
Bundestag on whether Germany should support the NATO extraction force, Fischer
argued that looking away from the events in Kosovo was not possible, as it would mean
the "acceptance of the murderous logic" being used by the Serbs. Supporting the
proposal, even though it was for a NATO force instead of UN force, which had been
opposed by many in the Greens including the swing group, was seen as part and parcel of
the solution, as it was the only form that the Kosovars would accept.82
The so-called Fischer plan was proffered by Germany and without the
consultation of other NATO allies in mid April during the escalating air attacks absent
concrete results. Amid fears that the military effort would escalate out of control, the
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plan was a way of creating a diplomatic settlement by enlisting Milosevic in a broader
peace effort for the area. While the NATO Council settled on a five point requirement
focused on military requirements, the German foreign ministry began to develop the
Fischer plan that aimed to retake the diplomatic initiative by offering fewer conditions
than the five being offered by NATO and in particular offering a short cease fire to allow
the Serbs to being withdrawing their forces. It focused on achieving a Serb withdraw
followed be the entrance of a heavily armed UN peace force, at least as originally
proposed, and then the return of the refugees before determining the final status of
Kosovo.

The ideas inherent in the Fischer plan, especially the cease fire option, were

quite similar to ideas proposed by many in the Greens in particular the swing group, as
will be demonstrated in more detail below. It would receive considerable support from
the Green Party; indeed, at the Bielefeld Party Day, the final declaration would include a
firm declaration of support for this plan.
All of these examples—the Rambouillet conference, the vote on the extraction
force, and the Fischer plan—demonstrated a new focus of influence on international
affairs for the Greens and in turn a greater willingness to accept the ideals inherent in
Regierungsfahigkeit. The Rambouillet conference was seen as a success of German
foreign policy and by extension Green foreign policy. Ludger Volmer would later cite
the fact that the conference even occurred as a "big success" of Green foreign policy.
The Green Party's declaration at the Bielefeld conference in May would recognize that
the new Red-Green government's actions had definitively led to Rambouillet and the
83

Rudolf, 139; Joseph Fitchett, "Diplomatic Efforts by Allies Over Kosovo Begin to Surface: EU Leaders
Back UN Cease-Fire Plan For Serb Pullback," International Herald Tribune, 15 April 1999; Fischer, Die
Rot-Grunen Jahre, 187.

227
chance to avoid a military conflict.84
The debate on the extraction force showed some evolution in the Green
perspective and a new acceptance of Regierungsfdhigkeit. Though traditionalists
continued to opposed this deployment believing that it would strengthen NATO and the
military mechanisms, there was widespread support within the Greens to include the
swing group, as only five opposed the motion. Even Volmer and Beer, as will be
discussed below, supported the resolution.

NATO had now become even more

acceptable to the swing group.
The Fischer plan though was more about an adaptation of Green values to the
international level for both domestic and foreign needs. As Fischer would later note in
his memoirs, he "absolutely" needed this plan, especially for the domestic audience.
With the pressure from his party growing every day as the bombing continued, Fischer
"desperately" needed "domestic relief through the "development of a convincing
political initiative." Its eventual planned release by the foreign ministry through the
Associate Press was both "helpful and important" for his domestic politics. Indeed,
Alister Miskimmon of the University of London agrees, arguing that this plan was an
example of domestic pressures being translated to the international level, especially given
Fischer's desire to reduce the domestic pressure on him.86 Without the now developed
acceptance of the desire for influence on the foreign policy stage, it is doubtful that the
Party would have accepted the Fischer plan as such a success.
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The Swing Group Evolves
For the swing group, there was no real argument between "never again war" and
"never again Auschwitz." There was an acceptance of the desire to protect the values of
human rights. Instead, it was between "never again war" and the will to govern and the
ideas of Regierungsfahigkeit. By the time the Party convened for the Party Day in
Bielefeld, which will be discussed in more detail below, many swing group leaders, such
as Ludger Volmer and Jiirgen Trittin, no longer spoke "from the soul" of their defining
principles. There evolution was primarily a manifestation of the integration into the
0*7

government.

This section will examine the specific changes of two of the most

important swing group members—Ludger Volmer and Angelika Beer.
As one of the key leaders of the swing group and one with significant power to
enact Green foreign policy once in the government, Volmer's perspectives and evolutions
on this crucial portion of the debate carry significant weight. Fischer saw him as the
88

"Creme de la Creme" of the swing group.

Moreover, Green leader and MP Fritz Kuhn

noted, it was Volmer and his evolutions that brought the Greens, and by proxy the swing
group, to the point where they could be a part of the governing coalition.

During the

Bosnia debate, as outlined in the previous chapter, Volmer was very much opposed to
any deployment of military forces, let along German forces. Yet, between 1995 and
1998, Volmer changed this perspective primarily out of a mixture of strategic reasons, in
hopes of the Greens becoming and remaining regierungsfdhig, and to an extent out of
conviction.90
87

Paul Lersch and Hajo Schumacher, "Weltpolitik in Bielefeld," Der Spiegel, 10 May 1999, 25.
Fischer, Die Rot-Grunen Jahre, 217.
89
Ralf Beste, "Die Macht wird neu verteilt," 15 May 1999, Berliner Zeitung, 3.
90
Voigt, interview by author.
88

229
From the onset of the crisis in 1998, the impact of events, in this case the shock of
the resurgence of violence in Kosovo, did help to evolve some of his viewpoints, though
it would not be enough to change his perspective. In his speech before the Bundestag
during the initial debate in 1998, Volmer argued that action to stop Milosevic's campaign
of violence was long overdue. After the massacre at Racak, the continuous flow of
television picture depicting the tragedy in Kosovo allowed his personal objections to the
lack of a UN mandate to recede into the background. By April 1999, Volmer was calling
Milosevic's preplanned actions in Kosovo "genocide" perpetrated under his direct
planning. Indeed, as he himself later noted in an interview 2002, the challenges inherent
with the violence in Bosnia and the resurgence of the war in Kosovo in 1998 created a
new security reality that was "stranger than theory" for the Greens. A new idea of Green
security policy that could come to terms with these new challenges and be more
consequential had to be developed.91
Despite his desire to end the violence in Kosovo, by October 1998 Volmer still
did not support using NATO. Though he was one of eight Greens, mostly swing group
members, to abstain from voting in a purely political move to avoid demonstrating any
disloyalty to Fischer on the eve of him becoming foreign minister or weakening the
political pressure the military threat could bring, Volmer clearly noted in his speech that
he opposed the proposed deployment of NATO and German forces as it lacked a UN
mandate, thus making it illegal in international law. Like others in the Greens, he feared
using NATO here would be a "precedent" that would lead to future cases when regional
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powers would use the same methodology to use military force. He charged those arguing
that it was an "exception" instead, were "window washing" the real issue.
Instead, he fell back on traditional Green arguments here, arguing for an
empowerment of the UN and OSCE to push conflict prevention mechanisms.

Thus,

despite his belief that the violence had to be stopped, that shock of the resurgence of
violence was not enough to overturn his conviction on the use of military force. Only
with the addition of strategic desires for the Party that came with the inclusion into the
government, would Volmer's rhetoric drastically change.
Over the course of the first six to eight months of being in the government,
Volmer demonstrated a clear change in his views on the use of military force. Eckart
Lohse, the prolific writer on the Greens for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, argued
that Volmer's "decisive" change in foreign policy came during this time, as the
potential means to reach the Green ends that had been long articulated had evolved with
joining the government. Achieving the "civilization of foreign policy," one of the pillars
of Green foreign policy, could now "when necessary" include air attacks.94 By the late
1999 debate about the base program for the Greens, through a dexterous intellectual
dance, Volmer had flipped the argument of non-violence for the Greens. The issue was
not a complete acceptance of non-violence, but that was rather a goal to be achieved. In
the interim amid such calamities as in the Balkans, however, it was "completely unreal"
to argue that no weapons could actually be used. Violence could not solve a crisis, but it
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was at times necessary.
During this same time, Volmer also showed some clear changes in at least two
other areas. Whereas in October 1998 he had based his opposition to the deployment of
German forces on convictions and the lack of a UN mandate, a few months later, that
position had drastically changed. Just prior to the actual beginning of air operations in
March 1999, Volmer recognized the legitimacy of using the NATO military threat to
achieve change on the ground in Kosovo. Shortly thereafter, he publically claimed that
his requirement for a UN mandate had receded to the background, replaced instead by the
"hyper-legal (Ubergesetzlichen) emergency" on the ground. The September 1998 UN
Security Council Resolution 1199 now provided legal cover for the attack, a complete
reversal from Volmer's October 1998 argument. Interestingly, in a March 1999 essay to
the Party, Volmer argued that the October 1998 vote was in fact only about developing a
military threat for political leverage, rather than an opposition to military force.
A second example rested with Volmer's perspective on the continuation of the
bombing campaign. A week into the attacks, Volmer argued that a unilateral end to the
NATO attacks, as some in the traditional pacifist elements of the Party were calling for,
would not lead to any success, as the war would continue according to Milosevic's plan
with a NATO pause. Even as it dragged into its third month, Volmer did not make a
direct call for stopping the attacks. Instead, he recognized that NATO should only look
at the possibility of a cease fire when it was integrated into a negotiation process
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requiring specific Serbian actions.97
These evolutions emerged primarily out of his desire for a regierungsfdhig Green
party. This influence of the will to govern was clear even as Volmer held to his
traditionalist principles during the October 1998 debate. Despite its division into three
distinct elements on this vote, he argued that the Party was acting "fully together." Even
with his abstention on the crucial vote, he was trying to denounce the influence of the
internal strife on the eve of joining the governing coalition.

As the attacks began amid

the collapse of the Green sponsored peace talks, Volmer also highlighted the second
aspect of Regierungsfahigkeit—in this case the potential for the Greens to have an impact
on international affairs. This is a stark change for Volmer, especially given his early
misgivings in 1998 that the Greens should even take over the foreign ministry. Within
six months, however, Volmer was arguing the contrary. With Fischer as the foreign
minister, the Party was now inexorably bound into the "solidarity of common action of
the international community." That integration gave a tremendous chance to have an
impact, even as the Greens were no "great power," as the successes with the calling of the
Rambouillet conference demonstrated."
Volmer himself in a 26 March 1999 article for the Party laid out the reasons for
the change. Following much of what he had highlighted publically, the essay argued that
the Greens were now acting in a new environment that not only did not conform to Green
wishes, but also brought forth new influences to guide Party actions. Unlike when the
Greens were in the opposition, they now had to act within the confines of the interests of
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national states (including Germany), alliances and international organizations. It would
be these new international elements of multilateralism and Germany's responsibility to
those ideals that would be crucial: "The decision making process that led to the combat
operation [in Kosovo] cannot be understood without the principal of multilateralism, for
which there is no alternative for German foreign policy." Indeed, at an April 1999
interview, Volmer further enunciated the impact of the Regierungsfdhigkeit. In leaving
the opposition and joining the government, he had to act "at another level and in another
context," which in turn required using other methods. No longer was simply stating an
opinion an option; instead, as a member of the governing coalition, he had to attempt to
rectify his principles with the complexities of the international environment.
Unlike their days in the opposition, according to Volmer, the crisis in Kosovo
would confront the Greens "stronger" now that they were in the government. Not only
would convictions define politics, but the necessities of German policy as a whole had to
be taken into account. The past ideals declared in Green programmatics must fall to a
"governance politic" that "acts responsibly." Though Green values can guide actions, the
new environment in which the Greens now had to act restricted what they could achieve.
For the swing party then, this new situation can lead to a situation where their pacifist
tendencies would be "depleted" against the realities of the situation.100
Though many scholars have pointed to the pressure exerted by other allied
partners on Germany's government, Volmer himself did not see this pressure as having a
major impact. For him the events on the ground and, more importantly, the effects of the
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ideals inherent in Regierungsfahigkeit, helped to change his perspectives on the Kosovo
crisis. Being a part of the government in the foreign office gave him first-hand access to
and understanding of the challenges of operating in this new environment, as his essays
and public declarations make quite apparent. The choice of abstention instead of rejection
of the proposal in October to send German troops to participate in the NATO attack as
well as the choice to defend the bombing campaign even amid direct challenges from his
own party are clear indications of his evolved perspective. Indeed, at the Green Party
Day at Bielefeld, Volmer remained true to the governing coalition's perspective, even
attacking some of the traditional leftists in the Party.
By late 1999 after the end of the Kosovo crisis, Volmer was strongly embedded in
the new government and was seeing that as a chance to affect Green values on the
international stage. In an internally distributed article in October 1999, Volmer spoke of
the necessity of operating in and pushing Green objectives as a part of the international
community. Protecting human rights, a pillar of Green policy, required direct
international involvement, though with the primarily mechanism being the UN. Later, in
an article in the Frankfurter Rundschau in September 2000, Volmer argued that it was
"unarguable" that the international community had a "moral responsibility" to prevent
suffering and limit damages.
While Volmer's evolution was quite clear, it also useful to look at the viewpoints
of another swing group member at the federal level to trace the factors affecting her
evolution. Angelika Beer, one of the renowned defense experts in the Party, was, like
101

Volmer, interview by author; Lohse, "Ludger der Wendige."
Ludger Volmer, "Erste Jahresbilanz—Griine Akzente in der deutschen AuBenpolitik," 12 October 1999,
<www.ludger-volmer.de/themen.neue-regionalpolitik/index.htm> accessed 2 December 2002; Ludger
Volmer, "Die neue humanitaren Herausforderungen meistern," Frankfurter Rundschau, 22 July 2000.
102

235
Volmer, viewed during the Bosnian debate and its immediate aftermath as a one of the
primary voices against the realo ideals of Fischer.103 Yet by the March 1999 Party Day
in Erfurt, she supported Fischer in his position, even as she did not completely agree with
him.
Even as the situation in Kosovo was at a low simmer, Beer was quite aware of the
dangers inherent in the region. In a paper to members of the foreign policy circle in the
Greens in 1996, she argued that with the region likely to see violence again, the Greens
would have to find a solution without a repeat of the controversy immediately after the
Srebrenica massacre. It must be a policy that was responsible for the people in the
region; there was scant mention of any need for responsibility within a German
government. She was still opposed to the use of NATO forces in the Balkans, preferring
to see UN or OSCE forces being used, a position she would still hold even as late as
October 1998. At this point, she continued to adhere to the traditionalist perspective,
arguing that any solution must move away from military perspectives.
However, she did also offer some indications of a potential for evolution. In
particular, she now offered her support of a UN mandated and run peacekeeping
operation for the Balkans, which the ardent fundis continued to oppose at this point in the
debate. Even as it was not the best mechanism, such a solution would present the chance
for success in the region, especially since the tools the Greens preferred to use were not
available in the region. She even suggested the possibility of the deployment of German
soldiers for a UN peacekeeping mission, so long as they were not under NATO
command.104 By 1996, Beer was a step ahead of the traditionalists, but still remained
103
104

Ralf Beste, "Die Frau zwischen den Fronten," Berliner Zeitung, 26 March 1999, 5.
Angelika Beer, "Wie weiter nach dem 12.06.96 im ehemaligen Jugoslawien?," 3 July 1996, Bestand

236
primarily wedded to traditionalist ideas, even as the potential for her evolution out of
consciences reasons was apparent.
Overall, Beer's evolution in 1998-1999 rested on both the conscience and
strategic desire, though as Karsten Voigt argues, it was more out of consciences reasons.
In her own words, there was no "logical" nature to her development.105 Her statements
during the crisis routinely mention the plight of the people in Kosovo. In the Bundestag
debate just after the bombing campaign began, she noted the goal of stopping the
"continuing (anbahnende) humanitarian tragedy" in Kosovo as a primary reason for her
support to the campaign. Even as the NATO attacks did not create an immediate
solution, she foremost maintained her rhetoric to end the massacres.106
Intellectually, as part of the explanation for her change, she recognized the gulf
between strict pacifism and the protection of human rights: "Guarding the peace and
protecting human rights are two Green objectives that cannot be realized simultaneously
at this point."107 Her general acceptance of NATO, which she had strongly opposed even
a year earlier, evolved out of a conscience desire to end the suffering of the refugees in
Kosovo. From her perspective, by early 1999 only NATO's military pressure could
create the circumstances to achieve that goal. Indeed, even when she was criticized as a
"warmonger," she often asked rhetorically what other options were even available to stop
the crisis. Moreover, she also reversed her position on using NATO forces to secure the
peace when she supported the use of German forces for the quick reaction force
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deployment in February.

At the same time, likely as a compromise with her own

principles of non-violence, she publicly noted that the situation for Kosovo would be a
solitary instance and not be a precedence case for the further militarization of NATO.109
The dilution of her pacifist principles thus came largely because of a conscious choice to
view military operations as the best means to fulfill her desire to end the suffering in
Kosovo.
Even as the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo played a large role in the evolution
of her pacifist principles, she also incorporated a more strategic vision that supported
becoming and later remaining a part of the governing coalition. Though she remained
critical of NATO leadership and the ActOrd, suggesting it lacked a political concept as
part of the solution and that its goals were focused more on the prevention of refugees in
the rest of Europe rather than preventing the conflict, by October she began arguing in
public that it should now be a goal to distance the Party from the general rejection of out
of area operations.110 Moreover, during that crucial vote she publically noted that there
would be no efforts to prevent this deployment after the new coalition took power.
These positions were now clear reflections of her change to accept the responsibilities of
being part of the governing coalition.
When it came to the October 1998 ArctOrd vote she, like Volmer, chose the
strategic route of abstention. Even later as she constantly criticized the lack of a UN
mandate, she never actually officially opposed the Red-Green coalition's position. In
statements shortly after the start of hostilities, she recognized the Green Party's
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acceptance of its responsibilities, suggesting that a new responsibility that was previously
"unknown" in Germany's recent history had developed with this decision made by the
Red-Green coalition. By making the decision, she recognized that the Greens had placed
themselves in "full responsibility in the governing coalition."112 Indeed, one of her rivals
and arch pacifist Hans-Christian Strobele believed that Beer would never have approved
1 1 "1

the Kosovo operation had the Greens not been in the government.

Her decision

making process was beginning to reflect a strategic choice to accept the ideas inherent in
Regierungsfdhigkeit.
Even as her position on the war in Kosovo evolved, she remained critical of some
elements of its execution and the government's perspective. When Fischer originally
hinted at the possibility of using NATO ground forces in mid April, an idea which he
later backed away from, Beer strongly criticized him. Moreover, she rejected Fischer's
equating of the Waffen SS of the Second World War with Milosevic's forces in Kosovo.
Both criticisms aimed to reel in what she perceived as a potential extension of the goals
of the NATO attacks to include the possible occupation of Serbia, while at the same time
arguing for the increase of diplomatic pressure and options to end the fighting.114
Even more illuminating is her 11 April letter to the leadership of the Green Party.
She strongly argues the only alternative with the failure of NATO to have achieved its
objectives with military force and the situation on the ground worsening, was a return to
diplomacy. Importantly however, she still did not suggest a unilateral halt to the NATO
campaign as many in the traditionalist wing did; instead she argued for essentially a
reduction in the NATO demands for a conditional cease fire. Her conditions, which
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would be similar to the Fischer plan, were only that Milosevic withdraw from Kosovo,
the ethnic cleansing be ended, and all refugees be allowed to return. As she clearly
stated, an unconditional end to NATO's air campaign was "not responsible," as it would
only lead to the fulfillment of Milosevic's goal of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.115 Such a
perspective demonstrates a clear adaptation to the new position supporting the governing
coalition.
For both Volmer and Beer, their evolutions from the traditionalist perspective
toward a more realo point of view emerged during both the shock of the increasingly
worsening situation in Kosovo and the transition from opposition to governing party. It
is also clear that their changes came about as a mixture of both an evolving conscience
and the strategic calculations of Regierungsfdhigkeit. For Volmer, strategic decisions
were likely at the heart of his evolution; in fact it also appears that he internalized the
responsibilities of government more than others. Beer's change appeared based more out
of a conscious desire to prevent another humanitarian disaster, even if that meant using
military force.
That the Greens were able to remain in government for five years through several
other major out of area deployments strongly suggests that the swing group at the
leadership level accepted, if not internalized, the responsibilities of being a part of the
German government. As the later sections will clearly demonstrate, the swing group
would no longer be resistant to using military force. The rest of the Party, however,
would be a different story.
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Interparty Violence in Bielefeld
Whereas many at the federal level of the Greens had long been encumbered with
the burdens of strategy over conscience, the Party as a whole was essentially confronted
with this dilemma in May 1999 in Bielefeld for the first time. Bielefeld, the first Green
major Party Day held with police protection, would be the "nightmare of all Green
nightmares"—a Party Day held in the middle of a war during a Red-Green government.
Unlike the earlier major Party Day in Magdeburg, when the Greens were able to hold
onto their defining traditionalist principles in front of the looming election, Bielefeld,
building somewhat on the smaller Erfurt Party Day in March, would see the additional
pressure down to the grass roots of the newly minted Regierungsfdhigkeit. It would
demonstrate how split the Party actually was and without question represent their deepest
existential crisis. But by the end, it would also be a clear delineation of a "deep break" in
the Party's foreign policy stance.116
The atmosphere was "full of hate," according to Fischer, who bore much of the
physical brunt of it when he was hit in the ear by a large sack of paint hurled by a
protester. The proceedings were the "ground war in Bielefeld."117 At issue was the core
of the future for the Greens—traditional principles or the strategy of an evolved
responsible political party as part of a German government. Going into the conference, it
was quite unclear how the Party would vote.118 However, according to Fischer, and
borne out in contemporary accounts, the Party was well aware of what was at stake. The
debate was not about the deployment of German forces to Kosovo, for that could not be
stopped. Instead, it was about the future of the Red-Green coalition. The Party would
116
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have to leave the "sun deck of theory" where it traditionally resided, and accept reality by
giving up the principles of absolute pacifism if it wanted to remain in government.
Bielefeld would be a decisive zero hour for Fischer's future leadership in the
party;

he was fully aware that a failure would be disastrous. Fischer believed that the

Greens wanted to govern and Bielefeld would show that or it would be the end: "Now
[the Party] will be hardened or burned to ashes."121 His speech, filled at times with at
times testy exchanges with hecklers, was an impassioned plea to his party to give him the
strength to carry out his duties as a Green foreign minister and continue the Red-Green
coalition. It was a plea to accept Regierungsfdhigkeit. Anything but absolute support of
his position would leave him weakened both within the coalition and internationally.
Fischer was so convinced of this that he threatened to resign both from the government
and the Party if he were not given a mandate in Bielefeld.
He began his speech with a reference to the Greens joining the government amid a
clear understanding that war was a possibility. The Greens could no longer be a protest
party; it must confront the reality in the Balkans and act responsibly. The Party had a
responsibility to the government, and thus the state of Germany, to have total clarity and
support for this policy. He noted on several occasions his personal efforts to avoid the
confrontation; indeed, he highlighted the Rambouillet conference as a final effort of the
Greens to stop the war. He also reached for the ideas that would resonate most in the
Party—"never again Auschwitz"—when he argued that his personal decision was based
also on the barbaric and planned actions of Milosevic in Kosovo, a strong belief in the
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idea of "never again Auschwitz," and a desire to prevent a resurgence of war in Europe.
He firmly believed and clearly stated that traditional Green pacifism could not provide an
1 99

answer to the challenges posed by Milosevic.
Fischer's ideas were of course not shared by all, especially by the traditionalists.
For example, Annelie Buntenback, who would later be one of four MPs to vote against
the deployment to Afghanistan, decisively rejected using military force even in the face
of the catastrophe in Kosovo. Though not a feeling accepted by all, she also clarified her
desire to remain in the government and change its policy. This suggests that even for the
traditionalists, the idea of Regierungsfdhigkeit had some impact, though not enough to
trump their pacifist principles. The consummate pacifist Hans-Christian Strobele
passionately argued that NATO's actions had only worsened the situation. Another
traditionalist, Ulrich Cremer, called the results an "historic betrayal" of the Green
values.123
The fundi proposal for the Party's Bielefeld declaration had both significant
similarities and differences with the final declaration. It followed the final declaration
with the belief that using NATO had damaged the strength of the UN, the perception that
this was a precedent case, and the complete rejection of using NATO ground forces. It
also accepted that the brutality in Kosovo was similar to Bosnia and caused by Milosevic.
Unlike the realos and to a large extent the swing group though, the fundis now decisively
rejected using this as a reason for reducing the influence of pacifism in the Party, calling
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it "selective information politics." In other words, the traditionalists rejected the
facilitating norm of "never again Auschwitz" that had influenced others earlier.
There was strong reference to the ideas inherent in traditional pacifism in this
declaration. The authors believed the "dominance of military logic" was leading to the
disastrous potential of escalation in Kosovo and throughout the region. Extricating the
region from the "military spiral" was becoming increasingly difficult while combat
targets were becoming increasingly fuzzier; from their perspective it was the Green
Party's responsibility to build the peace. Moreover, the fundis argued that the military
actions were not only actually helping Milosevic to achieve his goals, but could not
prevent the catastrophe, a direct rejection of the central argument of the Green leadership,
the German government, and NATO. To escape this dangerous spiral and help the
refugees, they called for an immediate end to the bombing and a return to more
traditional methods of Green policy, such as sanctions and political negotiation. At the
most basic level, the fundis continued to believed that military methods could have no
success in Kosovo and only made the situation worse.

All of these perspectives were

quite consistent with traditional pacifism, which was devoid of the necessities of being a
regierungsfdhig party in the Red-Green coalition. Had this proposal been approved by
the delegates, it would have likely meant the end of the coalition, according to a
contemporary interview with Angelika Beer.125
Unlike the fundis, members of the swing group and the realos offered support to
Fischer. Volmer was a decisive ally of Fischer in this debate, pleading to the delegates
Berliner Zeitung, 14 May 1999, 2.
124
Claudia Roth, Christian Strobele, u.a., "Die Luftangriffe sofort beenden und mit der Logik der
Kriegsfuhrung brechen," Antrag 74, 2. Aufierordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 13 May 1999, AGG;
Rede von Annelie Buntenbach zur BDK von Btlndnis 90/Die Grttnen am 13. Mai 1999 in Bielefeld.

244
that they not undercut the foreign minister. In a personal exchange with one high level
fundi, he retorted that the Greens "must speak about real possibilities, not the reality in
one's head." He also drew considerable applause and public attention as he described the
Milosevic policy in Kosovo as "fascism," a close synonym to the ideals inherent in
"never again Auschwitz." Kerstin Muller implored her fellow party members to
understand that unilaterally stopping the war would not mean an end to the violence; for
her the memories of guilt on failing to prevent the tragedy in Bosnia remained fresh. The
realo Daniel Cohn Bendit argued that it was "perverse" to save traditional Green values
at the expense of the dying in Kosovo; action was required.126
With a vote of 444-338, Fischer and the governing Greens succeeded in passing a
Bielefeld declaration by a strong majority that first and foremost affirmed the governing
policy, giving Fischer a "free hand" to act.127 But it was also a document full of
compromises that spoke to many sections of the Party, simply accepting rather than
supporting NATO's attack. It even incorporated some ideas from the fundi proposal.
The clear winner was of course Fischer, but this declaration was also an indication of the
growing shift of the swing group, especially as those in the general membership of the
Party now supported those in the federal leadership, away from the traditionalist
perspective and toward a governing responsibility. It is also a very clear representation
of the Party's acceptance of the ideas of Regierungsfahigkeit over one of the most deeply
ingrained principles, even though it received only limited direct mention in the
declaration.
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The lengthy five page declaration

began with an affirmation of Fischer's

request for absolute support. The rhetoric of the facilitating norm "never again
Auschwitz" was very clear throughout the first few sections of the declaration, as the
Party recognized the importance of acting with military force amid the violent and
worsening "extermination and expulsion war" to prevent a repeat of the events in Bosnia.
There was no doubt of the "moral legitimacy" to stop the Milosevic's actions. Though
there was no clear statement that claimed support for the NATO military actions, the
Party did agree that the real blame for the need to use military force rested with
Milosevic, who had absolute control to prevent NATO from attacking by simply stopping
his war in Kosovo. There was some strong criticism of the NATO attack strategy, given
its lack of a decisive end after two months and the worsening conditions. Though by no
means a realo declaration, it was indeed strong enough to give Fischer the backing he
needed both to maintain the governing coalition and act internationally.
This support for Fischer, which was only a small portion of the declaration, was
tempered with a clear recognition that this situation should be an exception, rather than
the rule of Green foreign policy, a strong reference to the ideals of the swing group and to
an extent the fundis. The lack of a UN mandate and the belief that NATO would now act
without such a mandate in "exceptional situations" were both seen as particularly
troubling. The declaration reaffirmed the Green desires to make the UN the ultimate
purveyor of military power, while strengthening both the UN and the OSCE. Reinforcing
this idea was the suggestion that any follow-on force to secure Kosovo should not consist
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of NATO forces or any troops from those countries who participated in the attack, as
their use could "torpedo" the potential for a political success. Given the already deployed
and approved NATO forces stationed in Macedonia, it is unlikely that this proposal
would have been seen as possible; instead it was more likely an internal political
statement designed to assuage the traditionalists in the Party. This analysis is supported
by the later strong support the Greens gave to the NATO led KFOR just after the war.
A significant portion of the declaration also focused on the potential of the Greens
now that they were in government. Highlighting the failures of the Kohl government in
leading to the crisis and the successes of the Greens with preventative policies since
being in office received considerable mention. Further, there could now be no conflict
between the principles of "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz," but instead a
merger to develop a Green foreign policy based on preventive policies. The declaration
perceived a clear future for Green ideals in German foreign policy. Though not
specifically mentioned, this is the closest affirmation of the desire to remain in
government supported by the entire Party.
Perhaps the most interesting suggestion in the declaration came with the
perspectives on whether to halt the NATO bombing campaign. With 62% of the Party's
regional organizations at the time wanting an immediate end to the campaign and only
26% supporting a diplomatic solution, the challenge was clear.

While the realos had

not wanted to halt the campaign, the fundis wanted it stopped immediately. In between
and the purveyor of policy in this declaration was the swing group's idea to see a halt in
the bombing as a tool in the negotiation process. The declaration clearly rejected the
complete halt to the bombing proposed by the fundis; instead it argued for a unilateral
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"interruption" of the attacks to give the Serbs the chance to acquiesce to the ideas of
Rambouillet and increase the potential for a diplomatic end to the conflict. The goal was
to end the spiral of escalation that had been defining the conflict up to that point.
Contemporary accounts at the time suggested that this inclusion of a limited interruption
was representative of a change in policy, if not a break with the SPD.130 In fact, however,
the inclusion of this nuanced perspective into the declaration was a clear victory of the
swing group, showing just how differentiated from the traditionalists the group had
become with their inclusion into the government.
The Bielefeld declaration was at its core a reflection of the evolving Green party.
Whereas the governing members of the swing group, such as Volmer and Beer, had
already grown to support this policy, the Bielefeld conference was a vote of confidence
from the grass roots not just on Fischer's leadership, but also on the overall direction the
Party was moving. Despite considerable unhappiness among the fundis, leading some to
feel betrayed and even leave the Party,131 there was strong support for the new course. In
the end, the Bielefeld conference, held at perhaps the most challenging time for the
Greens, was an affirmation of the entire Party's desire to govern and influence events,
even at the expense of a purist interpretation of their traditional pacifist values.
As the swing group was the purveyor of change, Bielefeld was also an affirmation
of the policy of the swing group, in particular its new emphasis of Regierungsfahigkeit
over traditional pacifist principles. Indeed, MP Antje Racke was "relieved" with the
decision. As one of the leaders of the federal level, she had urged the Party not to play
"Russian Roulette" with the coalition, arguing that there was a greater chance for
Lersch and Schumacher, 25.
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influence as part of the government as opposed to being in the opposition. Andrea
Fischer, another MP, agreed: "This is a big step for the Greens to accept responsibility in
government, especially for what is probably the most difficult issue forus." ,JZ Bielefeld
demonstrated that a majority of the Party supported the idea of being in government, even
as the distance in perspective between the federal leadership and core elements of the
Party had appeared to be never greater.133 According to Volmer, the fundis were now
"fragmented." As Green MP Klaus Miiller suggested, this conference confirmed the
general support for the direction of the realo line. Only now, with the swing group's
adherence to the course, there were "left and right realos."134
Fischer's clear statement that a failure to adhere to the government policy meant
an end to the Red-Green coalition no doubt influenced the decision of some in the Party
to support the declaration. His leadership of the Party and their admiration for him was
clearly an enabling factor in this process. Without his diplomatic successes and strong
charisma, it is unlikely that support would have come so easily. But equally as important
was the potential to have a strong impact on foreign affairs. The early successes of the
Greens, with the Rambouillet conference and the strong potential of such diplomatic
initiatives as the Fischer plan to bring a political end to the conflict, offered clear
indications of their potential while in office, especially in contrast to the earlier
Magdeburg declaration that had all but rejected involvement. Indeed, as events in
Macedonia would later demonstrate, there would be considerable potential for these
ideas.
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PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT TO MACEDONIA

The cessation of hostilities in Kosovo did not mean an end to the challenges in the
Balkan region, as Macedonia soon joined the ranks of troubled countries. This time,
however, the West as well as many in Germany, and importantly many Greens, had
learned from the previous failures first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo and looked to quell
the potential for violence before it occurred. Over the course of several months
beginning in August 2001, Germany approved and deployed forces to Macedonia for two
separate military operations designed to prevent an outbreak of violence. Indeed, by 1
November Joschka Fischer argued that the successes seen in Macedonia would not have
occurred without the use of military force.135
The Green Party's debate surrounding the deployment of German forces to
Macedonia, though not requiring an in-depth case study here, warrants attention for two
reasons. First, it introduced the idea of prevention by military force, meaning the use of
military force to halt the possibility of a surge in violence. Though excepted by many in
the Party, this new concept still provoked enough debate and discord within the Party to
cause a problem. That dissonance eventually led to the failure of the first missionEssential Harvest—to receive a governing majority within the Red-Green coalition,
which set the prelude for the November 2001 vote of confidence that directly challenged
the traditional pacifists to choose between their values and continued participation in the
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government. Second, it provides a brief examination of the effectiveness of
Regierungsfahigkeit absent a direct shock, allowing an examination of the measure of
internalization of this concept in the Green security identity.
The first mission deployed, Operation Essential Harvest, was designed to be a
thirty day mission to disarm Albanian rebels in Macedonia such as the UCK, who were
willing to relinquish their weapons to NATO forces. Though the proposed operation had
the support from both sides in Macedonia, it lacked a UN mandate and would be
executed by NATO, two conditions that irked the traditionalists in both the SPD and the
Greens. As the crisis in Macedonia deepened and the vote on Essential Harvest neared,
the Party's leadership supported the idea inherent in this operation. The faction's July
2001 discussion paper argued that any German Bundeswehr participation was designed to
prevent a civil war. Unlike the Kosovo crisis, this NATO deployment force would help
to create a political solution sanctioned by a democratically elected government. As the
faction clearly noted: "The mission is to provide military security and organizational
execution of an agreed upon demilitarization." The leadership's official declaration later
that month noted that this deployment, again unlike Kosovo, was not a "combat
deployment," but rather a "peace enhancing" mission. Just prior to the Bundestag debate
in August, the Party's leadership element voted 10-1 to support the deployment and urged
the other Green MPs to do the same.
As the faction leader Rezzo Schlauch noted in August, many Greens supported
the idea of a preventive deployment as it was a means of security policy they had always
wanted—preventive politics. In a joint letter with Schlauch, the swing group adherent
Kerstin Mtiller also argued that this deployment was exactly the methodology proposed
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by the new Green foreign and security policy. Joschka Fischer would also agree, arguing
at a 22 December 2001 Bundestag session that the two Macedonia mandates were a
"success" of "preventive politics," an idea he had noted several times earlier. Winfried
Nachtwei, the consummate intellectual moderate in the Party, argued that the deployment
was "politically necessary" for the eventual stabilization of Macedonia.136 In the end,
there was a substantial majority within the Green Party federal level that supported the
deployment, adhering to the new concept of preventative policy.
Even as many in the realo and swing group portions of the Party supported the
deployment of German forces to Macedonia, the traditional pacifists among the
leadership and in the population still had their lingering doubts, though even this showed
a new evolution in their perspectives. Hans-Christian Strobele, the loudest of the group,
in an editorial in taz just days before the vote in the Bundestag argued that he would
support the deployment of German troops to Macedonia as part of Essential Harvest only
if there was a clear UN mandate. The declaration from the UN Security Council of 13
August did not have a UN mandate and instead left the duties to NATO, which
traditionalists still saw as an impediment to peace. Strobele believed that NATO could
not act neutrally within Macedonia and would actually make the situation worse. The
proposal also lacked political clarity and acted against the 24 June 2000 Green Party
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declaration from the Munster Party Day that held that the Greens would only support the
use of the Bundeswehr for peacekeeping missions under a UN mandate.
At the debate in the Bundestag over the deployment of German forces to take part
in Essential Harvest, seven Greens—Annelie Buntenbach, Winfried Hermann, Steffi
Lemke, Irmingard Schewe-Gerigk, Christian Simmert, Hans-Christian Strobele und
Sylvia Voss—entered a statement into the record that explained their reasons for
opposing the deployment. Primary among them were the inherent risk of traditional
escalation through the introduction of additional military forces, their belief that NATO's
policy was neither coherent nor believable, and because this would represent the third,
lasting NATO deployment in the region. Though they recognized the necessity of
disarming the UCK, neither the proposed deployment nor the planned political process
could be effective in their view.
In the end, the vote on Essential Harvest was approved with 497 votes in favor,
130 opposed, and eight abstaining. For the Greens, six MPs voted against and two
abstained from the vote, a far cry from the original ActOrd vote in October 1998. The
vast majority of the opponents, and the primary reason for the necessity of relying on the
opposition, came from the SPD with some minorities from both the CDU/CSU and the
FPD. Having to accept this settlement reduced the political effectiveness of the
governing coalition, a position the Schroder government would be loathe to repeat just a
few months later.
Amid the successes of Essential Harvest, a follow on action, Operation Amber
137

Hans-Christain Strobele, "NATO Einsatz in Makedonien widerspricht der Vernunft und Grilnen
Beschlussen," (sic) 25 August 2001, <http://www.stroebele-online.de/themen/krieg/913.html> accessed 2
October 2002. Those in the Greens who supported the deployment argued that the permission from both
sides of the conflict gave this deployment its international law mandate.

253
Fox, began a month later to protect EU and OSCE international monitors overseeing the
peace plan in Macedonia. The worldwide developments since the first mission, namely
the 9/11 attacks and the awaited American response, had shifted NATO's internal
priorities and led to a greater need for German participation as the British pulled out of
their leadership role in Macedonia. With this operation, Germany would for the first time
in its history act as the lead nation in a NATO led operation, contributing approximately
1000 troops. Unlike it earlier cousin, this proposal by the German government garnered
the support of 528 of the 578 voting members in the Bundestag, including large sections
of all the major parties. In this case, the Red-Green coalition was able to get a governing
majority.
Interestingly, the transition from Essential Harvest to Amber Fox brought more
support from the traditionalist Greens. Unlike the earlier vote, five of the Greens who
had originally opposed the deployment of German forces as part of a weapon-collection
force this time merely abstained from the vote that offered armed German combat forces
for the protection of international observers invited by the Macedonian leadership.
Though they saw the international resolutions as a positive step, the continued use of
NATO, and the perceived baggage it brought with it, was problematic. Three others,
including the arch traditionalist Steffi Lemke, supported the deployment, even though
they likewise opposed the use of NATO forces. However, they believed that this force,
with the strong international consensus from the new UN mandate, created the potential
for political success.139 The focus on protection as opposed to more combative collection
of weapons and the increased potential for political success, and with it de-escalation of
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tensions, this deployment was entirely more acceptable for even the traditionalists in the
Green Party. In some cases, that was enough to even change their votes.
The large support behind these votes, especially the latter, suggests that many in
the Green Party had accepted this new idea of deploying forces for preventative purposes
amid the substantial demonstrated successes. Winfried Nachtwei noted a year later that
"without this deployment" the partial disarmament would not have happened and the
chances for political peace would have collapsed.140 Even the small minority that
opposed Essential Harvest did so out of old fears of the escalation potential of NATO or
out of a disbelief that military forces could be a part of the solution as Schlauch and
Miiller had argued.141 With the Amber Fox deployment, even Strobele, who abstained in
the voting because NATO executed the operation, recognized the de-escalation impact
the OSCE observers had and the necessity of protecting them.
The second reason to examine the Macedonia debate was to look at the Green
party debate exclusively from the perspective of the impact of Regierungsfahigkeit.
Unlike the case of Kosovo or even Bosnia for that matter, there was no shock for the
Green Party to spurn its political decisions. The German deployments to Macedonia
rested not only on the prevailing concept of conflict prevention, which for the first time
had become an important component of Green security policy, but also on Germany's
international responsibility. Many of the Green leadership perspectives were steeped in
the rhetoric of responsibility.
Joschka Fischer saw Germany's engagement in Macedonia, including the
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deployment of military forces, not as an "abstract recognized concept of solidarity," but
rather as a part of the greater European Common Foreign and Security Policy. It would
thus be "highly counterproductive" if Germany were to renege on its responsibility to
participate, especially given Germany's continuing role in the further integration of
Europe, a remark that earned him an ovation not just from his own party, but also that of
the SPD and the CDU. Put succinctly: "[The deployment] is about our responsibility for
peace and stability in the Balkans and our solidarity with our most important partners in
the EU and the transatlantic alliance." That responsibility, from Fischer's perspective,
could not be ignored.143
Another direct argument for support of the deployment of German forces as an
aspect of its international responsibility came from Schlauch and Muller. In their
opinion, for a party with a growing interest and impact on international affairs, simply
leaving the hard issues for others was no longer possible. The Bundestag and its
constituent elements had to decide whether it would act in concert with other NATO
partners and share the risks. If Germany's opinion in international security crises was to
be seen as important, it, and by proxy the Greens, must act by supporting these military
forces. "The loss of meaning of German foreign policy in the event of a German
rejection [of the deployment] would be enormous."144 For them, this new international
responsibility also had a clear linkage to the potential influence for Green policies. By
now, it was thoroughly internalized in the swing group, as its use as an argument for
supporting the deployment clearly illustrates.
The few major Green opponents to the deployment did not heed any call of
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Regierungsfahigkeit, instead arguing that NATO would only make matters worse. From
their perspective, the UN was the organization that should collect the weapons and the
concept of responsibility still had no decisive pull for Germany when it came to the UN.
By the time the second vote for Amber Fox appeared, there remained no pull from the
pressure of government, especially as the coalition was able to secure a governing
majority.
Though Macedonia was in just about every respect a small element in the Green
learning process over the decade sine German unification, it nonetheless does offer some
significant insights. Though several Greens and a number of SPD MPs caused the
chancellor some heartburn by denying him a governing majority with the Essential
Harvest vote, the large majority of the Greens now accepted a new methodology for
potential humanitarian crises that included a positive role for the German military under
NATO command. With the follow-on operation that provided NATO protection of
OSCE observers and a new German military leadership of that operation, there was even
less resistance, as there was a tacit acceptance of this new role amid the demonstrated
successes of Essential Harvest.
Whereas the Kosovo conflict required the new strength inherent in the pull of
Regierungsfahigkeit and to an extent an external shock, the decision process for the
Macedonia challenge was in many ways a product of a more mature Green party actively
involved in international politics. The leadership had clearly learned that the shocks of
the past—namely Bosnia and Kosovo—should be prevented, rather than left to be
cleaned up after enormous devastation. The very idea of "preventive diplomacy" became
cemented as a cornerstone of the new Green security policy and in many respects,

Macedonia was both its first major trial and its first success.
The majority of the Greens, particularly within the leadership, now embraced the
concept of Germany's responsibility within the international sphere; it was significantly
internalized enough that the arguments by the swing group in favor of it were steeped in
its rhetoric. The Greens were now making sincere arguments in favor of accepting this
responsibility and highlighted the disastrous consequences should Germany renege, as
the vote on Amber Fox in particular shows. Compared to the Bremen Party day in 1995
and the Magdeburg Party Day in 1998 when the Greens rejected any German
participation in a peacekeeping force approved by both sides with the Dayton Peace
Accords,145 the acceptance of this deployment represents a major shift. Moreover, the
ability to affect Green policy goals in the international sphere though the Party's
leadership in the foreign ministry in particular, made the pull of the Regierungsfdhigkeit
concept that much stronger.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated several key elements in the Green Party's
evolution. First, as the purveyor of change in the Greens, the swing group's conscious,
strategic decision to govern, a part of Regierungsfdhigkeit, was a major factor in the
Party's overall shift in the use of force debate. Second, when confronted with the option
of remaining in government or holding true to their pacifist principles, both the federal
level swing group adherents and the Party as a whole chose to remain with the
government. Third, both the Kosovo and Macedonia challenges proved to be
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evolutionary in the overall Green concept of "never again war," as using military force,
both in coercive and preventative means, to achieve ideas inherent in Green foreign
policy became accepted.
The Greens' reaction to Kosovo, and to an extent the later Macedonia crisis, was
without question a further evolution of their stance in the use of force debate. This
chapter's examination of these crises clearly shows that the ideal ofRegierungsfdhigkeit
had a clear and definitive impact on the Party's perspective on the issue. Though the
external shock of the violence in Kosovo and in particular the massacre at Racak was an
important aspect of NATO's, Germany's and to an extent the Green's selling of the
military response to the events in Kosovo, its overall impact on the purveyor of change in
the Greens, namely the swing group, was smaller than that of Regierungsfdhigkeit.
As the Greens prepared to enter the governing coalition, it was quite clear that
they needed to change. Many realos possessed and demonstrated the will to govern; yet
the swing group, as aptly displayed during the Magdeburg Party Day, saw no need to
change before actually being in the government. Ludger Volmer's speech at the October
1998 debate on the deployment of German forces for the NATO ActOrd offers important
evidence in support of that fact. Yet, within a few months after taking office and after
being integrated directly into the government, many in the swing group began to change
their rhetoric and their viewpoints, as the discussion of Volmer and Beer above
demonstrate. Moreover, as the Bielefeld Party Day clearly established, when faced with
the decision to support Fischer and the Red-Green coalition or remain fixated on
traditional pacifist values, the Party as a whole chose to remain in government. In
essence then, there was a strategic calculation among all levels of the swing group that
Thomas Brackvogel, "Der geteilte Pazifismus," Der Tagesspiegel, 4 December 1995.

helped push them toward a changed perspective on the use of force. With the swing
group as the purveyor of change, when faced with the choice, the Party chose
participation in government and the influence it brought over principles of pacifism.146
At the same time, however, the acceptance of a larger role in the government and
by proxy Germany's international responsibilities did not mean a pure denial of "never
again war," but rather a re-codification of it within Green security identity to deal with
current crises. Though few in the Party wanted to bomb Milosevic, large elements of the
Party both accepted it and defended it at internal debates. There was both an acceptance
of the events, especially since nothing could be done to stop it, as well as a clear
evolution in the very concept of Green pacifism in the majority of the Party away from
the absolute forbiddance of using military force. Indeed, the large support within the
Party for the NATO KFOR peacekeeping force, despite earlier misgivings, similarly
suggests a strong evolution in the guiding principles of pacifism.
With this shift in perspective, the Greens were no longer simply interested in
limiting themselves to expressing their pacifist opinion as part of the opposition; rather
they were striving now to develop anew their ideas of pacifism and non-violence to deal
with the security challenges of the time and remain in the government. As Daniel CohnBendit, said: "We have to be coherent. We cannot say we are still against war and remain
in this government."147 Indeed, the events during the Kosovo crisis and the later
exhibition of preventative policies in Macedonia demonstrated a general shift within the
Party closer to the mainstream of German politics.
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This shift and Germany's participation in the combat action in Kosovo came with
particular influence in the diplomatic arena. As Peter Rudolf argues, Germany's
"steadfast solidarity" during the crisis gave the German foreign policy makers, especially
the Greens, the "credentials to make a comeback with innovative ideas." Less than a
year after the crisis, Volmer would recognize this idea as well, noting that the "Kosovo
engagement was the implementation of Green peace politics in a time of war."
Without the strategic, conscious desire to become a part of the government and have an
impact on both international and domestic events, it is doubtful that this evolution of the
guiding principles and with it international influence would have occurred.
Coming after two years of integration into the government and the already
significant influence of successfully imparting Green ideals of German foreign policy, the
situation vis-a-vis Macedonia demonstrated an adaptive capability in Green ideas. Both
the swing group and the realos supported the deployment as a new aspect of Green
foreign policy, even as enough traditionalist in the Greens and the SPD rejected it,
forcing the coalition to depend on the opposition to pass the legislation. With this choice
came an even greater acceptance of Germany's international responsibilities, even absent
a clear shock such as the violence in Kosovo, suggesting additional internalization of the
new concept on the use of force by many in the Party. It was the exemplification of a
learning process that began with the integration of the Greens into the government with
the Kosovo crisis.
This chapter has demonstrated the clear impact of the intervening variable of
Regierungsfdhigkeit, both as a conscious desire to join the government and thorough the
Kosovo-Konflikt, Treffen mit US-Prasident Bill Clinton," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 10 October 1998.
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integration of Greens into the government. It weathered the challenges of both Kosovo
and Macedonia, suggesting an internalization of the concept by the swing group, but not
to a full extent by the traditionalists, leading some to believe as late as October 2001 that
the Party was at best only "partially" regierungsfdhig.149 Some believe that the Kosovo
crisis marked the end of the Green Party's transformation cycle on the use of force, since
the pacifist elements were removed.150 However, the challenges amid the possible
deployment of German troops to Afghanistan after the shock of the 9/11 attacks would
belie theses arguments as the debate surrounding the war on international terrorism and
Iraq demonstrated the continuing differences even within the Green Party.
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CHAPTER VII
THE CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE

The tragic events of 11 September 2001, so often referred to in US literature as
9/11, were a clear shock that brought forth another wave of personal reconsiderations and
definitive policy requirements for the Greens that would test the limits of their
Regierungsfahigkeit. Reacting to this shock that played out on live television during the
early afternoon in Germany, the Greens both as a Party and as the coalition partner of the
SPD, were thrust again into the spotlight on the debate over the use of force that some
had, perhaps a bit optimistically, thought largely complete several years earlier. In this
new debate, the Greens would take another step forward that even the most radical of
Green realos would never have thought remotely possible even a few years earlier.
The highly emotional debates amid the Bosnian and Kosovo crises had beset
friend against friend and practically torn the Party asunder. Whereas Bosnia had led to an
evolution on the realo perspective amid the shocks of Srebrenica and the Kosovo crisis
led many in the swing group to change their views on the use of force out of deference
primarily to the ideals of Regierungsfahigkeit, the crisis after the 9/11 attacks would
challenge Has, fundi element of the Party. The debate over deploying German forces to
Afghanistan would force the fundis into a direct conundrum between the strategy of
governance and their traditional pacifist principles. Unlike Bosnia and to an extent
Kosovo, both independent variables will be clearly and decisively present here; however,
in the end it is clear that the latter, much like three years earlier, would provide the
primary influence.
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The evolution of the Green perspective after the 9/11 attacks flows through the
early rhetoric recognizing the shock and debating possible options, amid speculation that
Germany may deploy German combat forces in support of the US, to the clear political
choice that came with the Bundestag vote on that deployment in November and the later
Rostock Party Day. The debate evolved from an entirely changed perspective
highlighted by German leaders. Echoing German chancellor Schroder's argument that
9/11 was a direct attack on the entire western world that required new actions, Ludger
Volmer, still a senior leader in the foreign ministry, called the attacks a new "zero hour in
foreign policy" that was comparable with the end of the Second World War or the fall of
the Berlin Wall.1
The debate of speculation ended though with chancellor Schroder's
announcement in early November of the government's proposal to send 3900 German
troops to participate in operations against terrorism. Supporting the deployment of
German combat forces, to include some ground forces, to a theater outside of Europe
made supporting this vote even more complicated, especially as the traditional pacifists
remained sternly opposed to any use of the military in the Global War on Terror. The
linkage of the vote on the military deployment with a vote of confidence in the RedGreen coalition in November directly challenged the fundis in particular to choose
between voting their conscience of pacifism and continuing the Red-Green coalition.
Much like the situation during the Kosovo crisis, when elements of the Greens were
forced to choose principles versus strategy, this new crisis again brought the coalition on
1
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the brink of disaster.
Though the Green Party leadership did eventually form a compromise under
direct pressure for the November Bundestag vote that saved the coalition, the differences
between the federal leadership and the grass roots of the Party were substantial. The
rancor of the base, in particular at the Party Day in Rostock just a week after the fateful
vote of confidence, was considerable and rivaled that of the Party Day in Bielefeld in
1999. This Party Day also demonstrated that the Party's base, for a second time, choose
the ideas of Regierungsfahigkeit over principle. Despite this acrimony between the two
sides, there was still evidence that the majority of the Party had grown to accept military
force as a legitimate tool in international security, as its codification first at Rostock and
later in the 2002 base Program demonstrated. Moreover, the widespread support for the
ISAF also showed a greater acceptance of international responsibility.
Still, the considerable advances in the Green Party's perspective on the use of
force over the past decade were not an absolute acceptance of using the military in all
cases. As a brief review of the debate surrounding the run-up to the war in Iraq a mere
eight months later will clearly demonstrate, the Greens at all levels had very clear limits
on what they would support. Though their opposition in this case would in many ways
return to the basic principles of Green traditionalism, it would also not represent a retreat
from their earlier gains.
Before delving into this case study, one caveat must be stated. Unlike the
numerous source possibilities through access to archival documents for earlier portions of
this study, the documentation of the Green Party's reaction to the 9/11 attacks is
somewhat limited. The lack of internal communications and specific press releases that

tell volumes of the thought processes of individual members and are not usually reported
in the mainstream press does hamper the overall analysis. That said, by utilizing
speeches and press reports, a very reasonable perspective can be produced. With the
release of more resources later, this analysis can be further enhanced.
This chapter will focus on the influence of both intervening variables—external
shocks and Regierungsfahigkeit—to explain the Greens' choices in supporting
Germany's deployment of the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan. It will be divided into four
major sections. First, it will discuss the acceptance of 9/11 as a shock by the Party and
describe the general parameters of the immediate reaction. Second, it will discuss the
political debate surrounding the linkage of the deployment vote and a vote of confidence
that forced the fundis to choose between political strategy and principles. Third, it will
briefly discuss the Party's grass roots acceptance of the ideals of Regierungsfahigkeit
with their vote in the Rostock Party Day. Finally, over two short sections it will examine
two aspects of unanimity, the support for ISAF and the rejection of a war in Iraq, as a
demonstration of the overall evolution of the Party's stance on the use of force debate.

PRELUDE TO A COALITION CRISIS

While the SPD-Green coalition managed to weather the storm surrounding the
deployment of German forces in support of operations against Serbia in 1999, the
significant challenges associated with supporting German forces in Afghanistan stretched
the governing coalition nearly to its breaking point. The fears and premonitions of some
Greens, especially of the fundis, immediately after the attacks soon burst into outright

disagreement. As the American attack against al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan
evolved over October, those reservations again received attention in the public eye.
Unlike the earlier conflicts, where many in the Party could invoke already
ingrained beliefs to offer a facilitating norm to support the use of the German military,
most prominently the "never again Auschwitz" clause, the debate on the deployment of
German forces to Afghanistan lacked such a direct ingrained moral norm. Instead this
support for the deployment's facilitators rested along two primary axes—the new moral
imperative many felt to respond to the attacks and Regierungsfahigkeit at the November
2001 Bundestag vote, in this case the clear political desire to remain a part of the
governing coalition and continue to affect domestic priorities. This section will outline
the Green and to an extent the government debate from the attacks leading to the crucial
Bundestag vote.

The Immediate Reaction
That 9/11 was an external shock need not be debated here, for there is likely no
clearer example, perhaps even eclipsing modern history's other major shock—Pearl
Harbor. When al Qaida terrorists hijacked four commercial jetliners to use them as
kamikaze style weapons, the threat posed by international terrorism received a
personification that had been lacking in the past. As viewers across the world watched in
horror as the two World Trade Centers in New York City fell, as smoke poured from the
Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia and as the reports of the fourth aircraft crashing in
Shanksville, Pennsylvania arose, an already overwhelmed public was filled with a new
sense of shock.
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In Germany, the reaction was often filled with emotion. The German state and its
people rose almost as one voice in condemnation of the attacks and in sorrow for the
victims. German television stations interrupted scheduled programming, devoting the
evening to the situation in the US and scrolled news along the bottom or told viewers
which channels were carrying information on the events in the US. In a very telling
display, Germany lowered flags on government buildings to half-mast for several days.
Those feelings of the German government and television stations were soon
echoed among the population. Three days after the attacks, 200,000 people came
together in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin to express sorrow for the victims.
Berlin and local communities held vigils for the victims of the attacks. Memories of the
US support to Germany in the past were a common theme running throughout Germany.
Invoking the memories of US President John Kennedy's famous "/c/z bin ein Berliner'"
speech, chancellor Schroder publically suggested that in these dark hours, "we are all
Americans."3
That emotion was coupled with a feeling, even in first days after the attack, that a
political debate loomed. Leaders in the German government almost immediately
recognized that Germany would again have to address the possibility of the use of its
military. In a Bundestag session on 19 September, even the CDU faction leader Friedrich
Merz noted that Germany must now be prepared to go to "new and possibly
uncomfortable" places.4
The afternoon and evening of 11 September 2001 were busy for German
2
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politicians. In a speech only a few hours after the attacks, chancellor Schroder laid out
the guideposts through which Germany's security apparatus would view this conflict—
the attacks had been a "declaration of war on the entire civilized world." At the same
time, Schroder gave a hint of things to come when he declared "unlimited solidarity"
with the US, clearly noting this solidarity would require action.5 A "new world order"
had emerged that would bring a new focus on Germany's international responsibilities.
Indeed, as Bob Woodward has noted, Germany was one of the first nations to call the US
and pledge its desire to become involved, even with military forces. Interestingly, in this
case the US would actually withhold significant pressure, being very cognizant to avoid
asking for forces that Germany could not provide out of both domestic and materiel
reasons.6
The senior German leadership from the early days after the attack, however,
remained rather cautious with its rhetoric on the possible use of German forces in support
of the war against terrorism.7 Indeed, the first government declaration by the chancellor
before the Bundestag two days after the attacks did not even mention the possible use of
military force. However, in a more lengthy government declaration eight days after the
attacks, the chancellor mentioned that very possibility, though he attempted to push that
into the background by dwelling even more on the broader necessities of combating
terrorism through non-military means. Predicating it through direct linkages to the
4
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terrorist attacks, the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 that called international
terrorism a threat to world security, the invocation of NATO's Article V self-defense
clause that Germany had supported, and the inherent right of self-defense, Schroder
reiterated his claim of "unlimited solidarity" and for the first time argued publically that
Germany's response could also include military means. Indeed, by late September and
early October German flight crews on NATO AWACS aircraft were being deployed at
the US' request to help protect its airspace.9 Schroder's speech very matter-of-factly
outlined the direction Germany would follow—military operations were possible, though
it would only be one part of the overall effort.
Within the population, there was support for Germany's military option. In a
survey in Der Spiegel from late September 2001, 58% of the population believed that
Germany should participate in military action in the war on terror, despite the fact that
72% believed such action would lead to a further escalation. That support, however, was
only for limited military operations, as only 42% supported a "hard American retaliation
attack." Those numbers left considerable room for opponents of the military option;
indeed those pacifistic tendencies found public outlets within a few weeks, as the US
Embassy turned from a shrine into a place of protest for the peace movement.
It is important to note here that even as the German leadership began to suggest
the possibility of using German military forces, it also began to suggests some limitations
<http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_55757.htm> accessed 12 December 2001.
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on the extent of that support. Chancellor Schroder argued in that same 19 September
speech at the Bundestag that Germany was ready to undertake risks to fight terrorism, but
was not ready to go off on an "adventure."11 Though Schroder's original statement was
aimed at assuaging fears of a German deployment to Somalia, this mechanism
demonstrated its full effectiveness during the Iraq debate the following year, which will
be discussed below. As this situation brought the German debate on the use of force into
unchartered territory, the impulse towards anti-militarism would remain an important part
of the entire debate, despite the earlier advances, effectively acting as a hurdle.
Within a few weeks of the attacks, however, the prospect of paying, as Germany
had done during the Gulf War, was decisively and publically ruled out.12 The impending
decision would be on the extent, rather than the possibility of action for military forces.
As Germany's original call offering military forces suggests, the interests and desire to
participate were internally generated. Though no concrete numbers had been determined,
this decision, according to Ludger Volmer, was motivated by solidarity as a result of the
attack. Gerd Weisskirchen, an SPD Member of the Bundestag, agreed, suggesting that
there was a "deep conviction" that Germany had to support the US.13 In practically every
level, the debate on whether to use German military forces was internally driven, with
little overt pressure from the outside.
That internal acceptance of a necessity to participate was broadly supported by all
Germany," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (English version), 23 September 2001.
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parties except for the PDS.

In fact, following Schroder's 19 September speech, the

Bundestag approved with a strong majority a broad declaration of support by all parties,
though with some consternation within the Greens. The declaration, signed by the
Party's faction leaders expressed strong solidarity with the American people in the wake
of the attacks. Moreover, it accepted and supported the American call for a worldwide
struggle against terrorism and accepted Germany's responsibilities as a part of NATO.
Bowing to the concerns among many to avoid usurping constitutional authority, it
supported the call of "unlimited solidarity," but only in the context of planning. Finally,
the approved document also included the importance of providing humanitarian help as
well as political and economic measures to combat terrorism.15
A true display of compromise, the declaration nonetheless represented a broad
element of support by Germany's political leadership to take an active role in the struggle
against international terrorism. Though there was considerable consternation early on the
issue of legality,16 it would be the thorny issue of the use of German military forces in
general, however, that would be the primary obstacle for the governing coalition. The
challenges posed by the intra-coalition politics, in particular within the Green Party itself,
Volmer, interview by author; Weisskirchen, interview by author; Biermann, interview by author.
"Der Terror und die Folgen."
15
"EntschlieBungsantrag der Fraktionen SPD, CDU/CSU, Bundnis 90/Die Grttnen und FDP
zu der Regierungserklarung des Bundeskanzlers zu den Terroranschlagen in den USA und zu den
Beschliissen des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen sowie der NATO," 19 September 2001,
<http://www.spdfraktion.de/rs_dateiZO,, 1442,00.pd£> accessed 3 July 2007.
16
In spite of the fact that many recognized the responsibility to act in the context of Article V and in
response to the attacks, there was considerable concern from some political factions that Germany would
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would shake the German government to the point that some would even think of the
possibility of a Grand Coalition (SPD-CDU) in the face of Green Party debate.17 Within
the Green Party, rectifying the idea of Regierungsfahigkeit with the significant hesitancy
of its base toward the use of the German military would be the significant challenge.

The Greens are Challenged Anew
From the days immediately following the attack until November, when the
German Bundestag voted to support the deployment of German forces, a number of
issues played into the evolving debate within the Green Party on the deployment of the
Bundeswehr to Afghanistan. In particular the largely accepted idea of
Regierungsfahigkeit, especially the political reality of a Germany that was a responsible
member of NATO, placed enormous pressure on some sections of the Greens. The
public speculation as to whether the Greens could remain a part of the governing
coalition in the wake of their failure to provide the chancellor a governing majority in
support of the deployment of German forces to Macedonia to collect weapons just a few
months earlier, made this internal debate much more challenging.
The Green leadership recognized that there would be considerable intraparty
consternation and did everything possible to prepare the Party for the eventual debate. In
a speech before the Bundestag one day after the attacks, the Green Party chairman Rezzo
Schlauch argued that the great change the world experienced as a result of the attacks
would also bring a "great challenge" to the Greens.18 Fischer's 26 September speech in
den USA."
17
Regine Zylka, "Im Konzert der Grofien mitspielen," Berliner Zeitung, 18 September 2001, 2.
18
Rezzo Schlauch, "Erklarung des Vorsitzenden der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Grtlnen Rezzo Schlauch zu
den Anschlagen in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," 12 September 2001,

273

the Bundestag was more direct. Suggesting that the Greens will soon be confronted with
"difficult decisions," Fischer directly asked whether there was any alternative that did not
also include some form of military force, which could include German forces.19 Playing
out in special Party Days, in the press, and no doubt in private this debate would rival the
one amid the deployment against Serbia forces in 1999. Though Fischer this time would
avoid the pain of a physical attack, the verbal assault by some would make this situation
as challenging as the one a few short years before.
The majority of the Green Party accepted that the attacks were clear shocks.
Joschka Fischer, in a very truncated statement on the afternoon of the attacks, said
Germany was "stunned and horrified" and stood in solidarity with the victims and people
of the US.20 The leaders of the Green Party, Claudia Roth and Fritz Kuhn, noted a
similar emotional response to that elicited by Fischer in a letter to the American
91

Ambassador in Berlin saying that the Greens as a whole were "horrified" by the attacks.
The reference to the shock value of the attacks continued in the weeks that
followed. Speaking a week later from the Pentagon, Joschka Fischer noted that the
events had "deeply" shocked the people of Europe. For him, it was an "emotional
reaction" to a "criminal and mass murderous attack on open society." He also followed
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the rhetoric of the chancellor, claiming that it was indeed an attack on "all of us."
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July 2007.
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accessed 6 November 2002.
22
Press Conference at the Pentagon between Paul Wolfowitz and Joschka Fischer, 19 September 2001,
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_l l/state_dept_brief006.htm> accessed 19 June 2007.

the onset of his speech before the Bundestag on 26 September, Fischer noted that the
events of that day represented a "deep break into our everyday life."

Likewise, the

Green local leadership felt the shock and used similar language as the federal leadership.
For example, in a 6 October 2001 declaration the Berlin local council wrote that the
attacks were in "contempt of humanity and were an attack on the values of an open civil
society."24 Thus, from both the leadership level as well as the local, grass roots level of
the Green Party, it was quite clear that the shock of the 9/11 attacks had clear resonance.
Moreover, most also quickly recognized 9/11 had thrust a new security
perspective onto the world requiring a new policy from the Party. Ludger Volmer noted
on 19 September that that world had "undergone a radical change" and as a result the
Greens must develop a new security policy that recognized terrorism as the number one
threat.25 Two months after the attacks in a speech before the United Nations, Fischer
argued that the attacks of 9/11 "thrust a dangerous future upon the world" in which no
country would be truly safe from the dangers of international terrorism. This "eerie
danger" had "dramatically altered the foundations of security policy" within international
politics.

The Party leader and MP Claudia Roth similarly suggested that the Greens

needed to undertake an "offensive debate" on the means of combating terrorism. Even
Joschka Fischer, "Rede von BundesauBenminister Fischer vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 26.09.2001
zu den international Konsequenzen der terrorischen Angriffen in den USA und ihren Auswirkungen auf die
AuBenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," 26 September 2001, < http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/de/Aul}enpolitik/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=2120&bereich_id=17&type_id=3> accessed 23
November 2001.
24
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25
Zylka; Ludger Volmer, "Rede des Staatsministers im AuswSrtigen Amt Dr. Ludger Volmer zu den
Terroranschlagen in den USA und den BeschlUssen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen sowie der
Nato vor dem Deutschen Bundestag," 19 September 2001,
<http://www.documentArchiv.de/brd/2001/rede_volmer_0919.html> accessed 2 July 2007.
26
Joschka Fischer, "Address by Joschka Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Germany at the Fifty-sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," New York, 12 November
2001, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Rede/Archiv/2001/011112-

275

the Party as a whole recognized this change with the declaration passed at the Rostock
BDK in late November 2001.27
One of the early issues that the Green's quickly addressed was Schroder's
declaration of "unlimited solidarity" with the US. Many in the Party were harshly critical
of this idea, believing that it would lead to a required use of German military forces. In
fact, Fischer would avoid repeating this phrase, instead choosing to use the more limited
phraseology of being in "strong solidarity" with the US.28 Though it would soon recede
into the background of rhetorical history, the early Green criticism of this idea would set
the tone of their debate.
Two days after the attack the Green Party issued a declaration of the Special Party
Council that reflected a general political compromise. Unfortunately this simple
compromise belied the heated debate that was to come, as the resolution was a quick
statement rather than a policy guidepost. An agreement by the Bundestag group and the
party local leadership, the declaration condemned the attacks. Mirroring some of the
chancellor's rhetoric from 11 September, the resolution argued that the "cynical strike"
attacked the "values of an open society for which we stand." Moreover, the Council
"share [d] in" the solidarity with the victims and the American people and recognized the
UN's demand that those responsible be brought to justice.
Referencing the invocation of the NATO Article V self-defense clause from 12
Fiftysixsession.html> accessed 19 June 2007.
Bilndnis 90/Die Grtinen, "Internationalen Terrorismus bekampfen, in kritischer Solidaritat handeln, die
Rot-Grtine Koalition fortsetzen," 17. Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 24-25 November 2001,
<http://www.gruene.de/archiv/grem/bdk/01Rostock/bescluss/B-P-01.htm> accessed 6 December 2001.
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September, the Greens recognized they "could not oppose the employment of the jointdefense situation" and thus recognized that military force to some measure would likely
be used. Yet, in a clear return to the traditional escalation fears that had been resident in
the Green ideology since the Party's foundation, the declaration made it quite clear that
the Greens opposed the perspective of all-out war on terrorism as the US was suggesting
at the time. The Council feared that this could in turn incite the very violence that the
terrorists had hoped to stimulate. This early Green compromise recognized the principle
and the right of the US to respond based on the law of self-defense, but definitively
rejected any violence based on revenge. Importantly, though they recognized this right of
self-defense, the declaration did not suggest that the NATO Article V clause meant a
decision in favor of German participation in US planning or in the actual projected
attacks in response to 9/11, a rebuke of the "unlimited solidarity" argument. Germany
itself, through the parliamentary decision making process, would have to decide whether
it would want to partake in military actions.29
As the narrative that follows will demonstrate, this declaration was in fact not a
roadmap of the direction of the Party, especially that of the Party's Bundestag leadership.
It was both an acceptance of what many feared would eventually come and a voice for
caution of what could come. In fact, this declaration was more likely a representation of
general Green values, but was largely devoid of the political realities of government
participation.
Over the first two months the battle lines that would largely define the debate
were clarified. Traditional pacifists such as Winfried Hermann and Hans-Christian
29

Biindnis 90/Die Grttnen, "Resolution of the Special Party Council and Bundestag Group," 13 September
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Strobele argued from the very beginning that any military attack in response to the 9/11
attacks should be avoided. During the intervening decade since the Bosnian crisis, the
traditional pacifist argument had changed little and thus does not require significant
discussion until the next section. The fundi position would only become important when
their numbers in the Bundestag faction were enough to cause a crisis within the coalition,
as will be discussed in more detail later.
On both the realo and to a large extent the swing group side, the rhetoric focused
on the larger picture, in particular the importance of Germany acting responsibly in this
crisis to include the idea of utilizing the military component as part of the larger effort.
The Party's leader and Germany's foreign minister Joschka Fischer clearly had a
prominent role. He was in particular very conscious of the need to maintain German
responsibility within NATO and maintain that continuity the Red-Green coalition had
established after the Kohl government. As he noted four months after the attacks, not
participating with military forces would have "deviated from the line which can be said to
have run from Adenauer to Schroder, with dire consequences for our country."30 In his
26 September speech before the Bundestag, which gave an accurate portrayal of his
argument throughout this early debate, Fischer argued vehemently that Germany could
not ignore these attacks, in particular as these international dimensions of the terrorist
threat also posed a risk to Germany. Turning away would not bring an end to that threat,
but rather would be an "invitation" to terrorism. From Fischer's perspective, any
response to counter that threat would require the use of military forces.
Still, even throughout these first two months of the debate, Fischer often remained
close to his Green heritage for both political and personal conviction reasons, by aiming
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to address the challenges that led to the terrorist threat through non-military means.
Protecting human rights, the inequality created in the wake of globalization, and
European integration were never far from his speeches that also argued for using military
force.31
His belief in responsibility and using military force were often echoed by others
in the Green Party leadership. The Green Party redo and leader Fritz Kuhn argued that
Germany "may not avoid its responsibility." Ludger Volmer, who had been the leader of
the swing group, continued to speak clearly of Germany responsibility: "As an ally of the
attacked partner, we have not only the moral authorization, but also the moral and
political responsibility to contribute our capability to the defense" and bring those
responsible to justice.
Both Volmer and Muller, stalwarts of the swing group, also talked of the
possibilities of military actions in their 19 September speeches in the Bundestag. Volmer
recognized that such military strikes by the US would be "justified and unavoidable,"
though he also reiterated that these strikes would have to be targeted and limited such that
Afghanistan would have a chance for the future. Moreover, remaining true to his swing
group ideas, such military actions would not be as important as the political measure to
be undertaken later. Muller noted that "limited military actions may be necessary," but
also proposed a greater focus on civil conflict prevention measures to destroy the
30

31

Hrycyk, 4.

"Rede von BundesauBenminister Fischer vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 26.09.2001."
"Kritische Stimmen zu deutscher Beteiligung an Vergeltungsschlag," Netzeitung,
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structure of terrorism.
The focus on a mixture of military and non-military means as a response to 9/11
were critical elements stressed during a special small Party Day called by Green leaders
in early October to address the consequences of the 9/11 attacks. The leadership group
here recognized the need for force, to include the possible participation of German forces,
"in view of the terrorist attacks" and the invocation of NATO Article V. Importantly, in
a strong reflection of the evolution of the Party leadership, a proposal asking for the mere
"acceptance" of this possibility as opposed to support, was rejected. During the
conference Party chair Claudia Roth argued that no Green wanted to have war, but the
terrorist threat required that military actions, stopping short of revenge, not be taken off
the table.34 The re ah perspective along with that of some swing group adherents carried
strong weight and from all accounts appears to have take the plurality, though not a
unanimous perspective. Much like the earlier events in Bosnia, this declaration reflected
that the leadership was ahead of the rest of the Party.
Stuck in the middle, however, were a number of others from the traditionalist side
of the swing group, who followed a tentative line focused on the futility of military
involvement. They understood and supported the ideals of Regierungsfahigkeit and had
even supported the deployment of German forces in Kosovo; however, this debate was
well outside of their comfort zone. One of the leading members of this portion of the
swing group, Winfried Nachtwei, believed in addressing this threat with critical eyes
toward a solution. Decrying the possibility of "returning to the roots" of the Greens,
33
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Nachtwei argued that the continuing security problems required a new vision of Green
security policy. He strongly believed that the use of the military would not lead to any
success, but instead over time would be "less responsible and legitimate." Later, in early
November, amid the slow progress of the war in Afghanistan at the time, he would follow
that ideal calling for a rejection of any German participation in the operation there,
instead focusing on political dynamics as a means of reducing the tension.
Other Green Party staffs followed a similar argument in a position paper in which
they stressed using military force would likely worsen the situation as it would lead to
considerable escalation. Using military forces, moreover, could actually backfire,
creating more martyrs and in fact solidifying opposition to the US if civilians were hit.
These staffs advisors instead proposed a new strategy that focused on dialog, solving the
conflict in the Middle East between the Israelis and Palestinians, stopping the "war
economies" of weapons proliferation, and pushing for a "law based international order."
These two examples show that the swing group as a whole still had some pacifist
tendencies, though they remained in the minority. The majority of the swing group
supported the realo position.
As the US began its military strikes against targets in Afghanistan in early
October, the progress and methods of the campaign soon became fodder within the Green
debate. US military actions had always been a cases belli for criticism from the Greens.
As one party member noted, the greatest unease for many Greens was the fact that
support for deploying German forces was also a decision in support of an American
October 2001, 1; "Fischer: Grtlne mttssen Verantwortung annehmen;" "Griine beftirworten Einsatz der
Bundeswehr," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 October 2001, 2.
35
Winfried Nachtwei, "Afghanistan-Krieg—Innere Lage," 2 November 2001,
<www.nachtwei.de/terror/offener%brief.htm> accessed 15 October 2002.
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attack. Fischer called these attacks "legitimate," and "targeted." A declaration from the
Party's chairmen (Mtiller, Schlauch, Roth, and Kuhn) on the day after the attacks
likewise recognized the targeted nature of the attacks and noted they were also
"proportional"—a tremendous difference from the earlier commentaries in the wake of
the start of the Gulf War.37
After ten days of bombing attacks in Afghanistan, the German population as a
whole was expressing hesitancy in the wake of the developing humanitarian catastrophe
that was receiving considerable press attention. Importantly, over 90% of the selfascribed Green members argued for a halt to the bombing, relative to 57% within the rest
of the population.38 That differed significantly relative to Kosovo. By early November,
many Greens, including at the leadership level, were becoming more critical of the
American campaign in Afghanistan, especially the use of cluster munitions, and became
more vocal about a possible cease-fire. The leadership level was beginning to show some
cracks. Several federal level delegates, such as Roth and Kuhn favored a pause in the
attacks for humanitarian reasons. However, in a demonstration of the contention even at
the federal leadership level, a few days later Kuhn moved away from that earlier
perspective for undeclared reasons. Those on the left fringes of the swing group, to say
nothing of the traditional pacifists, also expressed discontent with the worsening
humanitarian situation amid the American campaign. Nachtwei went even further,
36
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suggesting that a halt in the attacks was called for not only out of humanitarian reasons,
but also to support a long-range solution to the terrorist threat.39
However, in a clear indication of the split between the majority of the leadership
and the base, an 18 October statement from the faction argued that a halt in the bombing
would not substantially improve the situation in Afghanistan as it was not the "decisive
hindrance" for the terrible humanitarian situation there. Joschka Fischer also rejected all
such calls, arguing that the continued rule by the Taliban was the "central issue"
preventing the distribution of humanitarian resources. As he clearly stated: "When one
wants to help the humanitarian situation, one should rather try everything to defeat the
Taliban regime quicker. I think in any case that the interruption of the bombing would
not help the humanitarian situation. It would only strengthen the Taliban."40 Despite this
outcry within the Greens, there would be not official Green or German argument for a
pause in the attacks.
In addition to these varied perspectives on the use of or effectiveness of military
forces before and during the US strikes in Afghanistan, early statements from the
traditionalists and that small portion of the left side of the swing group suggested a
considerable wavering on whether to follow their conscience or support the alliance and
with it the coalition. As early as a week after the attacks, the Suddeutsche Zeitung was
rhetorically asking whether the Greens could indeed remain in the coalition. By late
39
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October, as the Greens intraparty fractures were becoming even more public and well
before Schroder publically called for the deployment, Der Spiegel noted that the Greens
were fighting for their very existence in the government as their capabilities of serving in
such a dire situation continued to be questioned.41
In a preview of the more intensive debate in mid-November, the various factions
had in essence been staking out their perspectives on the dichotomy of supporting a
potential German deployment and adhering to their conscience. While realos supported
maintaining German responsibility, traditionalists such as Hans-Christian Strobele argued
two weeks after 9/11 that opposing the use of the military was more important than
remaining in the coalition. Green swing group leaders such as Miiller, however,
countered that the Greens as a whole should not "rob" themselves of the chance to
influence the deliberations, both internally and externally.

Volmer, in his speech before

the Bundestag on 19 September, took a similar approach, arguing strongly for the
continuation of Green influence and the Fischer foreign policy, noting that it was
showing some effectiveness in the near East.43 Angelica Beer, who had only slowly
accepted the course to governance laid out by Fischer, believed that there was no
alternative to using force against terrorists. Beer even paid homage to the traditional
pacifist, asking rhetorically where the Party would be without them, but at the same time
suggested that many of them, particularly as the base did not have the necessity of acting
for a state to guide them.44
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However, there were others on the traditional side of the swing group that
questioned this logic. Nachtwei strongly disagreed with Fischer's argument that
Germany's responsibility carried with it the chance of German participation. If it came to
a vote on German participation, the individual's vote should be based "not on alliance
loyalty or coalition discipline," but should be a function of conscience. The Bundestag's
vice president, Antja Vollmer held a similar position.45 In the end, however, as will be
demonstrated below, the swing group as a whole followed the acceptance of the use of
force based on a number of reasons, though largely due to Regierungsfdhigkeit.
By early November, the stage was set within the Green Party for a tremendous
debate. Fischer's adherents were strongly supportive of the use of limited military force
in the context of a responsible Germany, while the traditional pacifists were as adamantly
opposed to using military force based on their conscience. In the middle again was the
swing group, though the majority accepted the ideas of Regierungsfdhigkeit and some
had even moved toward the realo perspective in large part due to their high level
government positions. This time, however, it would be the fundis that would primarily
have to make the choice between principles and strategic calculation.

THE COLLAPSE OF A DREAM?

The German government's decision to deploy combat forces to Afghanistan was
pursued early on behind the scenes. From the days after the attack, Germany had
expressed its willingness to offer military forces to the fight. In early October, Schroder
45
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made it quite clear through direct discussion between his and the US National Security
Advisors, that he understood military forces would be a part of Germany's contribution.
In that same discussion, however, Germany noted that there were limits to that
participation—no German ground combat formations could be used in Afghanistan.46
On 6 November 2001, amid some of the hardest fighting in Afghanistan,
chancellor Schroder made what he called the "necessary decision" and proposed the
twelve month deployment of up to 3900 German troops in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom. Developed out of a request from the US,47 the proposal the Cabinet put
forward significantly noted that military action was "essential" to combat the terrorist
threat and prevent a repeat of the deadly events of 9/11.
In his speech before the Bundestag that day arguing for the passage of the
proposal, the chancellor spoke of Germany's responsibility as an international partner.
Reminding his audience of the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 1368
and NATO Article V, Germany would contribute its troops according to the idea of
collective security and its responsibility within Europe. This decision, moreover, was in
concert with Germany's decision to accept its "growing responsibility" in world affairs.
Importantly, Schroder noted that accepting such responsibility was "in Germany's
interest." The proposal did contain the important caveat that the deployment would be
46
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limited by what was "objectively possible" and "politically responsible." Its area of
operations, in reaction to the considerable fear, especially from the Greens, that German
forces could be deployed around the world, moreover would be somewhat limited to
prevent an expansion of its mandate.
Though the possible deployment of military force garnered the most attention in
his speech, Schroder also incorporated the need to address the problem of terrorism
through non-military means—humanitarian assistance and combating terrorist finances—
partly in deference to the Leftist portions of his coalition, but also in concert with general
Red-Green policies. Indeed, his speech laid out a vision for greater German involvement
that incorporated military means, but focused more on non-military measures.49 The
evolution reflected in this proposed deployment and greater involvement in a global
threat in essence expanded the very concept of German responsibility beyond the
confines of Europe to the world stage and to a large extent broadened the tools Germany
was capable of using.
The 3900 troops proposed for deployment consisted of 1800 Navy personnel that
would patrol the Horn of Africa and Mediterranean Sea, 250 medical and transport
personnel to move wounded from Afghanistan, nuclear-biological-chemical detection
"Fox Panzers" for Kuwait, 500 personnel for air transportation and 100 KSK Special
"Antrag der Bundesregierung auf Einsatz bewaffheter deutscher Streitkrafte vom 7.11.01," 7 November
2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_62015_1499.htm> accessed 12 October
2001; "Bundeswehr vor dem Einsatz—Interview mit dem Bundeskanzler in der ARD," 6 November 2001,
<http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/rede/ix_61999_1499.htm> accessed 12 October 2001;
Schroder, "Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zur
Beteilung Bewaffheter Deutscher Streitkrafte," 6 November 2001,
<http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_62094_1499.htm> accessed 7 November 2001.
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interest, arguing that only "military relevant" partners would have influence. See Gerold Buchner, "Nur
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Forces. Though the Navy would take on the majority of the burden, the Army,
especially the KSK and to an extent the Fox Panzers, would take on the greatest risk.50
Yet, Schroder took great pains to show there was little overall risk involved and that
German forces would not be partaking in combat operations. In a released statement, the
chancellor made it clear that it was important to him that German troops would not take
part in air attacks or be present as ground troops for operations against al Qaida and the
Taliban.51 Though Germany was deploying its military further than it ever had before
and in rather large numbers, its leadership took considerable care to avoid the message
that they would take part in active combat operations, which represented a significant
difference from the Kosovo operation.
The deployment of the KSK posed by far the greatest challenge for the coalition.
The possibility of a KSK deployment at the request of the US had been mentioned in the
press as early as October, but the government remained largely mute throughout the
debate.

Seen as one of the best in Europe and having trained with American and British

special forces, the KSK were the one group outside of US special forces that could bring
so much specialized capability. With 100 KSK troops slated to deploy, whose mission
necessarily could bring them into active combat situations, their addition to the deployed
German forces could potentially cause significant, if unspoken, problems for an already
shaky coalition.
Within three months of their deployment, however, and despite Schroder's
Beteilung bewaffheter deutscher Streitkrafte."
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promises to the contrary, it became public that the KSK were moving beyond their
police-oriented operations and were actively taking part in the anti-terror combat
operations against al Qaida in Afghanistan. Though it would be difficult to call the
comments after this public admission an outrage there was significant criticism from
members of every party. Within the Green Party there was no major uprising, suggesting
that there was some measure of acceptance. The Green pacifist Winfried Hermann
argued that the fact that the KSK was partaking in active combat operations should have
been made public, while withholding the specifics. Contrarily, the Greens' defense
expert, Angelica Beer, argued that any discussion on the KSK endangered their lives,
instead suggesting that a committee should be informed. The foreign minister followed
on this argument, arguing that the government was responsible for their security and there
should be little discussion about their operations.53
It would not be until late 2006, after allegations that KSK forces were involved in
inappropriate actions toward a detainee, that more Greens began to call for the end of the
KSK mission in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Party chairwoman Claudia Roth suggested then
that she would have rescinded her original vote in favor of the use of the KSK. Asked
about the KSK in March 2007, defense expert Winfried Nachtwei, however, argued that
given the numerous successes the KSK has had in protecting German forces deployed in
Afghanistan that they should remain, though with greater control from the Bundestag.54
It thus took five years before significant criticism from the middle, swing group elements
"KSK-Einsatz: CDU und Griine, rttgen Scharpings Informationspolitik," Netzeitung, 25 February 2007,
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of the Green Party began to exhibit itself on one of the more controversial aspects of the
original deployment, suggesting that even if the original deployment had only grudging
support, it was strong enough to last the negative publicity of alleged KSK actions a half
decade later.
The announcement of the proposed deployment, to include the KSK, to
Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 was met with widespread
support in general. Both parties of the opposition, the CDU/CSU and the FDP, supported
it and majorities in both the SPD and the Greens also pledged their backing. Only the
PDS, the successor to the East German Communist Party demurred. Within the Greens,
however, the Party stood divided55 and this division would be a critical area of interest for
the chancellor.
Within a day of the announcement, there was already considerable talk that the
SPD-Green coalition would not have enough votes to create a governing majority,
leading some in the Green Party to think the coalition may be approaching its end.
Indeed, Der Spiegel on its 12 November 2001 cover called it an "emergency" for the
Red-Green Coalition.56 Schroder, however, remained steadfast early on, believing that he
would attain a majority with the use of his own coalition, though he also predicated those
thoughts with the comment that such a result was his "expectation." However, those
expectations soon proved overly optimistic as within a few days, there were public
admissions of at least five coalition members of the Bundestag (4 Green and 1 SPD) who
3 July 2007.
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would definitely vote no on the proposal, and several others that might follow that part.
Within a week, the number of Green opponents had grown to eight.
From insider reports, the total numbers of defectors throughout the process from
the coalition numbered eight Green Members of Parliament and twenty to thirty members
of Schroder's own Party, suggesting there was considerable pressure exerted within the
CO

chancellor's own party.

Those numbers, even only the eight of 47 Green Party

members alone, were clearly enough that the chancellor would have had to rely on the
opposition to pass the measure, which would put him in a precarious political position
given his failure to achieve a governing majority with the vote for the deployment to
Macedonia a few months earlier, when nineteen members of his own party and five
Greens rejected the proposal. Failure to achieve a governing majority would mean that
he could no longer trust his coalition partners, thus inhibiting his ability to govern.59
Though the break of the eight Greens at the federal level was by far the most
public division within the Party, much like the earlier Kosovo crisis, there was also a
more refined, subtle debate occurring. Building off of the previous crisis, this division
would be the Party's "hour of reality." Each of the major groups had their various
opinions, though for the most part, at the federal level the division stood between the
traditional pacifists as well as some left leaning swing group proponents and the
Der Spiegel 46, 12 November 2001, cover.
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remainder of the MPs. The realist side of the Greens, for example the Green faction
leader Rezzo Schlauch, spoke of maintaining allegiance to the alliance, of German
responsibility, and of the dangers of terrorism. Others, such as defense expert and swing
group adherent Angelica Beer, accepted a "limited" deployment of German forces.
Ludger Volmer, who had only six years previously attacked Fischer for even
proposing that military force be used in Bosnia and had now moved more to the realo
side, supported Fischer's ideas of international responsibility, arguing for "continuity"
with the German growing international responsibility. From his perspective, the new
lessons of the past had now morphed into a necessity for international responsibility. The
Kosovo and Macedonia operations had shown the necessity of acting within that new
international responsibility and support for the operations in Afghanistan was no
different.
Yet there was also some clear hesitation by some in the swing group. One of the
leading defense experts, Winfried Nachtwei warned that "blind loyalty" was
"dangerous." The Bundestag's vice president Antja Vollmer, who had long been a part
of the swing group during the debate, and the Bundestag member Franziska EichstadtBohlig remained critical of the direction the Red-Green coalition had taken with this
decision. On the extreme end of the pendulum, the traditionalists, such as Hans-Christian
Strobele remained strongly opposed to any deployment of forces and would resist it, even
if it meant the end of the coalition.60
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Though the eight members of the Bundestag that opposed the deployment were
vastly outnumbered within the parliamentary group, they had considerable support
among the Green base. Approximately 70% of the regular Green members opposed the
use of German forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, by November only 24% of the Greens
supported the overall policy of "unlimited solidarity" that chancellor Schroder had
offered the US, a drop of six points from a survey done the previous month.
The majority of the Green county organizations were also opposed to the German
participation in Afghanistan, even in the face of the later linkage of the vote to the
confidence measure. A quick recount of a few traditionalist proposals for the Rostock
Party Day will give a good flavor for the base's disdain for the perspective deployment of
German forces to Afghanistan. The local group from Thuringen, in a resolution passed
on 8 November strongly decried any deployment of German forces. The group from
Ronnenberg, following a similar line, invoked an idea suggested by Strobele that this
vote and the possible support of military operations was not about taking part in the
governing coalition at any price; it was about the "believability" of the Party. In a very
radical approach, the local group from Hersfeld-Rotenberg argued that the Greens in the
Bundestag should leave the coalition if the 16 November vote supported deploying the
Bundeswehr. Another radical position from the Brandenburg group believed that the
Green Bundestag members should push the US and Great Britain to pay Afghani civilians
for any damages incurred from the military action.62
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That does not mean, however, that all county organizations were opposed to using
force, though those in the base that supported using the military were clearly in the
minority. In fact, in a 10-4 leadership vote, the Baden-Wurttemberg state leadership
organization issued a clear "yes" to supporting the deployment of German forces to
Afghanistan. The Gross-Gerau local group argued that not only were the US led actions
in Afghanistan legitimate, but these actions could also be the precursor for bringing in
much needed help to the Afghani people.63
The leadership of the Party was thus put in a very precarious situation, pulled
between the competing demands as part of Germany's ruling coalition requiring it to act
responsibly internationally and the necessity of maintaining its more traditionally
oriented membership base. In a declaration from 12 November the leadership ostensibly
tried to assuage some of those fears and laid out some guidelines for their decision to
support the proposal. Recognizing that this would be the hardest decision the Party has
ever had to make, that many in the Party and the population had rejected any possible
deployment, and the contradictory paths laid out before them, the leadership while still
pledging its solidarity to the US based on the 9/11 attacks, chose to practice "critical
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solidarity" instead of "yes and amen."
In a foreshadowing of the later Green leadership argument, the declaration
dwelled considerably on the value of the ideals of Regierungsfdhigkeit. As members of
the governing coalition, the Greens had to "vocalize and accept the doubts, insecurities
and criticisms" that arise if they are to advance the causes of the Green Party. And that
included the use of German military forces. The leadership appealed to the overall
political desires of the Party for the international stage, arguing that above all else, the
Greens should remain a part of the governing coalition. With a war underway, remaining
in power would allow the Green to exhibit significant influence and ensure that the war
against terrorism also included a "coalition for humanity." Remaining in the coalition
would also give the Greens, through Joschka Fischer, the opportunity to practice their
ideals of conflict prevention, in particular in the Middle East and in protecting human
rights in Afghanistan.
Much like during Kosovo, the leadership rejected the proposal for a cessation of
all military actions in Operation Enduring Freedom, given the rights of the US to defend
itself and the threat posed by terrorism. In a clear acceptance of their role as part of the
governing coalition, the leadership argued that the Greens had a "responsibility" to
"protect the population, international security, and the peace as well as the preservation
of an open society." At the most basic level, however, approving the German military
participation was "responsible;" not only was it the correct action, but by remaining in
the coalition, the Greens could also ensure that it was embedded in the "corresponding
political realm."
However, the declaration did lay out some conditions for their approval, in
2001.
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essence leveraging the precarious position that Schroder was in, to restrict the mandate
even further and at the same time make it more tenable to the Green's base elements.
The military was to be restricted from fighting all but al Qaida; the area of operations
would have to be limited; any changes in levels of participation or area of operations
must be approved by the Bundestag; and the government must keep the Bundestag
informed of all military operations.64
Overall, the declaration attempted to rectify the challenges inherent in being a part
of the governing coalition and the necessities of responding to the 9/11 attacks, while also
maintaining some of the philosophy inherent to Xhefundis and some swing group
adherents. The considerable attention paid to the benefits for advancing the ideals of the
Green Party through remaining involved in the coalition was a way of achieving that
goal. Moreover, by outlining demands for the SPD, some of which were later accepted,
the leadership was able to demonstrate the "critical solidarity" while also exhibiting the
clear influence that the Greens could have. As will be seen below, the declaration clearly
had some resonance on the Party and in particular within its dissenting members of the
Bundestag.
The Green leader himself, Joschka Fischer, also echoed many of the ideas
outlined in this declaration. In a speech before the Bundestag on 8 November, Fischer, in
championing the realo end of the spectrum, laid out his reasons for supporting the
deployment of German forces. His speech was given from the perspective of the position
of the foreign minister and vice chancellor of the republic, though it also invoked Green
64
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ideas as well. The decision at hand was a question of war versus peace. Though war was
"abominable" and Germans had a responsibility to avoid it, the necessity of responding to
the terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11, to include military force, was crucial—a
logical conclusion from his belief that it was impossible to negotiate with Osama Bin
Laden, as his continued use of violence meant that "dialog had no chance." Following
the logic that he had developed amid the Bosnian crisis and used later during Kosovo,
Fischer flipped the concept of "never again war" on its head and argued that acting with
military force to prevent violence, in this case the terrorist threat, was indeed justified.
However, any use of the military would be an "instrument" in order to make a political
solution possible.
Moreover, Fischer also exhibited the pull of multilateralism and German
responsibility, arguing that the "primary question" facing the Bundestag now, would be
whether Germany would leave its "most important partner," the US to fight against
terrorism alone, which would have significant negative consequences for German
security and capabilities. Following on much of his rhetoric from the previous two
months, Fischer was making a clear connection between this decision to deploy German
forces and Germany's evolved international responsibilities.
At the same time, Fischer also exhibited his Green traits. Germany, he said, must
endeavor to bring the methods of conflict prevention though conflict mediation and
addressing other "soft" issues to greater prominence in international affairs. The mantra
of the overall politic for the Greens would be prevention, rather than militaristic attacks.65
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His adherence to these values was a clear manifestation that he still retained his
"Greenness," though such admission surely were also aimed at the swing group and
leftist elements of his own party.
Unlike the two earlier Bosnian and Kosovo crises, this time Fischer did not have
the crutch of "never again Auschwitz" to use; instead he unapologetically did not try and
"sweeten" the situation. Fischer relied solely on the reasons of international order, selfdefense, and German responsibility within the alliance system.6

Yet, Fischer did have a

political weapon at his disposal, one that he had used with considerable effectiveness
during the Kosovo crisis—he threatened to resign, not just from the government but also
from the Greens if his Party did not support him. This threat, which many took quite
seriously, was offered amid the important intraparty meetings in early November when
the Party was debating its fate. Indeed, as Eckart Lohse of the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung argues, his resignation threat was an important reason why the Left of the Party
either moved toward the realo perspective or acquiesced.
While there was a majority of support among the Bundestag members, the eight
fundis that did oppose the use of force were boisterous within the press. The soul of the
leftists and a "stubborn man," Strobele, saw the war in Afghanistan itself as "false and
fatal." He asked rhetorically how many would have to die before the Greens would
return to their roots and stop any support for this war. The rigidity of coalition duties did
not appeal to the man borne of opposition as he remained true to the original ideals of the
Party. Winfried Hermann, who had also been a loud opponent to any military action
throughout the entire debate, believed the war in Afghanistan was illegitimate because of
Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ)."
66
"Abmarsch in die Realitat," p. 29.

298
its brutality.68
The eight parliamentary opponents69 penned a position paper on 11 November
outlining in detail their reasons for rejecting the use of force. Adhering completely to the
pure tenets of Green pacifism, the treatise could very well have been written during the
Bosnian or Kosovo crises as in the months after 9/11. From their perspective, the
military methods of waging the war against terrorism were ineffective and, moreover,
damaging to the civil population. Indeed, adhering to the traditional value of escalation
in Green Party values, they believed that any use of force would only make matters
worse, leading to a "continuation" rather than ending of the terrorist threat.
They then listed eight specific reasons why they opposed the deployment of
German forces, of which the primary reasons were; the war in Afghanistan could not
solve the terrorist problem; the goals of the military strike were unclear; there was no
post-Taliban political solution in place: there was a distinct possibility of escalation of the
conflict; and it could lead to greater support worldwide for the terrorists. Summed into a
single sentence: "The war against Afghanistan is politically false, does not serve the
targeted goal of combating terrorism, is humanitarianly irresponsible, and creates new
political problems." In practically a direct quotation from the early 1990s, the group
stressed that this deployment would lead to the militarization of German foreign policy.
This considerable and strong opposition within the Greens alone, to say nothing
of the challenges within the chancellor's own party, essentially challenged the leadership
67
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of the SPD and the Greens alike and threatened the very existence of the Coalition. In
order to bring the members of his own coalition into line, chancellor Schroder upped the
ante and on 13 November linked a vote of confidence on his leadership with the vote for
German participation. The linkage of the two votes dramatically changed the context of
the debate, particularly for the eight Green members who were planning to vote against
the use of force. If they followed that course with this new connection, the coalition
would collapse. No longer was a philosophical choice the only factor that needed to be
considered; there was now a real strategic, political choice to be made.
In linking the two votes, Schroder presented the opponents within his own
coalition with a choice—vote for the deployment of the German military or force new
elections, which the Greens were not expected to fare well in, even possibly falling below
the 5% hurdle required for entrance into the Bundestag. With the large majority
including the opposition supporting the deployment, failure to vote for the proposal
would mean not only an end to the coalition, but it would also not prevent the
deployment of German forces. This hard choice was clearly part of what Christoph Egle
called "learning under stress."

To have an impact and continue to govern thus required

a political decision that was diametrically opposite to the decision of conscience. The
choice was now about the Regierungsfahigkeit of the Party.
Schroder made it clear that if the Green Party wanted to remain a part of the
governing coalition, it had to support him completely on security questions to give him
the capability to act, both politically and internationally, when needed. Indeed, Schroder
23 November 2001.
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also emphasized to the Greens during direct talks the necessity of Germany expressing
solidarity with its NATO partners. He placed all of the burden for the future of the
coalition on the Greens, aiming at "disciplining" the Greens and forcing them to "renew
their commitment in the coalition and to the requirements of power." There was
considerable talk both within the press and behind closed doors that the idea was gaining
traction within the SPD to end the coalition and push for new elections.

In essence,

Schroder "attacked the Greens," bending their political will to his desires.72 Interestingly
the week after the vote, Schroder backed away from this rhetoric, claiming that the intent
was not to end the Red-Green coalition, but rather to create a "new dynamic [and] also a
new closeness."
Many in the Greens expressed dissatisfaction about the linkage of the two votes.
Indeed, almost every member that spoke or entered material into the record for the 16
November debate were opposed to the coupling. In the words of Winfried Hermann, who
opposed the deployment, the linkage was the "emergency brake" to save the coalition.
Steffi Lemke, also one of the eight public opponents, believed that the coupling of these
two votes was legally "acceptable" but was not done correctly. She sharply attacked this
choice, claiming that their separation could have led to a passage of both votes. Several
in the Green federal level argued against the coupling of the two votes saying that the
vote for the use of German forces was a "conscience decision," rather than a cold,
political calculation. Chrstian Sterzing and Ulrike Hofken similarly strongly opposed the
Greens.
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linkage of a "question of conscience and a question of political power." Gerald Haffner
believed their combination would have the "absurd consequence" of reducing the
seriousness of the conscious decision on such a difficult topic. In her speech before the
Bundestag, swing group adherent Kerstin Miiller, who largely supported the use of force,
argued that to force this debate into one between "power and morality" was both
"polemic" and disregarded those who struggled with the lessons that had emerged out of
the Second World War.74 Moreover, at the base level, outside of the reach of the power
of political decision requirements, some among the Green Party county organization saw
the linkage as "power politics extortion."
As the debate in the Bundestag with the linked votes approached, the vote on the
deployment of German forces was likely made a bit easier as the fighting in Afghanistan
waned. The very day that Schroder offered the vote of confidence, the headline just
under that article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted that the Afghanistan
capital of Kabul had just fallen to the Northern Alliance.

That the worst of the fighting

appeared to be over likely had an impact on the perceptions of those voting, though likely
only on easing the consciousness, as the hard political reality of preserving the coalition
remained the primary driving force. Indeed, Winfried Nachtwei, one of the Green Party's
leading international security experts, argued during the 16 November debate that the
proposal for the deployment only became acceptable to him with the improving situation
in Afghanistan.
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Despite the strong opposition in the base, the federal leadership of the Greens
overwhelmingly supported the deployment of German forces. Even before the linkage of
the two votes, 39 of 47 Greens supported this deployment. Just prior to the vote on the
linked proposals, the leadership issued a statement outlining their reasons for the
supporting the deployment that especially highlighted the Green influence on the
government proposal. In particular, the increased restriction on the area of Bundeswehr
operations to Afghanistan and an outline for the political goals of the war against
terrorism, which had been the reasons for the conditional support as outlined in the
leadership declaration of 12 November, had both been fulfilled. The leadership
highlighted both these changes as a "Green victory," which many members believed
pivotal to their support. Though the leadership respected the difficulty of the issue, it
asked that all members of the Bundestag support the decision.77
The debate in the Bundestag on 16 November was rambunctious to say the least,
as politics at all levels took to the stage—the argument between governing coalition and
opposition over control of the Bundestag; the intra-Green Party struggle over its possible
future; and the push by the coalition to save its own majority. The transcript of the
debate is filled with interjections and demonstrations of emotion. There were 77 written
declarations submitted for the record; of the 23 attached in the recorded record, 13 were
from the Greens. Both the CDU/CSU and FDP leadership made it quite clear in their
speeches that their parties supported the proposal to deploy the use of force, yet
interview by author.
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unanimously opposed the governing coalition.

The Red-Green coalition side, however,

was a debate replete with crisis. Both the speeches and the statements entered for the
written record provide considerable insight, illuminating the cantankerous debate within
the coalition. Moreover, the latter of these suggest that support for the deployment within
the Greens was not at the level suggested before the vote.
The chancellor's speech, echoed by the SPD party leader Peter Stuck, focused on
international responsibility, but began by highlighting the successes in Afghanistan with
the fall of Kabul, noting that the military successes had opened the possibility for
humanitarian assistance. Indeed, the first half of the speech was devoted to ideals that
were dear to many on the Left and were inherent in preventative politics and reducing
tensions in other conflicts such as that in the Middle East. Schroder directly alluded to
the politics of the time and explained the reason for calling the vote of confidence—the
"dependability of our politics" vis-a-vis the German people, Germany's European
partners and the international community. In that context, the deployment of military
forces was "necessary." Moreover, with this deployment, Germany would meet the
"expectations" of its partners in a "politically responsible" form. In particular, "through
this contribution, the unified and sovereign Germany meets its growing responsibility in
the world." Stuck followed that logic, arguing that avoiding these responsibilities would
leave an isolated Germany, which would be very damaging.79
The speeches of the Greens covered the entire spectrum of possibilities. All of
them resonated to one respect or another with Green ideas. Many who supported the use
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of force still pushed for strong humanitarian efforts and conflict prevention. No Green
spoke of an outright support to the US strategy, instead opting for "critical solidarity."
Moreover, all who supported it spoke of a "limited" military involvement, rather than a
blank check. Clearly, that demonstrates that although the Greens had undergone a
significant evolution over the previous six years, there will still vastly different from the
CDUortheFDP.
Kerstin Miiller, the Green Party leader slated to speak during the debate, invoking
the danger of new attacks after the shock of 9/11 and using language that would become
the mantra of many Greens, made it very clear: "Without limited and goal-oriented
military measures against the terrorist network infrastructure, Bin Laden and his
associates will plan and carry out new attacks."80 At the same time, she looked toward
the future influence Greens could have in foreign policy and the chances for a Green
based, peace movement that could have considerable effect in the international
community. Miiller also dwelled on the question of morality, believing that there was an
element of morality in the decision to be made. But whereas the Bosnian and Kosovo
deployments had been about protecting citizens suffering from genocide, that was not the
case here. Instead she suggested that in this case, the moral argument focused on the
struggle against "oppression, hate and violence," all of which were squarely in line with
traditional Green values.
Perhaps the most enlightening, and indeed most interesting speech, came from the
Green foreign minister, Joschka Fischer. Fischer did touch on the military deployment,
pointing out that it would help the situation in Afghanistan and spoke of the importance
Plenarprotokoll 14/202.
80
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of continuing the efforts to prevent future wars through non-military means, a
cornerstone of Green foreign policy philosophy. Yet, he chose largely to ignore the
tenets of international responsibility and focused on the accomplishments of the SPDGreen coalition and the potential of the Green Party to have continued influence. His
audience was not so much the Bundestag itself, as it was his Party. Indeed, Guido
Westerwelle of the FDP who followed Fischer at the lectern, called it a masterful "party
day speech."
At one level Fischer's speech focused on the challenge to Green governance
posed by the vote of confidence. Instead of trying to persuade what he called the
"pacifists by conviction," he highlighted the merits of the Green Party's domestic agenda
within the current coalition and offered possibilities of where it could go in the future.
Issues such as tax reform and the budget, normally outside of a debate on the use of the
military, were perfectly within perspective here. The current coalition had "decisively
renewed the Republic" and to ditch that on this vote would be disastrous. At the most
basic level, the vote was a "decision about the future of this country" and Fischer asked
for the trust of his fellow Party members. The foreign minister's choice to focus on
political and domestic politics clearly demonstrates that the Party leader wanted to make
this vote about domestic politics, rather than foreign policy. Continuing
Regierungsfahigkeit was the theme.
The written statements entered into the record provide further detail of those who
supported the deployment. Dr. Uschi Eid and seven other Green Members, who were
clearly attached to the realo camp, offered compelling reasons for supporting the use of
German forces. They expanded on Miiller's argument of the possibility of an expanding
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threat posed by terrorism, and evoked the potential of a weapons of mass destruction
attack or even attacks in Europe. In an eerie reminder of the argument that Joschka
Fischer made in his letter to the Party amid the Bosnian crisis in 1995, these authors
suggested that those who did not act would share in the guilt of future attacks.
Others, such as realos Volker Beck and Gerald Hafner, weighed in on the values
of a Red-Green coalition. In one of the longer written statements Angelika Beer, a very
vocal member during the debate, argued that her support for the deployment of German
forces was based on international requirements and an analysis of the current situation on
the ground. As she noted, "targeted military measures in the current situation are
essential." That said, she also expressed significant criticism of the way the US was
conducting the operation and believed that other methods should be used in concert with
the military measure. Nachtwei, who had only a week before argued against supporting
the deployment, noted that the de-escalation of violence and the clearer mandate the
Germans would have for the support of the post-Taliban process made his vote for
supporting the deployment more palpable.
These supporters also highlighted how remaining in the coalition had meant
influence on the current policies. The draft proposal circulated before the vote contained
many provisos that had many Greens concerned, among them the role of the KSK special
forces, the possible expansion of the mandate to permit operations in Iraq or Somalia, that
German forces may be placed under American command and maybe forced to conduct
operations outside of that permitted by the Bundestag mandate, and the possibility that
German forces would be used in air or attack functions. In a brilliant display of political
prowess and in fact helped by Schroder's use of the vote of confidence, the Greens were
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able to exact political changes that would have wide ranging repercussions on the
proposal. Indeed, largely because of the Greens, the mandate of the KSK was limited to
only police-military missions (e.g. hostage rescue or arrests such as had occurred in
Bosnia), the operating area for the Bundeswehr was limited and no German forces were
slated to partake in ground operations. Dr. Eid's group and several other Greens
referenced this specific success and the power that the Greens had as part of the coalition
as a reason for their support.81
This was a very crucial argument that many in the Green federal level made—as
part of the government, they had a much stronger influence in the development and
execution of German security policy. The idea of preventative security policy and
Joschka Fischer's strong initiatives in the first three years of the Red-Green coalition
were consistently mentioned by many during the debate. Moreover, as Joschka Fischer's
speech and the written declarations of Albert Schmidt made clear, the chances to further
the Green domestic agenda were now inexorably linked to the vote.
Though public reports before the vote for the most part suggested that the Green
Party was in fact largely unified with the exception of the eight fundi members, the
written declarations suggest there was considerably more opposition to the use of force.
There had been some speculation earlier that week that Fischer's threat to resign was in
large part due to some significant opposition in the Greens beyond the eight primary
81
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opponents.82 In her speech, Gila Airman rejected the German deployment, yet voted yes
to continue the coalition. Gritje Bettin also opposed the use of German forces, yet
"against her conscience and against her convictions" voted yes on the linked measure.
Moreover, in a joint declaration Christian Sterzing and Ulrike Hofken, who were also not
part of the publically admitted eight opponents, sharply opposed the war and its execution
by the US; they also firmly rejected the use of German soldiers in Afghanistan.
All of those in this position believed that preserving the Red-Green coalition was
more important than the "conscious decision" of rejecting the use of force. Indeed, just
two days before the vote, Eckart Lohse, the prolific writer on the Greens for the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, suggested that a large number of Greens, including
those who had their doubts about the use of military force, had come to the conclusion
that the Greens could do more in the coalition than if they were to leave it. Even Steffi
Lemke, one of the eight public opponents, recognized that this was the defining question
of the 16 November vote.

This opposition suggests that dissent within the Green Party

may have been more widespread than had originally been recognized and also that the
desire to maintain influence was a major factor in the Party's support.
The eight Greens who publicly opposed the deployment of the Bundeswehr
maintained their strict opposition to the deployment of the military while decrying the
linkage of the two votes. Steffi Lemke, the spokesperson for the group during the debate
in the Bundestag, argued that not only were the military attacks damaging to civilians and
were actually counterproductive, but the use of the Bundeswehr would be a "further
82
83

Lohse, "Was Fischer so in Rage brachte," 3.
Eckart Lohse, "Feste Umarmt," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 2001, 3.

309
decisive step toward de-tabooing military means."

Though no one, even at that level

wanted to end the coalition, for these traditionalist members the idea that war was
"politically irresponsible and humanitarian false" was the deciding factor, leading them to
argue for opposing the resolution.

The eight fundis held the fate of the coalition in their

hands. In essence, to maintain the coalition and thus salvage the domestic goals and
foreign policy influence of the Greens four of the eight would have to vote yes and
jettison their principles.
In the end, 336 MPs supported the resolution and the coalition survived. Of the
eight Greens who had earlier expressed their desire to vote against the German troop
participation, in a brilliant tactical political maneuver, four—Steffi Lemke, Annelie
Butenbach, Monica Knoche and Irmingard Schewe-Gerigk—voted for the chancellor to
save to coalition. To ensure that result, the eight Greens devised a compromise whereby
they would split their vote to save the coalition while still expressing their disdain for the
use of force. Thus the four others, Annelie Buntenbach, Winfried Hermann, Christian
Simmert, Hans-Christian Strobele, along with one former member of the SPD and the
entire opposition voted against the proposition.
Three of the eight publically announced opponents—Winfried Hermann, Silvia
Voss, and Irmingard Schewe-Gerigk—made written statements. Voss and ScheweGerigk both made abundantly clear their disagreement to the deployment of German
forces, but noted that there positive vote was to save the Red-Green coalition.
Interestingly Voss took special pain to ask for understanding from her political base,
which had written her asking her to withhold the confidence from Schroder. As she
84
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noted, it was a decision she made with a "heavy heart," but with a "responsible
consideration" of the question. Hermann spent considerable time explaining the
politically tactical maneuver that allowed the vote to pass and saving the coalition.
For these eight members, the only thing worse than the deployment of the military
was the possibility of a conservative government, as illustrated by the written statements
in the record. Even the arch-pacifist Winfried Hermann recognized that though many
were opposed to the war, the desire to save the coalition was stronger. As such, the eight
opponents, according to Winfried Hermann, made a group decision to ensure that it
would be seen as a collective action. As Steffi Lemke noted, the group "answered a
power question strategically, in that we say 'yes' to the continuation of the coalition and
'no' to legitimatizing of the Bundeswehr mandate." It was a political answer that the
Group believed was "very responsible."87 At the same time, in order to express their
displeasure, the eight MPs published their rejection of the Bundeswehr deployment in an
open letter.
The clear choice by the eight fundis of governance over principles represented the
culmination of the internalization the ideals of Regierungsfdhigkeit by the federal
leadership. The question they faced could not have been clearer and their decision was
equally as unambiguous. The earlier decision in the mid 1990s by first the realos and
later the swing group to vie to become a part of the government had now come to a full
resolution. Though the vote of confidence in the Bundestag was successful and the
Greens ultimately remained in power for four more years, this does not mean to suggest
that the Greens as a whole had supported the decision. The base had strong discontent
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with the leadership's decision, ostracizing the traditional pacifist left wing of the party,
even if there were few defections.

To codify that ideal more in the base of the Green

psyche would require bringing the entire Party together to discuss the issue in a special
Party Day; two years ago a similar event had practically brought the Party to its knees
and Rostock would be almost as contentious.

PARTY INFIGHTING IN ROSTOCK

The Party Day at Rostock from 24-25 November 2001 had originally been
planned to discuss the long outdated party base program, but instead it became a general
debate on the foreign and security policy situation after the 9/11 attacks. With 776
delegates and over 40 distinct proposals for the way ahead, the conference saw hefty
debate among all sides of the Party as the concepts of the use of military force in
Afghanistan and the desire to continue to govern as part of the coalition demanded a clear
position among the Party's base and its leadership. Indeed, as Joschka Fischer stated in
his speech, there was a need for clarification on the military issue; the base must also
accept its "responsibility" and make a decision or there would be no success in the
election in 2002. At the same time there was a distinct move within the BDK to define a
Green position for incorporation into its base ideals, rather than continually react to each
. .
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The speeches and the proposals from the debate provide an excellent window into
the various themes within the conference. Two of the Party's leading chairs—Claudia
Roth and Kerstin Muller provided an excellent tandem that explained both the case for
staying in the coalition and for using limited military force as part of Enduring Freedom.
It was a direct one-two from the leadership to the base.
Roth spent considerable time speaking of the need for and responsibility of the
Green Party in Germany—"Exactly now, we need the Greens." The very divisions and
debate that so many in the press lamented, she saw as a strength; the Greens have
evolved, but their basis principles remain. In particular, Roth focused on the influence of
the Greens in government and the potential for future accomplishments. They had
substantially limited the current deployment of German forces in the war against terror;
Joschka Fischer was actively engaged in diplomacy in the Middle East; and, importantly,
the Greens had significantly strengthened the German society domestically. The
coalition must be continued "because it is good for the people of this country." The
"critical solidarity" and using limited force in reaction to a threat belong to a new view of
a "world oriented" Green party.91
Muller argued passionately for never ruling-out the use of military force as a last
resort. The Green Party needed an answer to the threats posed by terrorism, in particular
how they proposed to stop it. In her view, and one held by a majority of the federal
leadership, terrorism could not be stopped without "limited and targeted" military force.
Yet, in highlighting the concept of "critical solidarity," she clearly noted that simply
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accepting the use of military force here does not mean blanket support to US military
operations, in particular if Iraq were to be attacked. Moreover, using the military was
only a last resort, as civil conflict prevention remained the primary method of the Greens.
With her reasoning defined and a long history of having to deal with an internal
crisis every time the use of force became an option, she forcefully asked for the party to
make a clear decision on the use of military force. Though she offered respect for those
who opposed its usage, she argued that to hold to that view meant a return to the
opposition.92 Though not directly stated, Miiller clearly argued that to be a part of the
governing coalition, the use of limited force must be an accepted practice.
Joschka Fischer, who, in a sign of reverence and respect, received a long standing
ovation from the delegates at the conference, asked his Party, much like he did during the
Bielefeld Party Day, not to leave him alone. Instead, they should offer their trust and
confidence in him and his leadership, which included accepting the use of force. Much
like Miiller, he pushed for a consensus within the Party, arguing that such a decision
would determine whether there would even be a Green Party in the future. Invoking the
concept of international responsibility and potential Green influence, Fischer argued that
as a part of the governing coalition the Greens could push for political solutions and
humanitarian help, but had "no other way" but to accept the use of force as a tool and
send German forces. Antje Vollmer criticized this perspective of Fischer's, suggesting
that Germany had now accepted a new military role. In her speech she asked Fischer
what the limits of this new role would be, a clear reference to the importance of defining
2001, AGG.
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the new basis of foreign and security policy.
For the traditionalists, Hans-Christian Strobele also receiving a considerable
amount of ovation from the assembled delegates, and Steffi Lemke renewed their
arguments that military force and German participation were not acceptable. Winfried
Hermann noted that he received considerable personal praise for his position during the
BDK. The war in Afghanistan according to Strobele had now evolved away from a
targeted strike against terrorists and was now focused on a state, causing considerable
damage to civilians, and was actually creating the grounds for an increase in terrorism
rather than defeating it. Moreover, he believed that the American leadership of the
military effort was "false." Though he did receive personal applause, he would find that
his argument would fall on largely deaf ears, overpowered by the desire to "accept" the
German deployment and remain in the coalition. 4
The over forty proposals presented at the conference fell generally into two
categories—the realo ox fundi perspective. The swing group's perspective, though they
may have been more critical on the military aspect relative to the realos, generally fell in
with that of their realo brethren. The fundi proposals followed the same traditional logic,
rejecting any use of the military in the war against terrorism. Many of these came from
the base, though they came with varying radical degrees. The realo proposals tended to
vary more than their traditionalist cousins, especially in the level of possible effectiveness
of military operations. There were no war-mongers within the Greens; the primary issue
to be decided here was the extent to which military forces, which all recognized could
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have a devastating impact on civilians, could be used against terrorists.95
The results of the debate and the votes were a surprise, as the leadership faction's
proposal received a significant majority, much higher than most had expected. The final
vote came down to two proposals from the realo perspective—that from the leadership
faction, which was eventually adopted, and one from Ralf Flicks. The latter, which was
considerably more focused toward an aggressive stance fell under the weight of the
compromised form of the leadership's proposal. In a clear rebuke to the traditional
pacifists, a proposal that rejected any form of military strikes did not even make it to the
second round of voting, meaning it had almost no support among the delegates. A
second fundi proposal that argued for stopping the attacks in Afghanistan and opposed
only the deployment of the Bundeswehr also received no majority.96 Such results clearly
dictate that after the shocks of the 9/11 attacks and building on the debates of the past
decade, the fundis, and as such the traditional roots of pacifism, had been drastically
shunned within the Party. A new perspective that accepted the multilateral use of force,
including German forces, had become acceptable to the majority of the Green
membership.
The leadership proposal that was eventually accepted as the four page BDK
resolution, entitled "Fight International Terrorism, Act with Critical Solidarity, Continue
the Red-Green Coalition," offered a relatively clear decision on the Green position on the
use of military force and German participation. As Winfried Hermann noted, this new
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perspective was in effect a new basis program for the Party.

The resolution began by

recognizing that several of the Bundestag members had voted for the coalition instead of
voting their conscience in order to prevent the collapse of the Red-Green collation.
Harking on the successes of the Party leadership in limiting the mandate to defensive,
police, transportation, and medical missions as well as the deployment location of the
Bundeswehr the resolution accepted "unfortunately" that military means must not be
excluded as a last resort, though the Greens remained a "military critical party." Though
it would not be able to take part in so-called "classic interventions," the Bundeswehr can
now participate in "protection" and "peace rebuilding" (Wiederherstellung des Friedens)
missions under a UN mandate. Importantly, the Greens now recognized the value of
using force at times. As the resolution noted, the Greens "now take note" that the US
military led attack had led to the collapse of the Taliban, enabling both the provision of
supplies to large portions of the population and development in Afghanistan.
Despite this new acceptance, the resolution argued that the Greens remained
wedded to the "pacifist tradition," though not pacifism itself. With a new, evolved
context of the security policy realm, they still had clear coals to establish—nuclear
disarmament, the end of the draft, an international law system, and addressing the
challenges of global warming. They would continue to push for international integration
and an end to political power politics. Moreover, the Party would continue to criticize
the US strategy in Afghanistan and work to prevent the escalation of violence in the
region. To continue to affect such policies required remaining in the coalition: "Also
out of a foreign policy responsibility, we do not want to surrender this country to today's
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98

Hermann, interview by author.
Interestingly there was no mention of the fact that under such a definition, the intervention to save the

317
opposition." In the end, the Greens would now accept a greater degree of responsibility
in the international realm, would protect the civil population, and work for protecting
international security, and use military force at times, though it would all be with "critical
solidarity."99
For the base, the reaction was a mixture of varying levels of support and
acceptance. Hubert Kleinert, the chair of the Hessen group, noted that with the
agreement that "absolute non-violence" could no longer be a part of the Green party, a
new clarity was required for the base Party program. Essentially, the new acceptance of
the use of military force must be codified in the Party platform, which would not happen
until the following year. On the other hand, Astrid Rothe, the chairman of the Thuringen
local group, who had clearly opposed the use of military force in Afghanistan, recognized
that the traditionalist perspective was now a minority position within the Party.
Moreover, he had to "accept" the result of the BDK and work to convince members of
the Party to stay rather than leave, especially in light of the upcoming election.100
Winfried Hermann disagreed with this perspective, instead arguing that since the BDK
was only a small representation of the total Party membership the wider base had a
significantly different perspective from that agreed to at the BDK.101
In the press, most believed the results were a clear indication of change for the
Greens. The large majority that supported the resolution and the fact that the
traditionalist proposals found no majority prompted the taz to claim that there was
"finally clarity" within the Party, as the Greens joined the other major parties in Germany
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in accepting military means as a "legitimate" method. The Tagesspiegel believed that the
long learning process that had brought the Greens to Rostock had finally ushered them
into the 21 st century. The Frankfurter Rundschau suggested that in their attempt to
change Germany, the Greens were inexorably changed with it. Tissy Bruns of Die Welt,
invoking the principles of international responsibility, argued that the Greens had learned
"under pressure" that governing a state such as Germany meant that it could not deny
alliance responsibilities; however, the party had not yet defined a new platform that
would codify these new lessons. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung's Eckart Lohse,
contrary to other commentators, believed that the Greens had not actually come to a clear
result, believing the final declaration was in fact more a political concession to prevent
droves of members from leaving.
The Rostock BDK does clearly represent the victory of the realo perspective
within the Green Party. That these ideas were later codified in the 2002 election platform
and the 2002 base program represents a significant step forward in Green Party thinking
and suggests that although the Greens will likely continue to debate any possible use of
coercive military force, there is now a greater acceptance of it as an aspect of policy.
Moreover, building off of the three years of participation in the German governing
coalition, the BDK here was one of the culminating events in the dwindling influence of
the traditional pacifists within the Party.

Indeed according to parliament member

Monika Knoche, with the BDK decision the Greens had ceased to be the "Parliamentary
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arm" of the peace movement.104 There was also no significant exodus from the Greens,
offering further evidence of an acceptance, if a bit grudgingly, of the necessity of using
military force by the base. As the Greens would remain in the government for another
four years, the BDK was a distinct codification of an evolutionary change in the Party's
perspective in reaction to a new world threat matrix and not the collapse of a political
party under the weight of its inherent, outmoded ideals.

SUPPORT FOR ISAF

As the combat operations against al Qaida and the Taliban shifted to the remote
regions of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the possibility of the deployment of a
peacekeeping began to take shape. By early December, as Germany hosted a conference
in Bonn on the future of Afghanistan, ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force,
became ever closer to reality. Eventually based on a UN resolution and undertaken under
the auspices of NATO it would be a peacekeeping mission designed to secure the newly
freed portions of Afghanistan. Very quickly, the possibility of German participation and
even leadership of the ISAF mission around the Kabul area received considerable
attention within the press.
From early December, chancellor Schroder argued that Germany would
"probably" participate in the deployment, as Germany did not want to "obturate" this task
and would wait for a clear definition on location and mandate from the UN before
making a decision. In the early discussions on the possible deployment, the two largest
issues that busied the political elites were not politics, but rather questions of execution—
104
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who would take leadership of the force and how could Germany pay for it? Germany's
defense elites argued that the leadership of the security force was "not Germany's task."
On the latter, Defense Minister Scharping had noted publically that Germany had only
"limited military means" in personnel, financial and equipment, especially with the
deployment of soldiers in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and for Enduring Freedom.
Indeed, Germany had "hardly any more capacity" to take on the leadership of the
ISAF.105
From the very beginning the proposal to take part in the peacekeeping force in
Afghanistan received wide support within all of the parties, with the exception of the
PDS. Even the arch pacifist Strobele said that this possibility was "by all means
possible" as early as the first week of December so long as it had a clearly defined
mandate. This was a stark difference from his approach to KFOR deployment in 1999.
Ten days later, he believed that these troops would have the right to protect themselves
under a Chapter VII mandate. Moreover, the eight Greens that had thrown the coalition
into chaos just a few weeks earlier thought positively of deploying peacekeepers. As
Strobele noted, this was "fundamentally something else" when compared to the
November deployment of German combat forces.106
Just before Christmas 2001, Germany offered 1200 personnel for the ISAF
contingent. In part because of Green proposals, though pushed by other parties as well,
the deployment area was restricted to Kabul and its immediate vicinity, though that could
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be expanded in cases of self-defense. Moreover, there would be a strict separation
between the peacekeeping operations of ISAF

and the continuing combat operations

hunting the Taliban. Germany also decried any possible leadership of ISAF, though that
condition would also later dissolve. In a tip to his Green brethren, the foreign minister
Fischer noted, Germany would work for the rebuilding of the economy, education
systems, and engage for women's equality.108
When the Bundestag debated and voted on the resolution on a special Saturday
session on 22 December, the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of deploying German
forces as part of ISAF. Of the 581 members that participated, 538 supported it, 35
opposed it and eight withheld their vote. Not one Green member voted against the
resolution and only four (Hermann, Knoche, Lemke and Buntenbach), all of which had
been a part of the eight earlier opponents, abstained from the vote.109
In the speeches before the Bundestag, Fischer noted the historic nature of the
moment that for the first time offered Afghanistan a chance. He paid special attention,
even publically agreeing with the CDU party chairman, to the fact that this situation
would not have been possible without the military defeat of the Taliban. It was
important, moreover, that Germany be engaged in this mission, in particular given its
responsibility to the UN and the necessity to provide humanitarian aid. Rezzo Schlauch
followed similar arguments, invoking Germany's international responsibility. He also
made note of the important restrictions of the mandate—separation from combat
operations against the Taliban, the importance of a Chapter VII mandate for self-defense
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of the soldiers, and that ISAF came with the support of the new Afghanistan government.
Strobele, the lone traditionalist to speak at the debate, argued that because the UN
would be overseeing the mandate and because he wanted to see the strengthening of the
UN, he would support the proposal. He also offered a strong clarification on the
differences between the vote of a month previously and that for the ISAF force. "We
decide her today not about the participation on a war, instead we decide today about
whether Germany and as such the Bundeswehr will take part in a deployment that serves
peace and should help the chances to secure a long lasting peace."110 Perhaps no other
statement could explain the clear differences that even these arch traditional pacifists saw
between coercive combat operations and peacekeeping operations.
Interestingly, the original restriction of no German leadership and a six month
limitation on the deployment were eventually lifted. By late January, the government
began to argue that leading ISAF was not something they were "aspiring" for, but it was
at the same time not "ruled out," even as few in the Berlin diplomatic circles felt the US
was pressuring Germany to acquiesce. By early March 2002, the Bundeswehr had
assumed tactical command of Kabul in an effort to assume "more responsibility" as part
of the ISAF leadership. The CDU MP Erich Fritz, however, argues that there was
significant pressure from outside Germany to take on a leadership role, suggesting that
after the shocks wore off, pressure from international partners was not absent. At about
the same time, Schroder also began to clarify that the mandate could be extended.111
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Even years later, after several extensions, numerous leadership rotations and a switch in
command to NATO, Germany remains part of ISAF as of 2007 and the Greens continue
to remain supportive.

THE GREENS AND THE IRAQ WAR

The decade of significant evolutions from the Gulf War to Afghanistan within the
Green Party were in a way brought full circle with the crisis prior to the US-led invasion
of Iraq in March 2003. Even before the ISAF was fully in place in Afghanistan, rhetoric
was already emerging from the US that Saddam Hussein would be the next target.
President Bush's January 2002 State of the Union address crystallized the apparent
intentions for a confrontation with Iraq, as it was the preeminent focus of this three
119

nations "axis of evil."

The evolution of the position of the German government and

the outright hostility from the strong majority of Greens toward a possible war with Iraq,
when seen in combination with a looming election the Red-Green Coalition was not
expected to fare well in, offer important lessons for understanding not only the German
evolution, but the limits and policies of the Green Party on the use of force.
Even at the early stages of the Schroder government, the situation in Iraq had
been problematic. Under his leadership, Germany chose not to participate in the US and
British bombing of Iraq in December 1998 for expelling UN inspectors. This time Iraq
and its defiance of the international community's regarding weapons of mass destruction,
however, was under the shadow of the 9/11 attacks, which had fundamentally altered the
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Bush Administration's perception of international security. Indeed, over the next thirteen
months the pressure would escalate, eventually embroiling the transatlantic alliance in its
most serious crisis.
In the early months of the crisis, there seemed to be some correlation between the
goals of the US and Germany, yet distinct opinions on how to approach the problem. As
early as November 2001, Schroder had attempted to discourage the US from attacking
Iraq, believing that it was not necessary. Both Schroder and Fischer warned the US that
expanding the conflict to Iraq would destroy the anti-terror coalition. Indeed, the
i n

chancellor even decried any talk of such a possibility.

In a February 2002 speech

before the Bundestag, foreign minister Joschka Fischer recognized the evils of Saddam
Hussein and his attempts to defy UN sanctions. He argued that Iraq must accept the
sanctions and permit UN inspectors, who had been thrown out back in 1998, to return to
Iraq.

Germany also supported the unanimous Security Council vote in November 2002

to force Iraq to disarm and open itself to inspections again. Whereas the US spoke of war
as a possibility, Fischer and other German leaders suggested that inspections, rather than
warfare, were the answer.
As the American rhetoric for confrontation rose, there was little appetite within
the Red-Green coalition for deploying German troops to the region. Yet, the chancellor
argued that this was not an abdication of Germany's international responsibility; rather
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Germany would continue to fulfill these obligations, but would determine contribution
based on what would be "meaningful and efficient" and "observed historical
sensibilities." Still, he also noted that fighting terrorists required continued cooperation
as a "trusted friend" under the guise of the United Nations. Throughout the first half of
2002, Schroder continually spoke of Germany's "responsibility for peace."115
By August 2002, the subtle differences in policy between the US and Germany
exploded into an active campaign by Schroder against the possibility of war. Faced with
election polls that were overwhelmingly predicting his defeat in the September 2002
elections, Schroder gave a speech at an SPD Party rally on 5 August proclaiming a
"German way" that rejected participation in any "adventures." He promised that
Germany would not support a possible war against Iraq with either money or soldiers.
Moreover, the Fox panzers stationed in Kuwait under the Enduring Freedom mandate
would also be withdraw in case of a war.116 Interestingly, Fischer attempted to convince
Schroder not to take this path not out of principled reasons, but rather out of the belief
that Germany would have to continue to work with the US to have an influence on the
evolving debate.'11
Schroder's strong change in position reached out to the majority of the German
population in an attempt to gain momentum for the upcoming election.

Indeed,
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throughout the crisis Germans overwhelmingly opposed any war against Iraq. In a
survey conducted in late September 2002, 97% of the German population expressed their
opposition to the participation of German forces in a possible invasion of Iraq. In
addition, 95% were against any type of coercive military attack.119
The opposition and some members of the press, however, greeted Schroder's
sudden change in August 2002 with criticism, rejecting this "German way," believing it
to be isolationist and harmful to Germany's predictability and reliability. Indeed, in an
op-ed article in The Washington Post, CDU/CSU leader Angela Merkel argued that
Schroder "does not speak for all Germans."120 However, the CDU/CSU was also quick
to avoid any appearances that they favored war, given the strong opposition among the
population. Eventually, the CDU/CSU chancellor candidate, Edmund Stoiber, publicly
expressed opposition to unilateral US action, even as his position on the participation of
German soldiers continued to evolve. On 29 August, he made any German participation
in a war against Iraq conditional on a UN mandate; two weeks later, however, he ruled
out any possibility of German participation.121
For the Greens, there was almost universal unanimity against a possible use of
force against Iraq and very strong opposition to using German forces there. In fact,
unlike the other instances—Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia or Afghanistan—the Green
discussion on the Iraq crisis was significant in that there was no debate on whether to use
military forces. Even amid the debates surrounding Operation Enduring Freedom, there
had been considerable efforts by the Green leadership to limit its mandate to prevent a
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possible attack on Iraq. Yet, even as they resoundingly rejected the military options, the
Party's position showed a developed confidence in their new security identity, as the idea
of diplomatic pressure for preventative diplomacy to reduce the threat from Iraq became
the centerpiece of their approach.
The traditional pacifists, such as Hermann and Strobele, were clearly opposed to
any use of military force in Iraq. Even those in the leadership and part of the realo
contingent also expressed significant reservations against the possible use of force in
Iraq. The new Chair of the Greens, Fritz Kuhn, called a potential attack against Iraq an
"adventure" as early as March of 2002. Angelika Beer, who had been a proponent of the
unlimited solidarity offered by Schroder in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, argued in
February 2002 that this solidarity did not include support for military actions against Iraq.
Instead, the risks posed from Saddam Hussein must be countered through the UN through
effective sanctions and the return of the weapons inspectors. Winfried Nachtwei, another
prominent security specialist in the Bundestag faction and proponent of the swing group,
likewise rejected the possible use of military force against Iraq, instead arguing for a
strong German role for conflict prevention under the leadership of the UN.122 By late
September, the Greens had decisively rejected any military actions in Iraq and forcefully
rejected any possibilities of any German participation.
Even the Bundestag faction of the Greens remained strongly opposed to military
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intervention against Iraq. In an August declaration, the faction made it quite clear that
they did not believe that an "imminent danger" came from Iraq. Though the faction
believed that Iraq had not fulfilled its obligations set out by the UN for disarmament, any
military attack against Iraq would bring tremendous risk to the region and indeed to
Europe itself. Instead, the faction argued for "continued patient pressure" to give
weapons inspections a chance.124 Moreover, the faction did not believe that any such
coercive attack against Iraq could lead to victory, especially without a clear political plan
for a postwar Iraq.125 Unlike in past events when the leadership often had a very different
opinion from the grass roots on the use of military force, in the case of Iraq, there was
strong unanimity within the Party's leadership as well to oppose any use of military
force.
With the majority of the Party firmly opposed to any intervention, it is perhaps
most enlightening to examine Fischer's perspective during this crisis. As the most vocal
supporter of using military force when required, the leader of the Party, and the purveyor
of the international realm in the Greens, his viewpoint will demonstrate important aspects
of the overall party position. His position was quite different from his past acceptance of
military force as a possible mechanism; for the first time since becoming part of the
ruling coalition, he found himself on the side of war opponents. Throughout 2002,
Fischer made it clear that an analysis of the threat emanating from Iraq did not warrant
using military forces. As he noted in one interview: "A military action for the purpose of
changing the regime in Baghdad in this region is incalculable."
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the threat did not warrant military forces, he did recognize that it must be confronted. In
a 22 February 2002 speech, he noted the brutalities of Saddam Hussein and recognized
that Iraq was still looking for ways to have the chance to create weapons of mass
destruction. His focus was on returning the inspectors to Iraq with unfettered access to
all sites, believing that would reduce the threat.127 Moreover, Fischer noted in September
2002 that there was also no need for a threat backed by military force to bring a change in
policy, as there had been in Kosovo. The threat situation vis-a-vis Iraq did not warrant
it.128 Thus, there was no reason for either a military attack or the strong military buildup.
Despite this clear opposition to any war in Iraq and especially any German
participation, the Greens voted against a proposition by the PDS during the final vote of
the Bundestag session to legally rule out any German participation in a war against Iraq
as well as any war at all against Iraq. Only the pacifist Hans-Christian Strobele chose not
to vote with the Party, instead abstaining from the vote on the PDS proposal opposing
German participation, while voting for the PDS proposal opposing war against Iraq.
Though supportive of the general nature of the PDS proposals, the rejection by the
Greens demonstrates a complete disdain for the absolute pacifism inherent in the PDS
while also recognizing the need to act in the international community by preferring not to
stake out such a clear position in legal terms.
In December 2002, Fischer caused a slight uproar in the Party when he suggested
that there was no way to determine how Germany would vote on any possible
forthcoming UN Security Council resolution on using military force against Iraq. Many
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Greens saw this as a change in policy, which Fischer and the chancellor rejected. Indeed
the redoubtable pacifist Hans-Christina Strobele argued at this point that Germany should
reject any possible use of force, even if it came with UN support.130 As it became
increasingly clear that war with Iraq was ever closer on the horizon, there was less
willingness even to talk of any possible support for using military force.
As the drums of war beat steadily closer, Fischer saw some successes through
international pressure in late 2002 and early 2003 that led him to believe the need for
military violence had been even further reduced. Indeed, at the well known February
2003 UN Security Council meeting, he suggested that although Iraq still had much to do
before being in compliance with UN resolutions, the threat from Iraq had been
"effectively reduced" with the return of the inspectors.

Even on the very eve of war on

19 March 2003, Fischer argued for alternatives to war, invoking Germany's experience
with the disastrous consequences of war.
There are a number of reasons why the Greens as a whole rejected the use of
military force to combat Iraq in 2002-2003. While the traditional suspicions of great
power politics from the US and the fear that military operations would only escalate
tensions in the volatile Middle East offer strong explanative power for the Green stance
here, it is useful to examine this case from the variables that had defined the earlier Green
support for the use of military force. In particular, what does an analysis of three of the
elements of change outlined in this dissertation—the presence of shocks, pressure of
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Regierungsfahigkeit in the context of international responsibility, and the leadership of
Joschka Fischer—provide to better understand the shift in the Greens' stance?
Unlike the previous cases, there were no clear shocks to spurn the Green Party to
rethink its values or adjust its parameters of decision-making. Whereas Srebrenica and
the 9/11 attacks in particular led to significant shifts in the Green Party, the absence of
such a shock meant that any Green Party decision in the case of Iraq would be based on
already existing normative perspectives, which in this cases were decisively opposed to
aggressive, unprovoked, or preemptive attacks such as what would be the case in Iraq.
Without a distinct shock to react to, such as genocide or terrorist attacks, the
feeling of urgency faded, especially as Germany had never viewed Iraq with any sense of
urgency. Moreover, while German leaders were able to overcome some minor public
disapproval of German deployment in the war against terrorism, the overwhelming public
disdain for any war in Iraq, let alone German participation, effectively limited the options
of the government, and the absence of any shocks prohibited any chance of real
evolution.
Much like the above absence of shocks, the involvement of the Greens in the RedGreen coalition did not exert any mechanisms of change and reevaluation. Whereas the
desire to become a part of the governing coalition in the 1990s had led to a fundamental
rethinking of the use of force, and the importance of remaining within the government,
exemplified by the support for operations in Kosovo and the clear political decision to
save to coalition in November 2001, the SPD exerted no pressure on the Greens to
change. Schroder's early rejections for German participation, hardened by his August
speech, meant there was no pressure to conform for the Greens and there was zero chance
amtde/www/de/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=4223> accessed 30 March 2004.

that the Greens would be influenced by the opposition. Indeed, by March 2002, Fischer
was already telling his Party that the Bundestag would never approve German
participation in an attack on Iraq.

Winfried Hermann, moreover, believed that had it

come to any form of German participation, the government would have collapsed,134
suggesting there was a tacit agreement even early in this crisis that a Red-Green coalition
could not even offer the possibility of German participation.
Internationally, moreover, Germany likely did not see significant forms of
pressure to fulfill any responsibilities. By August, Germany had gained the support of
France and Russia and as the American rhetoric towards war increased, others in the
international community also began to fall toward Germany's side. There was, however
some opposition from both within and without to Schroder's stark August declaration of
non-participation. Klaus-Dieter Frankenburger of the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung suggested that Schroder did Germany "no favors" with his German way. Giinter
Nonnenmacher, one of the five editors of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, argued that
lie

Germany had returned to the "role of a dwarf with Schroder's Iraq policy.

Former

Clinton advisor Ronald Asmus weighed in with a translated op-ed in the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, calling Schroder's policy a "new German irresponsibility."
Any pressure from the US became largely irrelevant after relations hit rock
bottom just before the 22 September election when the German Justice Minister
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reportedly compared the politics of George W. Bush with Adolf Hitler at a local meeting.
President Bush apparently took the comments quite personally and after Schroder's
victory in the election, in a major diplomatic snub, Bush did not call the reelected
chancellor. Several months later, in January 2003, US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld made the infamous reference to Germany and France as "old Europe" that only
cemented this negative personalization. In the end, this spiraling angry personalization
made the possibilities of any clear and resonant impact of possible pressure for the US all
but non-existent.
Internally within the Greens, there was also no enabler for change in the case of
Iraq. During the past seven years, Joschka Fischer's leadership had been paramount to
the evolving perspectives on the use of force for the Greens. But in this case, as Eckart
Lohse so accurately described, Fischer had returned to the side of the war opponents.
Whether out of political choices, which Fischer denied,137 or principled choice, it was
clear that Fischer's opposition to military action against Iraq prevented redirecting the
direction of the Party. Much like the lack of pressure from their coalition partners, there
was similarly a lack of pull from the Party's leader to move the Party away from an
entrenched position of opposition to a possible war.
From the Green Party's perspective, there were none of the forcing mechanisms
that had defined the evolutions during the Bosnian, Kosovo, of 9/11 crises. The
perceptions of a potential invasion of Iraq as a method of aggressive warfare created
harsh opposition in Germany and especially the Greens in large part due to already
ingrained norms and ideals. The Greens, and the Left in general, saw diplomatic means
as the primary method to counter the level of threat emanating from Iraq. In many
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respects, the Green Party's stance vis-a-vis the Iraq crisis was very much in concert with
its security identity that it had developed in the preceding decade; this case merely
represented the limits of the Party's stance on the use of force.

CONCLUSION

The shock of the events of 9/11 was an extremely palpable and emotional event
for all Germans. It brought significant and practically revolutionary statements from an
SPD chancellor and from his Green counterpart. The majority of the Green party indeed
recognized the 9/11 attacks as a clear shock that would transform their perspective on
security policy. Within a short time after the attacks, the potential for German
participation in military actions was at the forefront of debate and, in turn, again brought
forth one of the central challenges that had long plagued the coalition. That the coalition
had only months before failed to achieve its own governing majority on a vote on the
deployment of a contingent of German soldiers to gather weapons in Macedonia, which
had been at the behest of both sides and supported by the UN, made it even more
challenging.
The overall debate within the Greens before and during the vote in the Bundestag
provides considerable insight. Many, such as Fischer, Beer and Volmer, who supported
the deployment invoked the necessity of acting based on Germany's responsibility within
the international structures. For others, the importance of continuing the coalition was
critical. A key component of that desire to continue governing arose out of a conscious
decision the Party chairmen, Rezzo Schlauch and Kerstin Miiller, had taken to ensure that
Lohse, "PlOtzlich wieder auf der Seite der Kriegsgegner."
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Party remained focused on influencing the government course during the first three years
no

of the coalition.

Still, as the statements attached to the written record of the 16

November debate demonstrate, there was also some hesitancy within the swing group,
though they never publicly said they would vote against the deployment, suggesting that
even before the vote the strategic importance may have been overriding their strict
principles.
Several reasons led to the support by both the realos and the majority of the swing
group early in the process; both intervening variables of change were present here. The
reaction to new threats apparent in the shock of 9/11 and the requirements placed on
Germany through its international responsibilities, essentially a more mature version of
the Regierungsfahigkeit that had influenced so many during the Kosovo crisis, were
critical. The Greens also had three years as a partner in the governing coalition and had
some considerable successes in implementing Green policy that fostered a desire by
many, especially in the swing group, to ensure the continuity of the coalition. Indeed,
their involvement in government had a clear impact in this case on the mandate for the
deployment of the Bundeswehr, particularly in narrowing its location and mission.
Whereas the earlier debate surrounding the Bosnian and Kosovo crises had put the
swing group under fire, this occasion focused the attention squarely on the traditional
pacifists. There were eight fundi MPs that declared a resounding opposition to any use of
German forces in the fight in Afghanistan. The flop amid the Macedonia mandate
elevated this minor disagreement to a level where they controlled the fate of the RedGreen coalition. In this case, their strong opposition to the deployment was challenged
by the linkage of the deployment vote to a vote of confidence on the chancellor; they
138
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were forced to choose between continuing the government and staying true to their
conscience. In the end, a mutually developed political compromise to save the coalition
overrode the conscience-based opposition for the eight opponents. A similar decision
was supported by the Party as a whole in the Rostock BDK just a few short weeks later.
Taken in sum, this suggests that most in the Party would bow to the political needs of the
Party rather than the personal convictions of the individual—Regierungsfahigkeit was the
predominant influence when it came to a choice between strategic vision and pacifist
principles.
On the heels of the cantankerous debate in November came two instances of unity
in the Party. Despite continued clashes over using German forces in combat operations,
the debate about ISAF showed a very different conclusion—that a very majority of the
Party accepted using German forces in peacekeeping roles. In the December 2001 vote,
not one Green voted against it and in the renewal vote in mid-November 2002, there were
only one abstention and two votes against the proposal (Hermann and Strobele).

Even

this was a monumental change relative to the early debates that had resulted in the
rejection of the SFOR vote in the 1990s.
On the other end of the spectrum, there was also complete unity within the Party
for rejecting the US war in Iraq, to say nothing of any German participation. With no
shocks, no governance pressure, and no enabling leadership, there was also no pressure to
change the perspective of the Party. While the Party was willing to support deploying
combat forces to Afghanistan, supporting what the perceived as the aggressive pursuit of
national interests was beyond their established limits.
That the Greens, meaning especially the traditionalist wing, chose to continue the
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coalition instead of holding true to the mantra of "never again war" meant a clear
withering of the pacifist dictum in the Party. At its most basic level, amid the 9/11 crisis
the Greens were more for Joschka Fischer and the continuation of Green foreign and
domestic policy, than they were against the war.140 That shift in the overall identity of
the Party had some very clear impacts. In early 2002, the realos for all intents and
purposes tried to shut out Hans-Christian Strobele, one of the more vocal left wing
pacifists, from the upcoming September 2002 election. Only his direct election within
his Berlin district brought him back into the Bundestag. Some pacifists simply left the
party, though in small numbers, giving further indications of the changed nature of the
Greens.141
The change in the Greens' security identity, though, did not have disastrous
effects on the Green's electability, suggesting that the reasons for change had some
resonance within the Party's base. Though the memory of almost bringing the coalition
to its knees was recent, by the election in September 2002 that had largely been eclipsed
by the absolute rejection of any possible support for an invasion of Iraq. With Germany
again embroiled in a debate about a potential war, even the veritable realo Fischer this
time found himself opposing any potential invasion. In fact, after the 2002 election the
Greens had increased their percentage of votes from 6.7% to 8.6%, bringing eight
additional seats in the Bundestag.142
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The Green Party's reaction to the 9/11 attacks and its acceptance and codification
of a new, further evolved security identity suggests that the Green evolution may have
reached its apex. Yet, few would have fathomed even in 1998 that the Party would have
largely supported using German combat forces abroad. Given the varied threats in the
world and an every evolving security environment, it is difficult to predict what future
iterations of evolution, and possibly de-evolution could occur. With the departure of the
Greens from the governing coalition in 2005, the return to the Opposition could also
bring forth some changes. However, the evolutionary changes from 1990-2001 were
clear and undeniable and will likely remain a facet of the Green security identity.
This chapter has demonstrated the continued evolution of the Green Party's use of
force debate amid the crises in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Like the earlier Bosnian and
Kosovo incidents, external shocks, here the terrorist attacks, and the will to govern, most
poignantly displayed this time by the fundis during the November vote, were the
variables of change. With three years of successes in influencing the foreign and
domestic policy of Germany, the ideals of Regierungsfdhigkeit were now even stronger
than during Kosovo at both the grass roots and leadership levels. At the same time, the
absolute rejection of using force in Iraq demonstrated an apparent limit to the Greens'
evolution.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION—SHADES OF GREEN

A comparison of the platforms of the German Green Party from 1990 and 2002
shows nothing short of a complete reversal in the Party's perspective on the use of
military force. From a complete rejection of using any force to evict Saddam Hussein
from Kuwait in 1990-91 to a strong majority in support of the deployment of German
combat forces to Afghanistan in 2001, the Party's evolution has been one of continuous,
acidic debate and slow evolutions as opposed to revolutions. Decisive shocks in the
international environment, in particular the massive humanitarian crises in Bosnia and
Kosovo and later the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and, primarily, the conscious will to
become and remain a part of the governing coalition were the decisive variables for this
change. The end of the Cold War, to include the developing German international
responsibilities, and the dynamic Green leadership, moreover, provided two enabling
elements that provided the background and helped enable the two variables of change to
be effective. The decade long evolution introduced a new shade of green to the German
Green Party—olive green.
Though the will to govern was the decisive factor in the evolution of the Greens,
in fact, without both of them, it is highly unlikely that so complete an evolution would
have occurred. Looking at it from a temporal perspective, it is also doubtful that the
influence of the will to govern would have had such an impact on the debate without the
shocks in the Balkans first providing a reordering of internal priorities for the realos in
favor of "never again Auschwitz" over "never again war." The shocks in Bosnia and
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Kosovo were "milestones" for the Green evolution, as they caused significant internal
strife each time and gave reason for leaders to rethink their philosophical positions.1
Indeed, the very reaction to the three major shocks, Srebrenica, Kosovo (Racak), and
9/11, clearly demonstrated both of these aspects.
While the effect of the shocks were easy to measure given the considerable debate
and obvious shift in individual positions, the impact of the will to govern was not as easy.
What is clear, however, is the impact this desire to at first join the governing coalition
and later to remain in it had on the swing group during the Kosovo crisis, both at its
federal leadership and the grassroots levels, and on the fundis in the wake of 9/11. The
shift in perspectives and rhetoric during the Kosovo crisis from such key swing group
leaders as Ludger Volmer and Angelika Beer after they joined the government
demonstrated a quick acceptance of the desire to have influence and in turn the
acceptance of Germany's international responsibilities. Moreover, the very clear decision
by four of the eight fundis to vote for the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan in
November 2001 in order to save the Red-Green coalition offers no better example of the
pull of this will to govern. The choice of strategy over principles was quite clear in both
cases and gives clear evidence why the will to govern was the decisive reason for the
Green Party's changed perspective on the use of force.
At the heart of this support resulting from the will to govern by the majority of the
swing group and to an extent the fundi leaders was the SPD requirement outlined before
the 1998 election that the Greens must accept the use of German military forces to be
capable of governing in a Red-Green coalition. A clear path can be seen between the
German international requirements and the Greens' change in perspective of the use of
1
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force. The logic of appropriate action at the macro level dictated German international
responsibilities, while the priorities of the incoming SPD government in 1998 determined
the necessity of continuing these priorities including the use of German military force.
Thus, those who wished to join that government and have a degree of influence on
German policy had to accept these requirements, even if that meant change. The
weakness of the Greens electoral prospects in turn gave them little choice—either include
the use of force into a new concept of Green security or risk falling into obscurity.
Following symmetric mathematic logic then, the power of the logic of appropriate action
was linked directly to a distinct acceptance of the use of German military force in the
swing group and fundis. Regierungsfahigkeit thus had a distinct international element to
it.
The grass roots of the Party faced the same dilemma of principles over strategy
that the leadership did when Party Days were held both during the Kosovo war and just
after the deployment of German combat forces to Afghanistan. In October 2001 amid the
looming debate on the deployment of German forces, Joachim Raschke argued that the
Greens remained a party whose majority in the grass roots was intent on blocking
initiatives, intent to remain in step with their principles.2 However, much like the federal
leadership, they too chose to maintain influence rather than withdraw the mandate of their
leaders, especially Joschka Fischer. Though both conferences were extremely
tumultuous, and actually violent in the first case, the results indicate a general acceptance,
as opposed to an internalization, of the use of force by the Party's base. By 2002, in
direct contradiction to Raschke's argument, there was a clear consensus within the Party
that accepted the use of force in certain situations, suggesting that there principles could
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be overcome by a will to govern.
Over the course of this decade of change, the very idea of "never again war" that
had defined the Party's pacifist lexicon was redefined. As the Berlin Wall fell, this
concept had meant opposition to the use of the military at all for the Greens; by 2002,
however, it was a more relaxed definition, opposing only aggressive force, invasions of
another country, and in particular using military force to achieve selfish national interest
goals. No more was "war" as simple as before. Now, targeted military force, to include
both select combat operations and almost all peacekeeping operations, was seen as a
potential factor for good and not simply as a force of destruction. Indeed, by the end of
this evolution, German participation in peacekeeping missions had widespread support
within the Green Party, even among the arch pacifists.
A very stark representation of the overall evolution of individual members of the
Party can be seen with the evolution of Kerstin Muller. Originally harshly opposed to
Fischer's suggestion in 1995 that military force should be considered to stop the genocide
after the Srebrenica massacre, her position had shifted completely within six years.
Speaking at the Rostock Party Day in 2001, she argued that had the international
community acted as decisively in 1991 in Bosnia as it had in Macedonia in 2001, then
there would "probably still be several hundred thousand people alive."4 No clearer
statement of individual change represents the overall evolution of many in the Party—
from an absolute refusal to arguing for it as a means of saving lives.
By late 2001 at the Rostock Party Day, the Party chair Claudia Roth had clarified
the distinction between "repressive force" and "war," as the former came to be seen as an
2
3
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"aid," even though the latter was still widely rejected. The Party remained an anti-war
party, though it now was a party with "high peace expertise" (hoher Friedenskompetenz)
that recognized the potential positive influences of military force.5 Even the arch pacifist
Hans-Christian Strobele recognized this difference when he spoke about the deployment
of ISAF to Afghanistan in December 2001: "We decide here today not about the
participation in a war, instead we decide today about whether Germany and as such the
Bundeswehr will take part in a deployment that serves peace and should help the chances
to secure a long lasting peace."6
The result of the challenges faced by the Greens and their long learning process
was in many ways a re-codification of Green security identity in reaction to the current
environment. Pacifism, which had long been the defining theme of the Greens, had lost
its prominence as the casus belli of the Greens. Indeed, as the Party Base Program
approved with a strong majority noted: "We also know that the use of violence in
accordance with constitutional and international law cannot always be ruled out." With
the inability to provide any solutions to post Cold War crises, this traditional pacifism,
still locked as it always had been in the Cold War matrix, could no longer be taken
seriously.8
An integral part of this new version of Green security identity was a focus on
conflict prevention. Built on the same basic Green values, this evolved idea nonetheless
4
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began to incorporate this positive role for military force to achieve the traditional goals of
the Party. Ludger Volmer, in a speech on the foundations of German foreign policy in
November 2001 argued that Germany's participation in conflict prevention operations, to
include deployments of the Bundeswehr, was a "positive change" rather than a formula
for worsening the situation. The tenet of "never again war" could not simply be a
measure to hold back and watch as other take the responsibility to act, especially amid
such crises as in the Balkans and after 9/11.9 As Niki Kortvelyessy, a leading member of
the Brussels-based European Federation of Green Parties, noted as early as 1999 this shift
was merely an adjustment of means: "Our aims have not changed. The strategies have
changed."10 This new Green idea of conflict prevention that had solidified by the 2002
election was now a lesson from the sum of the entire German history, encompassing the
Second World War, the Westbindung of the Cold War and importantly the reaction to the
challenges that beset Europe and the world in the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Though it was quite clear that during the terms of this study, the Greens supported
or at least accepted the use of force, an important question that needs to be addressed now
is whether this new identity has been internalized completely or whether it was simply a
fleeting acceptance to maintain a role in the governing majority. To answer that question,
albeit only partially at the moment, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the path of the
Greens since they left the governing coalition in 2005. As events will demonstrate, there
would be a significant shift in Green Party's perceptions in the use of force.
Much like its predecessors, the 2005 election platform had a small focus on
foreign and security policy. The Party recognized the threats in the world, including
9
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terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and argued that it was no longer
possible to remain aloof from such challenges, which in itself was a significant change.
Moreover, the Greens also engaged for human rights, for example in the case of Sudan,
though there was no mention of the need for active military force. Though they firmly
rejected preemptive attacks, such as in Iraq, the Greens now clearly recognized the
positive influence German soldiers were having in both Kosovo and Afghanistan as part
of a force to reduce violence and build peace, even though there were no direct positive
statements in the election platform for OEF or ISAF. Finally, they pushed for the
continuation of the conflict prevention ideas that had been implemented under the RedGreen coalition.

Though clearly not as supportive of the use of force as the 2002

election platform, the 2005 platform does indeed suggest a continued acceptance of the
policies of the past few years, if a bit diluted. However, a bigger question would be how
the Greens would react as events in Afghanistan worsened and their memories of the
years in government faded.
As the Greens fell into the opposition, many of their key leaders had also left.
Joschka Fischer and Ludger Volmer left the Party; Angelika Beer moved to the European
Parliament. The result was a new generation of leaders that had not always directly
interacted with the defining events of the 1990s. As events in Afghanistan worsened and
amid the necessity of renewing the three German mandates for Afghanistan—OEF, ISAF
and a Tornado deployment for reconnaissance in support of ISAF—debate again rose
within the Party. There was still a recognition that the military had a role to play,
suggesting that the Greens had not reverted to the traditional ways of old. As Winnfried
11
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Nachtwei, one of the leaders in the security policy debate and an adherent to the swing
group, noted in March 2007 the fight against terrorism required a multi-faceted approach,
for which the use of military force was both "essential and necessary."12 Only this time
there would be much more considerable debate on the use of German forces in combat
actions, especially OEF in general and the use of the Tornado aircraft in particular.
In September 2007, the Greens held a special Party Day in Gottingen to discuss
the Party's stance on German forces in Afghanistan. Though much more divided than in
the past, the Party's leadership officially argued that all the Afghanistan mandates should
be extended. The most contentious issue though was the extension of the Tornado
deployment, which had been originally approved by only 26 of the 51 Green MPs in
March 2007. The Party Chairman Reinhard Biitikofer, who argued that to give up on
Afghanistan was "not an alternative," received both considerable applause and, like his
predecessors, loud protests. Despite his arguments, in a considerable blow to the
leadership, the Party's grass roots firmly rejected the extension of the OEF mandate and
argued for an immediate withdraw of the German Tornado contingents, though they
continued to support the presence of German troops as part of the ISAF peacekeeping
force.13
The Greens were now arguing for a "change in strategy" for Afghanistan. The
declaration, entitled "Military Escalation is not a Solution," argued that the war on terror
could not be won militarily, as events in both Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated. It
issued a "clear rejection" of OEF, arguing that it should be ended immediately as it
2007.
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hindered the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Moreover, the Party sharply criticized the
combination of the ISAF mandate and Tornado extension votes, arguing that the ISAF
extension was now a "hostage" to the Tornado deployment. Throughout the declaration,
there was particular concern of the increasing predominance of the military in
Afghanistan. If there was no evolution in this strategy, the Greens also hinted that all
German soldiers should be pulled out of Afghanistan.
The question then is whether these recent events actually represent a fundamental
change in the Green Party's position. The Suddeutsche Zeitung argues that the
declaration from the Party Day was in fact not a change in direction of the Greens, but
rather a way of the Party's grass roots to express their displeasure with the leadership.15
Yet, when seen in the context of the earlier positions in late 2001 and early 2002, it is
clear that the Party has changed its position, suggesting that the Green position developed
from 1990-2002 was not permanent. There was some clear backtracking away from the
2001 perspective on the use of force, perhaps in part due to the opposition to the way the
US was prosecuting the war in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Still, the Party Day's results continued to show a desire for engagement by the
Party and was not a complete rejection of the lessons learned earlier. The distinction
between the varying mandates was critical here. There was no doubt that strong
majorities of the Greens opposed the extension of the OEF; indeed the MPs unanimously
opposed the extension of its mandate in a November 2007 Bundestag vote. Yet, there
14
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was also strong support for the IS AF peacekeeping force to protect those rebuilding
Afghanistan. That continued support, in a distinct difference from the newly created Left
Party in Germany, represented a continued desire to continue to accept the responsibility
for Afghanistan, a point argued directly in the Green press release on the website.16
While it is clear there was a shift, the exact reasons for this change are not
completely clear. In the intervening six years since the attack, events such as the Abu
Ghraib torture scandal, the increased militarization of the conflict, and likely the fading
of the impact of the shock, no doubt helped to lead to a shift in perspectives in the
Greens. But important questions remain to be studied in more detail. What specific role
did being out of the governing coalition have on this shift? Did the lack of a dynamic
leader, such as Joschka Fischer, and new federal leaders change the dynamic of intraparty
relations? Was there a "reverse shock," meaning a negative reaction to military events in
Iraq and Afghanistan, that rekindled the pacifist norm within the Party? These questions,
in particular the first and last, offer extremely interesting areas for further research and
indeed a logical follow-on study.
This brief inclusion of the years since the Greens left the governing coalition
facilitates a clearer understanding of what the Green view is on the use of force, almost
two decades since the end of the Cold War. First, there is a clear acceptance of the use of
the Bundeswehr for peacekeeping operations, linking directly to the Green idea of
preventive politics. Second, the Greens absolutely reject any use of military force they
view as aggressive or supporting nationalist interests; their rejection of all actions in Iraq
clearly displays this limitation. Third, preventing genocide remains an important feature
16
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of the Greens, but unlike in Bosnia and Kosovo, there has been no argument to send
forces to Darfur, suggesting both geography and government participation remain
important factors in their choice to accept military force in these cases. Fourth, with the
recent shift, it appears that involvement in the governing coalition plays a key role in
leadership's perspectives on the use of force. Finally, as much of the evolutions emerged
out of reactions to decisive shifts in the international environment, the Green policy on
the use of force is not a concrete policy, but rather can still change depending on future
events.
The methods outlined here have been quite useful in explaining the evolution of
the Green Party between 1990 and 2002. The next step then is to look at other major
examples of historical change—at the political party, state, and systemic levels—and see
if similar mechanism of change appear. Applying these methods to study other states,
such as Japan or other possible hesitant partners, can be fruitful both for academics as
well as policymakers. One of the more interesting tangential ideas arising from this work
suggests that a political party can survive, if not flourish, even when the governing
leadership of a political party ignores its base on passionate issues such as the use of
force. A study of this concept in the context of the Republican and Democrat parties in
the US as they rush headlong into the 2008 presidential election could offer interesting
contrasting perspectives.
For the Greens, there are several areas that must be further studied. First, as more
archival records open, the internal mechanisms of the change during the late 1990s as the
Greens stood poised to join the coalition will be able to shed more concrete light on the
role of Joschka Fischer and the personal opinions on the importance of the strategic
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choice to govern in the personal decisions of many of the swing group. Second, it will
also be useful to move beyond the strict use of force debate and look for tangential effects
on other Green security policies. Third, to expand on a theme only lightly covered in this
work, in-depth research at the local level and how they perceived the dwindling power of
pacifism can more clearly demonstrate the level of acceptance at the grass roots level as
well as explain the continued Green success in elections despite the grass roots hesitance
to the Party's acceptance of the use of force. Finally, only as the years of the Red-Green
coalition fade into the background even further and future leaders emerge will the exact
level of internalization be clear. Though the years 1990-2002 will clearly continue to
resonate within the Greens for years to come, as they are now a part of the Party's
identity, only if the lessons of using force to protect the innocent or in active support of
self-defense outside of Germany continue to remain into the distant future, will the years
1990-2002 be seen as defining moments, rather than fleeting political shifts, for the
Green Party.
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